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Foreword

July I 8 J 6 final jurisdiction of non-federal litigation
passed from the Michigan Territorial Supreme Court
to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan . Then,
substantially as now, the Constitution provided: "The judi
cial power shall be vested in one supreme court, and such
other courts as the legislature may from time to time estab
lish." Mich. Const. I 835, Art. VI, §r. Those who are inter
ested in the judicial history of Michigan prior to I 8 3 6 are
fortunate in having access to much of such history contained
in the six volumes entitled "Transactions of the Supreme
Court of Michigan," edited by Professor William Wirt Blume
of the Michigan Law School faculty. Along with other inter
esting material, he has included therein and thus made avail
able some seventy of the opinions of the Michigan Territorial
Supreme Court. His present volume of "Unreported Opinions
of the Supreme Court of Michigan, I 836- I 843" brings to
light and for the first time makes accessible the Michigan
Supreme Court decisions therein contained which were ren
dered during the indicated period of seven years.
Contrary to the prevailing assumption among laymen and
some members of the legal profession, the Michigan Supreme
Court Reports do not (with a few exceptions) contain the
'·Supreme Court opinions which were rendered during this
seven year period from I 8 J 6 to I 843. This failure to per
. petuate opinions of the Supreme Court from I 8 3 6 to I 843
may in part be attributed to the fact there had been no printed
1� reports of the Michigan Territorial Court during the immedi
. � ately preceding period. Seemingly there was no orderly pro
� cedure adopted for permanent preservation of the Michigan
Supreme Coures opinions during the first years following its
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creation. Thus quite naturally such of the Court's opinions as
were reduced to writing found lodgment in diversified reposi
tories and often in obscure places. The fact that during the
noted period the Supreme Court held its sessions in various
localities doubtless was a contributing circumstance to the dis
appearance of many of its records. But since the informative
introduction to this volume by Doctor Clark F. Norton of the
University of Michigan so amply narrates the circumstances
which produced this hiatus in Michigan's judicial history,
there is no need of amplification in this foreword ; but the
circumstance is worthy of note as indicative of the value of
Professor Blume's present contribution to Michigan's judicial
history.
The authenticity of this volume's contents is vouchsafed
by the detailed references painstakingly provided by the edi
tor to many manuscripts, public records, etc. Readers of this
volume will find therein the earlier and probably the first
utterances of the Supreme Court of Michigan relative to many
interesting phases of our law. Suffice to note among them the
following:
Lack of legislative power to revive abated suits. Calhoun
v. Cable, et al. Jurors in justice court are judges of both law
and facts, hence it was error for justice to direct a jury in
matters affecting verdict. Burhans v. Reynolds. General ap
pearance in a civil case waives objections to process ; and de
cision by lower court on issues of fact will be affirmed though
not entirely free from doubt. Dorr, et al. v. Dreyer. A wit
nessed memorandum purporting to dispose of his property
approved orally by one in his last sickness, though not written
or signed by him, constitutes .a nuncupative will. Brewster, et
al. v. Hastings, et al. Receipt of security by an endorser of a
promissory note to indemnify him against his contingent lia
bility, does not waive his right of demand and notice. Brewster
v. Drew. Validity of a will requires that a subscribing witness
saw testator sign. McCall, et al. v. Hough, et al.
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In addition to the subject matter hereinbefore noted,
Professor Blume has preserved for us in this volume the
early rule making activities of Michigan State Courts. He
notes that at the outset ( I 8 3 7 ) the State Supreme Court
adopted the rules of the Michigan Territorial Court. And
by reproduction to some extent of the early promulgated
court rules, we are given the genesis of the exercise of the
rule making power by the judicial branch of our State gov
ernment, thereby seeming to exemplify the fact that this is
an inherent power of Michigan's judiciary.
The compiler of this volume has, as it were, saved from
complete loss much of the subject matter presented. By its
perusal the reader can gain a closer touch with the manner
in which cases were presented in the State Supreme Court by
early and noted practitioners, among them such outstanding
members of the legal profession as Henry M. Walker, Al
pheus Felch, E. Burke Harrington, G. E. Hand, B. F . H.
Witherell, E. Farnsworth, and Samuel T. Douglass.
In this volume and the preceding volumes of "Transac
tions of the Supreme Court of Michigan" we seemingly have
as complete an assemblage of the record from I 805 to I 843
of both the Michigan Territorial Court and the Michigan
State Supreme Court as could well be accomplished. These
volumes are a merited tribute to the patience, industry and
ingenuity of Professor Blume, and likewise a credit to the
Michigan Law School which has made their publication pos
sible. For this work the bench and bar of the State, historians,
and others interested owe a debt of gratitude to those who have
made it accessible.
WALTER H. NoRTH
Justice, Michigan Supreme Court
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Historical Introduction*
T IS a commonly known fact that, although Michigan
was admitted to the Union in I 8 3 7 (many of her citizens
had claimed statehood for more than a year prior to her
formal admission), few opinions of the state supreme court
written before I 843 have ever been published. Why a period
of almost ten years should have elapsed before the first volume
of state reports was issued in I 846 (with the exception of two
volumes of chancery reports), or why the early reporters seem,
from a casual examination, to have neglected decisions of the
court before r 843, or what happened to the opinions, if any,
that were rendered by supreme court justices during the first
seven years of the state's existence, are ques.tions which have
never been answered adequately.
The historical setting of this subject may be summarized
for present purposes in a few sentences. During the summer
of I 835 a constitutional convention, which had been elected by
the people of the Territory of Michigan, drew up and sub
mitted to the electorate for ratification the first constitution of
the state. This document was approved by a large maj ority of
the people voting at a surprisingly small election in October
of that year.1 At the same time a governor, lieutenant-gover
nor, and members of the state legislature were chosen, all of
whom shortly thereafter assumed office and, without Congres-

I

* This introduction is a shortened and revised version of the sixth chapter
of the writer's unpublished doctoral dissertation, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, I836- 1 857, pp. :uo-273 ( 1 940) (Legal
Research Library, University of Michigan). It appeared in slightly different
form in 42 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 87 (August, 1943) .
1 The total vote was: Yes-- 6 ,299 ; No-1 ,359· In only one county (Branch)
were there more ballots cast against than for the constitution, and that was by the
narrow margin of 29 to 32. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as SENATE JOUR . ) , I835- 1836, Doc. No. 1.
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sional sanction, attempted to establish a state government and
to cast off the territorial government. 2 Of the various meas
ures undertaken in the interim preceding final entrance into
the Union, it is necessary to note here only that the new legis
lature early in the next year adopted laws which provided for
the cessation on July 4, I 8 3 6, of the terms and functions of
the territorial officers, 3 for the establishment of a peripatetic
supreme court whose members were to act singly as presiding
judges in the circuit courts of the various counties and jointly
as the highest court of review, and for the selection of the new
state judges! Subsequently, the governor in July nominated
for the positions of chief justice and associate justices of the
state supreme court three men who were approved almost
unanimously by the senate. 5 Within a week after their appoint
ment these men began to assume control of Michigan's judi
cial business.6
• For a detailed account of the actions taken by the governor and legislature
of Michigan, counter measures carried out by President Jackson and his aides,
and the arguments presented on both sides in regard to the right of Michigan
to proceed as a state previous to approval by Congress of her constitution, see
NORTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
I836-1857, pp. 68-III (I940) . Also see the treatment of the same subject in
I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN,
I825-I836, pp. xlv-liii (I94o) (edited by W. W. Blume) .
1 Mich. Pub. Acts (I8 36) , pp. I4-23, 30-35.
• Id. 30-35.
• The three were William A. Fletcher, George Morell, and Epaphroditus
Ransom, all nominated and approved on July IS, I836. EXECUTIVE JouRNAL
OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, I835-I836, pp. I7-I8.
• Although no session of the state supreme court as a whole was held until
January I837, the individual justices, as required by law, presided in the state
circuit courts which were held in several counties during the latter part of I 8 3 6.
See the STATE JoURNAL (Ann Arbor) , Oct. 20, 1 836, and the Journal of the
Washtenaw County Circuit Court for the session of circuit court held in Wash
tenaw County ; for reports on circuit court terms in Kalamazoo and St. Clair
Counties, see Ransom, "Kalamazoo County," 7 MICHIGAN PIONEER CoLLEC
TIONS 469 at 473 (I886) , (Michigan Historical Commission) and 1 W. L.
JENKS, ST. CLAIR COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS. HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE I96
(I912) . In addition there were at least three writs issued before August I , I836,
which bore the heading "State Supreme Court": a writ of certiorari, dated July
25, in Batty v. Fraser, Sup. Ct., ISt eire., file No. 23; a writ of certiorari, dated
July 30, in Lee v. Force, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. I8 ; and a writ of error,
dated July 30, in Mathews v. Howell, Sup. Ct., ISt eire., file No. 8.
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Little emphasis had been placed upon the reporting and
publishing of judicial opinions during the thirty-one years
Michigan had territorial status. As far as is known, the Su
preme Court of Michigan Territory never appointed an
official reporter of its decisions, although for two years ( I 8 I 9I 82 I ) a court rule was in force which provided that reports
of the j udges' opinions should be kept by some person ap
pointed by the court, and James Duane Doty, clerk of the
supreme court at that time, appears to have made an attempt
to report several cases. 7 I n I 8 2 5 another private venture at
reporting the supreme court decisions at least was proj ected/
apparently without success. The legislative council adopted a
resolution in I 828 instructing the committee on the j udiciary
to inquire whether it would be advisable to require the judges
when sitting in bank to file written opinions on the cases
disposed. 9 While there were no immediate tangible results of
this resolution, in I 8 3 I a law was passed by the legislative
council which required the judges of the Territorial Supreme
Court and of the Wayne County Circuit Court to write
decisions "in such cases and matters as are usually reported
in the several States of the United States, where there are
reporters provided by law," and such opinions to be filed and
preserved by the clerks of the courts.10 However, no collection
of decisions by the Territorial Supreme Court was published
until recently,11 and the few opinions which were printed
• Doty's reportorial activities, as well as his manuscript volume of reports,
have been recorded in I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, I8I4-I824, pp. 365-427 (1938).
8 Notice was given in I825 that A. G. Whitney, United States District
Attorney, was engaged in taking notes on the arguments of counsel and on the
decisions by the supreme court with the intention of collecting materials for a
report of cases in that court. MICHIGAN HERALD' (Detroit), Dec. 13, I825
(photostatic copy in the Legal Research Library, University of Michigan) .
0 JoURNAL OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHI
GAN, I828, pp. I8, 27.
10
Act of March 3, I83I, 3 Mich Terr. Laws (I874 ed.) , p. 886.
u All available opinions which could be located have been printed in th;
.
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contemporaneously appeared mainly in newspapers.
In view of these precedents, as well as the examples of
similar practices followed by many other states during their
early history, it is not surprising that neither the constitution
of I 835, nor the acts which established the state supreme
court in I 836, provided that the justices should write their
opinions or that a reporter should edit and publish them.
Some evidence exists that at least Chief Justice William A.
Fletcher intended to write some opinions during I 8 3 7, which
was the first year sessions of the court were held,12 but no
extant opinions have been found which date prior to I 83 8/3
The latter year marked the earliest statutory provision for
a court reporter. According to the revision of the laws made
in I 8 3 8, this official was to report the decisions of both the
supreme court and the court of chancery, and was required
to attend all terms of those courts, to make "true reports of
their decisions upon all such causes and matters as are usually
reported," and to publish every year the decisions of each
court separately. His appointment and tenure of office were
subject to the action of a majority of the justices and the
chancellor, but in the selection of cases to be reported he was
given a certain amount of discretion on the basis of their im
portance. In turn it was made the duty of the courts to give
their opinions to the reporter in writing as soon as conv�nient.
Although the compensation of the reporter was fixed at six
six volumes of TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF
MICHIGAN (1935-I940).
"' In I842. newly appointed Chief Justice George Morell wrote a notation
on the wrapper of a case file that Fletcher had taken the papers in that particular
file at the June term, I837, "to draw up the opinion of the court." Fletcher did
not return the papers until March 31, I842.. United States v. Cornell, Sup. Ct.,
Ist eire., file No. 62..
.
13 There are thirty-seven cases decided before I843 in which opinions,
manuscript and printed, are known to be in existence. By year, these are 1838,
six ; 1839, four; I84o, two; I841, eight, and I842., seventeen. Eight of the
thirty-seven have bee.n published in full and one in part. The remainder are pub
lished for the first time in the present volume.
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hundred dollars annually, payable quarterly, he was to re
ceive in addition any profits which might result from the sale
of the reports. Under this law the reporter, while nominally
a state official, was forced to assume personally the risk and
expense of publishing the reports, although, as will be seen,
state assistance was sometimes extended.14
Available information indicates that the only two active
candidates for the new position were Charles H. Steware5
and Ebenezer Burke Harrington. The latter, a young lawyer,
was selected by the court: Much of Harrington's early life is
obscure. He apparently left the home of his parents in
Michigan while still a youth, learned the trade of a cabinet
maker at Jamestown, New York, then later studied law at
Whitestown in the same state. 16 Before he returned to Michi
gan in I 836 he had been one of the compilers of Barbour's
and Harrington's Equity Digest for the state of New York.17
10
Mich. Rev. Stat. (I8 3 8), p. 4I4· For a brief sketch of the office of re
porter by Justice James V. Campbell, who was a contemporary and had business
connections with at least two of the reporters (Walker and Douglass) , see his
opinion in People ex rei. Ayres v. State Auditors, 42 Mich. 422 at 43I-435>
4 N. W. 274 (r88o) .
.
""'In soliciting the support of William Woodbridge for the office, Stewart
claimed that he had received favorable expressions from most of the Detroit bar,
including A. D. Fraser. An inclosure from Fraser stated the opinion that Stewart
would make an excellent reporter. Dec.·4, I8J8, WooDBRIDGE PAPERS (Burton
Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library) .
18 "Daniel B. Harrington," 5 MICHIGAN PIONEER CoLLECTIONS IJ8 at
I4I-I42 (I884) . Authorities differ on whether Harrington's first name was
"Ebenezer" or "Edmund." The above article, along with r MICHIGAN BIOGRA
PHIES 374 (I 924) (Michigan Historical Commission) and I JENKS, ST. CLAIR
COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE I96 (I912) , use the former
name, but the supreme court journal calls him by the latter. SuP. CT. JoURN., ISt
eire., vol. I, pp. 299, 350. In I836 he signed his name as "Ebenezer" (Fisk v.
Leroy, Sup. Ct., Ist eire., file No. 5) , which should be conclusive unless he had
it legally changed. A short biographical sketch of Harrington can be found in
R. B. Ross, THE EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT 85 ( I90 7 ) .
17 An article had appeared i n the Detroit ADVERTISER, Sept. 2 I, I838, pur
porting to be an extract from the American Jurist, which charged that Harring
ton had acted as no more than a clerk in the compilation of the Equity Digest.
Harrington replied in a letter to the editor of the Free Press that the charge was
false, that a contract had been made by Barbour and by himself, providing that
both their names should appear on the title page, and that he had actually done
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He was reputed to have been admitted on October 20, I 8 3 6,
to the bar in the circuit court of St . Clair county, and then to
have opened a law office in the village of Desmond, Michi
gan/8 During the next few months he edited and published
the Lake Huron Observer at Port Huron, made a venture
in real estate speculation which was a complete failure, and
then moved in I 8 3 8 to Detroit, where he practiced law as a
partner of James A. Van Dyke.19 Governor Stevens T. Mason
appointed him and E. J. Roberts to edit and superintend the
publication of the revision of Michigan laws made in I 83 8 .20
A practical politician, he was a delegate from St. Clair county
to the Democratic state convention at Ann Arbor, July 20,
I 83 7, and was nominated and elected state senator from the
fourth district in IS3 8 .21 He continued to hold his senatorship
through the I 8 3 9 session and was called "as useful a legisla
tor, as any man in the senate."22 Moreover, he was in I 840,
while still state reporter, the prosecuting attorney for
Michilimackinac county.2 3 These activities, in addition to his
continuous services as an attorney and counselor at law, would
seem to indicate that the duties of reporting were not then
very onerous.
The exact date of Harrington's appointment as reporter
has not been determined, but it was probably about February
more work on it than had Barbour because the latter was at the same time the
chancellor's clerk. See the FREE PRESS (Detroit), Dec. 25, I838.
18
I JENKS, ST. CLAIR COUNTY, MICHIGAN: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE
I96·I97 (I912).
19 Id. ; I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 3 74 (I924) ; "A Good Chancery Lawyer
but Unlucky in Real Estate," newspaper clipping, undated, in 2 C. M. BURTON,
SCRAPBOOK 106 (Burton Coli.). Harrington laid out a "paper town" on Lake
Huron north of Port Huron in I 83 7 but failed to sell any lots.
"'Mich. Rev. Stat. (I838), p. 3·
21 FREE PRESS, July 24, I837 ; Sept. I9, I838 ; Nov. 24, I838. In the Senate
he was a member of the committee on the judiciary. SENATE JouRN., I839, p. 7·
22 MACOMB DEMOCRAT, quoted in the FREE PRESS, March 28, I839•
23 See the notice (July 10, I84o) and the subpoena (July 2o, I84o) in
the examination of A. R. Davenport, "· . . Inspector of Fish for Michilimack
inac County." WooDBRIDGE PAPERS, folder July u-201 I84o (Burton Coli.),
_

,
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20, I 83 9· 24 "To handsome talents and much legal learning
and experience, Mr. Harrington unites habits of industry
which. well qualify him for the proper discharge of the duties
of the office," was the comment of the D.etroit Free Press.25
In view of the fact that the only volume of reports which
he edited was that of the court of chancery, and that no
opinions of the supreme court were published while he was
in office, the question whether Harrington adequately ful
filled his duties as reporter may well be raised. Existing
manuscript opinions prove without doubt that he did edit
several opinions, complete with headnotes, statement of facts,
arguments of counsel, and revisions of the original drafts of
opinions written by the justices of the supreme court. In
cluded in the files of the court are six opinions in cases de
cided at the January terms of r 838, held at Detroit and Ann
Arbor, all of which are in the handwriting of Associate
Justice Epaphroditus Ransom. They are accompanied by
other drafts of the same opinions written by Harrington in
the form of reports.26 Some of these contain a penciled annota
tion, "not to be reported," written by an unidentified person,
probably a later reporter ; there are also short memoranda
penned by Harrington for both the maj ority and dissenting
opinions delivered in a case decided in r 8J9.2 7 However, the
.. There is no entry in any of the extant Journals of the Supreme Court
indicating the date of appointment, but H. N. Walker, Harrington's successor
as reporter, stated that it was in February 1839. See the preface to MICHIGAN
CHANCERY REPORTS (Harrington). The leading Democratic newspaper of the
state did not announce the appointment until May 22. FREE PREss, May 22,
1839. However, there is documentary proof that his salary must have begun
�ometime in February, because on April 23 he was paid $r62, more than 'a
quarter of a year's salary. DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as SENATE Docs.), I84o, I, 518
.. May 22, r 839.
""Burhans v. Reynolds, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. II6o (Index of 1902);
Calhoun v. Cable, Sup. Ct., Mich. ·Terr., file No. 1491; Hubble v. Burch,
Sup. Ct., rst eire., file No. 70; Mundy v. Sargent, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No.
II58 (Index of r 902); Norris v. Hawks, Sup. Ct., 2d eire., file No. 66;
Whitcomb v. Porter, Sup. Ct. 1st eire., file No. 88.
"'Henretty v. City of Detroit1 Sup. Ct.1 rst circ.1 file No. 159·
•
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remaining manuscript opinions, most of which were written by
Chief Justice Fletcher, show no marks of editing by the
reporter.
This paucity of existing opinions reported by Harrington
does not by itself constitute sufficient evidence to censure him
for neglecting his duties ; because of the incomplete status of
the files, and the probability that many of his reported opin
ions were never in the official files, it would be unjust, without
more positive evidence, to make such a charge. Moreover,
there are strong grounds to believe that he intended as early
as r 840 to publish a volume of chancery court and supreme
court reports.28
Formal notice of the delay in publishing the reports was
taken by the state senate in I 841, which adopted a resolution
directing Harrington to inform the senate in the near future
"the number of cases decided by the supreme court, designat
ing the title of the cause, what judges have furnished him
with a written opinion, and the time when furnished, and in
what circuit the cause has been decided, and also the same, as
near as may be, in the court of chancery, and at what time a
volume of reports of the decisions of the supreme court, or of
the court of chancery will be published. "29
Harrington's reply to this legislative request is most
instructive. He claimed that since the date of his appoint
ment as reporter he had attended nearly all the terms of both
the supreme court and the chancery courts, that he had kept an
accurate list of cases with notes on their principal points, and
""A notice appeared in the newspapers requesting the clerks of the several
counties to send to Harrington at Detroit the names of attorneys in their
counties, because he is "now preparing the first number of reports of the cases
decided in the court of chancery and supreme court of this state, which will
be published during the ensuing winter, and is desirous of ascertaining the
number of Attorneys in the State, that he may the better judge how large an
edition will be necessary." FREE PRESS, Nov. 28, 1839; MICHIGAN STATE
JouRNAL (Ann Arbor) , Jan. 11 1840.
29
SENATE JouR., 1841, p. 74· Adopted on Jan. 15.
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that he had examined the papers in over seven hundred
causes. However, it was his contention that the justices of the
supreme court had directed him to report only seventy-three
decisions. According to Harrington, up to I 841 only one
member of the court, Justice Ransom, had sent in his opin
ions ; these, the reporter asserted, he had prepared for the
press, but he had been informed by the chief justice that
opinions had been written in most of the cases in "schedule
B" and were then ready for the reporter. Furthermore, Har
rington stated that in September, 1 840, he had cont�acted
with Dawson and Bates for the printing of one volume of
reports for each court, that this printing had begun in Oc
tober, and that about three hundred pages of the chancery
volume were finished and about one hundred more pages
ready to be printed. "The cases in the supreme court will be
printed and ready for delivery by the fifteenth of June next
[ I 841 ] .nao
The following year, when the advisability of maintaining
the office of reporter was questioned by the new economy
minded governor, John S. Barry/1 the legislature proceeded
30 SENATE Do cs . , I 8 4 I , No. 3 8 , pp. I 47-I 48. On the last day of the
legislative session in I 8 4 I , a resolution was offered that Dawson and Bates
should be paid the sum of $9 1 2 for printing the first volume of chancery
reports, provided that the reporter should relinquish all his right and title to
any profits from the sale of the reports, but it was not adopted. SENATE JouR .,
I 8 4 I , pp. 4 8 9-490. However, it appears that Harrington proceeded with his
plans and published a pamphlet volume of chancery reports which extended
through I 840 and was ready for sale in the summer of I 84 r. See the DAILY
ADVERTISER (Detroit) , July 7, I 84 I .
•• In his annual address ( 1 84z) Governor Barry repeated most of the
information which Harrington had conveyed to the senate in I 84 I, but said
that enough opinions had been received from Justice Ransom to make about
I o o pages and none from the other j ustices. "These facts naturally suggest the
inquiry whether, under the present legislation upon the subject, the public are
likely to receive an adequate benefit for the expense incurred in providing a
reporter." He said that the subject required the attention of the legislature, and
that either the reporter should be abolished or more effectual means should be
provided to publish supreme court decisions. JOURNAL OF THE HousE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as HOUSE
JOUR.) , I 84z, p. 4 8 .
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to investigate the whole subject. A petition by Harrington
asking for relief in return for the printing of three hundred
and seventy-two pages of chancery reports was rejected on
the recommendation of the house committee on claims, which
held that the law giving the reporter a salary and allowing
him profits from sale of reports rendered such relief un
necessary.32 In reply to inquiries sent by the house committee
on the judiciary to the members of the supreme court to
ascertain their views upon the subject and to learn the "true
reasons" why the reports had not been published, letters
were received from each of the four justices.33
Chief Justice William A. Fletcher's answer was a condi
tional one : "If the present judicial system is to continue, I
think some other means of publishing the reports, as they can
be prepared, might be adopted which would be attended with
less expense."34 Justice Ransom stated that the creation of a
reporter was entirely premature, that in 1 838 there had been
few cases pending which, when decided, would settle the law,
and that the benefits derived from reporting them would not
equal the expense to the treasury. He suggested that instead
of abolishing the office, it would be necessary only to repeal
the law providing for the reporter's salary, as the incumbent
would thereupon resign ; by this procedure the office would
be left in existence so that when a reporter was needed one
could be provided by merely restoring the salary. He also
suggested that until a new reporter should be appointed, the
opinions of the supreme and chancery courts ought to be filed
.. Id., pp. IZ7, 327·
DoCUMENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF
MrcHIGAN (hereafter cited as HousE Docs.) , 1842, No. 21, pp. 85-94. The
j udiciary committee included the letters of the j ustices in full in their report
because of the complete information they contained and because "they so
perfectly exculpate those functionaries from what a cursory reader of the
governor's message might suppose a censure upon them," but asserted that
the only desire of the governor was "to discharge his whole duty to the people
of this state." Id., 8 7.
"'Id.
33
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with the secretary of state, who should publish a synopsis of
each case in the newspapers at no cost to the state. 35 Justice
Charles W. Whipple wrote that
". . . under existing circumstances, the office of re
porter is of but little practical importance, and might
well be dispensed with . In expressing this opinion, I
am not insensible of the great importance of perfecting
the judgments and opinions of the highest judicial
tribunal in the state ; but under the present system, this
cannot be done. m6
Of the four justices, the only one who believed that it was
proper for the position of reporter as constituted to be con
tinued was George W. Morell, who stated that the business
of the supreme court had accumulated and in the near future
would be increasing sufficiently to justify retention of the
office.3 7
Although a majority of the court seemed to have been
inclined to doubt the necessity for an official reporter, the
fundamental reason for their stand clearly arose from the
belief that they did not have enough opportunity (because of
their burdensome task of presiding in the circuit courts) to
perform the research and to spend the time necessary for the
writing of adequate opinions. Each one of them stressed this
point emphatically in his letter to the house judiciary com
mittee. For example, Chief Justice Fletcher wrote that
" . . . we have not time, under the present system,
to do that which we think the interest of the public
requires, ' to draw up with care, opinions in the great
variety of cases which are presented, many of them
involving new and important principles, and which
opinions are to become written law." 38
.. Id.,
86 Id.,
• • Id.,
as Id.,

p.
p.
p.
p.

89.
91.
94·
88.

XXII

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Associate Justices Ransom, Whipple, and Morell ex
pressed similar views, all of them blaming the requirement of
circuit duty as the chief obstacle to thoughtful consideration
and preparation of opinions in the majority of decisions.39
With the exception of Ransom, none of them intimated the
belief that the quality of causes which had been adjudicated by
the supreme court since the appointment of a reporter in I 8 3 8
was of so minor a character that written and published
opinions were not justified or desirable, at least in many cases.
Even the statement of Ransom on this point (referred to
above) appears to be rather singular in the light of the fact
that he himself had written at least six opinions for the year
I 8J 8.40 Moreover, Justice Whipple very pointedly called
attention in a later decision to the handicap that resulted from
a lack of published opinions before I 843,4 1 and neither
Fletcher nor Morell was opposed to the principle of printing
reports of the supreme court's decisions. Nevertheless, the
judiciary committee of the house recommended, as Ransom
had advised, the repeal of the law which had provided for
the salary of the reporter,4 2 and a joint resolution to that effect
was adopted by the legislature -and approved by the governor
on February I 6, I 842.43
.. ld., pp. 90, 9I-92, 93-94· Whipple suggested another justice be added
to the supreme court, which would help both the supreme and the circuit courts
and allow the members more time to write opinions.
"' See note 26 above.
41 In the case of Robinson v. Steam Boat Red Jacket, I Mich. I 71 at I 7 3
(I849), Whipple wrote: "The learned counsel for the plaintiff was not advised,
until the argument of the case, that a construction had been given to the
statute in question by this court-the opinion never having been published
[referring to Moses v. Steam Boat Missouri, decided Jan. I 842]. Had the fact
of its promulgation been known, it must have narrowed a discussion which
assumed a wider range in consequence of the prominence given to a question
which it was supposed had not been judicially determined."
'" HousE Docs., I842, No. 2I, p. 94·
.. Mich. Pub. Acts (I842) , J. Res. 28, p. I68. For legislative proceedings
on this Joint Resolution, see HousE JouR., I842, pp. 3I3, 36I, and SENATE
JouR., I 842, p. 254.
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Perhaps more important than the fate of either Harring
ton or the office of reporter is the question how many opinions
were written by the justices of the supreme court prior to
I 843 and what happened to them. To summarize briefly,
opinions from thirty-seven cases which date from that period
are known to be in existence!4 All these cases are listed in a
table of cases, infra p. Iii. The opinions in twenty-eight cases
are published for the first time in the present volume, two
others for which the manuscripts are still in the court files
have been printed, and the remaining seven can be found
only in later published reports. The assertions by Harrington
noted above concerning his intentions to publish a volume of
supreme court reports during 1 840- 1 84I were of a prospec
tive nature and can be relied upon only as an indication that
he expected to have collected enough opinions by those dates
to constitute a volume, but the signifi.cance of his statement
that the supreme court had directed him, by I 84 1 , to report
seventy-three cases cannot be waived lightly. If true, it would
mean that nearly two years before 1 843 the supreme court
had selected twice as many cases to be reported as now exist
'
for the whole period, and had, presumably, assigned them to
the various members to be written. Even more striking is the
fact that of the thirty-seven opinions now extant which were
delivered before I 843, seventeen bear the date I 842, so that
for the years in which the Supreme Court intended at least
seventy.:.three cases to be reported we have opinions in only
twenty cases.
It is certain that as late as 1 842 many of the opinions were
still in the hands of the justices who wrote them and not in
the possession of the reporter. For in:5tance, Whipple stated
.. Of these, one case is represented only by a dissenting opinion (Infra,
p. 36) and another only by a long quotation in a later case (Infra, p. 69).
In one case (Infra, p. 85) there is both a majority and a dissenting opinion.
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that all of the opinions which he had delivered were in written
form and were ready to be given to the reporter, who had
been advised of their availability but had neglected to collect
them.45 Truly mysterious are the circumstances involving the
Morell opinions. Justice Morell's own words testify that he
wrote them, as well as to the fact that they were mainly
dissenting ones,4 6 but most of them have completely disap
peared. Morell's wife, daughter, and son, after the justice's
death in r 845, accused Justice Ransom of having called at
their home and taken away the supreme court opinions of
their husband and father, but Ransom vigorously denied the
charge and countered with the statement that no such opin
ions ever existed.4 7 However, another authority who cannot
be entirely disregarded maintained directly the opposite view.
He said :
" . . . Judge Morell always wrote out in full his im
portant opinions, and a full series of his manuscripts
was found, but they could not well be published with.. HousE Docs., I84z,

No. zI, p. 9z•
.. According to Morell, Chief Justice Fletcher was to have prepared his
opinions in the cases he thought proper to report and give a list of them to
the reporter, who was to submit it to Morell for his examination. If Morell
approved the list he was to give the reporter his own decisions in cases they
thought advisable to report, but he claimed that no such list had been furnished
him. "The reporter was informed long ago, that my decisions, (which are most
all dissenting ones,) would be furnished at a moment's notice, whenever he
got the opinions of a maj ority of the court, for I supposed it would hardly
be admissable [sic] to publish a minority decision before publishing that of
the majority. The fact is, that I have had so many legal opinions to give and
write out, in cases arising alone in the county of Wayne, that I have had but
very little time to draw up opinions for publication in the Supreme Court, and
as my brethren are willing to spread their opinions upon the record, I was
perfectly willing to accommodate them." HousE Docs., I84z, No. ZI, p. 93·
c Epaphroditus Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. I, I845,
HERBERT BOWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . Ransom said in this letter that he had
at one time examined some opinions delivered by Morell in Wayne Circuit
Court, but that he had returned them immediately, and that the only time he
had visited the Morell home since I843 was at attend Morell's funeral in I845.
He claimed that Morell had not drawn up or delivered a written opinion in a
single case . during the year prior to the expiration of his term, except at
Kalamazoo in I 843, when he delivered two or three opinions.
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out the rest [of the court's opinions] . The Reporter
[Douglass] therefore, although his friend and admirer,
was reluctantly compelled to begin his work at a time
when the materials were more complete ; and our series,
but a few of his opinions, and
for this reason, contains
'
these all belong to the later years of his j udicial ca
reer."48
The full significance of these words can be understood better
if it is remembered that their author, Justice James V. Camp
bell, had been from I 845 to I 8 50 a law partner of Samuel T.
Douglass, who was without doubt the "Reporter" to whom
Campbell referred; and that a few years later Douglass, by
his marriage to Campbell's sister, became his brother-in-law.
These circumstances would make for an intimate acquaintance
both in business and personal affairs between the two men and
add credence and authenticity to Campbell's words . Certainly
Douglass had made efforts to locate Morell's opinions, for
he wrote to Chief Justice Ransom in I 845 asking for them/9
and, if we are to believe what Justice Campbell said, Douglass
found but did not print them. Only two opinions written by
Justice Morell are known to exist today, both delivered in
I 843, and both have been published.50
In addition to the above-mentioned six manuscript opin
ions of I 8 3 8 by Ransom, we have but one other of his previ
ous to I 843 .51 Nine of Justice Whipple's opinions before I 843
are extant, five of which have been printed.5 2 Chief Justice
I

.. Justice James V. Campbell's address delivered at the acceptance of Judge
Morell's portrait by the Supreme Court in 1 8 8 o, printed in 4 3 Mich. xviii
(1 88o) .
•• See note 4 7 a hove.
50 Beach v. Botsford, 1
Doug. 1 99 ( 1 8 4 3 ) ; Taylor v. Kneeland, 1 Doug.
67 ( 1 84 3 ) .
51 Owen v . Farmers' Bank o f Sandstone, 2 Doug. 1 34, note ( 1 84 1 ) .
.,. Davis v. Ingersoll, 2 Doug. 3 72 ( 1 840) ; Godfrey v. Beach, Sup. Ct.,
1 st eire., :file No. 1 8 8 ; Caswell v. Ward, 2 Doug. 3 7 4 ( 1 8 4 2 ) ; Slaughter v.
People, 2 Doug. 3 34, note ( 1 842 ) , and also with the BY-LAws AND ORDI
NANCES OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, 1 842 in the Burton Historical Collection,

xxvi

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Fletcher before his retirement in I 842 wrote nineteen opin
ions, or nearly two-thirds of all those prior to I 843 which are
still available, but only two of his have been included in later
reports. 53 Moreover, it should be noted that of Fletcher's
nineteen opinions, only eight were written before the year
( I 842) he resigned from the bench : two in I 8 3 9, one in I 840,
and five in I 84 I .54 The very fact that Chief Justice Fletcher,
in the few months of I 842 during which he was a member of
the supreme court, wrote nearly as many opinions as did any
one justice during any full year of the whole period between
I 8 3 6 and I 8 57 permits the inference that he probably drew
up more opinions than eight during the five years he served
on the bench prior to I 842. We know that as early as the June
term, I 8 3 7, he had taken the papers from a certain file with
the intention of writing an opinion in that particular case . 55
Although it has been stated that some of Fletcher's opinions
were printed in contemporary newspapers/6 the present
writer has found none in any of the newspaper files which he
has searched. 5 7
Detroit; Royce v. Bradburn, 2 Doug. 3 7 7 ( r 84 z ) . In Campbell, Appellant,
2 Doug. 1 44 ( r 845 ) , Justice Ransom quoted a long paragraph that supposedly
was an excerpt from an opinion written by Justice Whipple in the case of
Godfroy v. Brooks. He undoubtedly meant Godfrey v. Beach, above. See
infra, p. 69•
.. Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463 ( r 84 r ) ; Chamberlin v. Brown, 2
Doug. no, note ( r 842) . A manuscript copy of the latter opinion in the
handwriting of Harrington is also extant, but it is not identical with the
printed report. See Sup. Ct., r st eire., file No. 1 95 .
.. See opinions, infra.
'"' See note r 2 above.
.. Both R. B. Ross and G. B. CATLIN, LANDMARKS OF DETROIT, Burton
rev. ed., 3 94 (1898 ) , and R. B. Ross, EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT
64 ( I 907 ) , make such statements. The latte1· quotes Alpheus Felch as having
supposedly said the following : "Some of his [Fletcher's] opinions, however,
found their way into the newspapers of the day; and many are treasured up
in the memory of early members of the bar. The latter were often cited by
them in Court, and even at this late day they are sometimes quoted, and always
regarded as high authority."
"' Their nonexistence in the newspapers is corroborated by another worker
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In spite of the fact that his salary as reporter was sus
pended by the legislature on February I 6, I 842, Harrington
did not stop his attempts to report the cases of both the
supreme and the chancery courts. His interest in the decisions
and in their publication was so genuine that he continued his
work, providing the public press with abstracts of many
chancery court opinions and presumably of some supreme
court opinions. In a letter to the editor of the Detroit Free
Press he explained his position admirably:
"The Legislature of this state have made no provi
sion for the preservation or publication of the judicial
decisions of our Supreme Court or Court of Chancery.
Although these decisions form an important part of
the law they are only known to the judges themselves,
and those who are in constant attendance upon the
courts. Many of these opinions have been written out
with care and placed in my hands as Reporter for pub
lication, and I have prepared them for the press, but
I am unable to publish them without compensation.
I will hereafter furnish you with the headnotes for
publication from time to time as my leisure will per
mit."5 8
The headnotes of at least ninteen chancery court cases
were printed in the Free Press between December I 5, I 842
and July 2 5, I 843 ; 59 unfortunately none has been found for
supreme court cases.
Early in I 843 Governor Barry formally recognized
Harrington's continued services as well as the need for pub
lication of the supreme court and chancery court opinions. 60
PO'ITER, ADDRESS AT THE UNVEILING OF A
MARKER ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF WILLIAM AsA FLETCHER 9- 1 0 ( 1 93 5 ) .
.. FREE PRESS, Dec. r s , 1 8 42 .

who has searched for them.

.. Dec. 1 5 , 1 8 42, four cases ; Dec. 29, 1 842, five cases; July 2 5 , 1 84 3 , ten
cases.
eo Barry noted that the salary of the reporter had been suspended but said
that the incumbent had continued to discharge the duties of the office. "It
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Apparently the governor's attitude had changed considerably
since his first annual message; nevertheless he still expressed
hope that "if such reports were judiciously prepared under
well digested regulations of law, the proceeds from their sale
would nearly, if not altogether, reimburse the expense of their
publication."6 1 The legislature, however, was not willing to
carry out completely the governor's recommendations and
adopted a compromise scheme. According to the new law it
was provided that in any matter adjudicated by the supreme
court, the justices thereof must pronounce an opinion and
prepare an abstract of it in writing. These abstracts were to
be filed by the first Monday in January of each year with the
secretary of state, who was to have them published in one
newspaper of each judicial circuit with the printing costs
borne by the state. When enough abstracts .of opinions had
been accumulated to compose a volume of about three hun
dred and fifty pages, the secretary of state was directed to
have them edited and to have one thousand copies printed at
state expense and offered for sale, any profits derived there
from to go to the state.6 2 As a consequence of this statute, the
task of reporting what condensed opinions the justices might
seems to me that the best interest of [the] state requires the decisions of its
courts to be published, and that much other printing is now required which is
of less importance and less beneficial. Indeed I consider the reports of decisions
which give construction to the statutes, as important as the statutes themselves,
and as necessary to be distributed among the citizens of the state for their in
formation and guidance." HousE JouR., . 1 843, p. 1 6.
"' Id.
.,. Mich. Pub. Acts ( 1 843 ) , pp. 1 69- 1 70. This act was approved by the
governor March 9; 1 8 4 3, and given immediate effect. On Feb. 3 , 1 84 3 , a state
ment made by Harrington had been presented to the house of representatives by
Justus Goodwin of Calhoun County, and as a result the question what would
be the best method and means of procuring reports of the decisions of the
supreme court and the court of chancery was referred to the judiciary com
mittee. HousE JOUR., 1 84 3 , p. 2 2 5 . Further action on the bill can be found in
id., 1 84 3 , pp. 5 34, 5 3 5 , 5 3 7, and in SENATE JouR., 1 84 3 , pp. 2 6 8, 2 8 1 , 422,
429, 4 3 0, 43 1 . A second bill which provided for the publication of the reports
was adopted by the senate but not by the house. See id. 1 84 3 , pp. 3 63 , 3 74-3 7 5 ;
HousE JouR., 1 84 3 , p p . 495, 499·
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furnish was added to the regular duties of a state officer who
had little connection with the courts and who might not
possess any interest in their decisions. It is not surprising
that, as far as can be learned, there were never any tangible
results from this act ;63 certainly it was not an adequate solu
tion of the problem.
Great influence must have been exercised upon the legis
lators by the very able report made in the house of representa
tives early in 1 844 by H. N. Walker, a member of the house
from Detroit who, after a few months, succeeded Harrington
as reporter. Petitions by Harrington concerning publication of
the opinions had been presented in both the senate and the
house, and the latter body referred the matter to a select
committee of which Mr. Walker was the chairman.6� As a
result of their deliberations, the representatives composing
this committee concluded that the decisions of the highest
state courts were too important a part of the law for their
publication to be neglected. They believed that the establish
ment of legal principles, the interpretation of constitutional
provisions, and the construction of important laws, all of
which in their reasoning were essential to the administration
of justice, could not be understood by the people without
printed opinions. Other points the committee emphasized
were that requiring written opinions would insure careful
attention and examination by the courts to the questions before
them, and that their publication would create a guide for
future courts which would make for uniformity in practice
and procedure.
68 Not one such abstract has ever been found in any of the newspapers
searched by this writer. Moreover, it was stated in the house of representatives
in I 844 that this act had never been complied with and that it never could be
"with any benefit or advantage to the state." HoUSE JouR., I 844, p. I I 8 .
"' S . M . Green, later a j ustice o f the supreme court, presented the petition
in the senate and Mr. Walker presented it in the house, both on Jan. I S , I 844•
See SENATE JouR., I 844, p. so, and HousE JouR., I 844, p. sz.
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Rather strangely, the committee adopted the view that
published court decisions would be a means of preserving the
separation of powers guaranteed by the state constitution, and
would thus constitute a "guard against encroachments by the
j udiciary upon other departments, and the assumption of
powers which do not belong to them. . . ." The statute of
1 8 43 which required j ustices of the supreme court to prepare
abstracts of their opinions and which provided for the publi
cation of these abstracts in various newspapers at the expense
of the state was scoffed at in the committee report. It was
pointed out that the cost of such an undertaking would equal
that of the regular form of reports, and that "the publication
of an abstract of an opinion of the court without the state
ment of the case, and without the care and attention of a
proper and competent person to correct the proof, would be
of no more authority in legal proceedings than any other
article found inserted in a newspaper would be evidence of the
facts therein contained.' . ."65 Consequently, the committee
introduced a bill to provide for publication of the decisions
of the supreme court and of the court of chancery ; after
much discussion and several amendments, 66 the bill was passed
by both houses and approved by the governor on February
29, 1 8#. 6 7
With one exception this new law established the reports
and the office of reporter on a basis similar to that set forth
in 1 8 38 by the Revised Statutes. By virtue of its provisions
the j ustices of the supreme court and the chancellor, or any
.

85 The entire report of the select committee is in the HousE JouR., 1 844,
pp. 1 1 6-1 1 9 ·
68 The greatest amount of controversy over the bill occurred in the house,
- where the question of salary to be paid the reporter was much disputed , but the
senate made several amendments and set the salary at $6oo per year. See
HousE JouR., 1 844, pp. 1 1 9, 1 95, 209, 279-2 8 o , 2 9 7 , 3 1 4- 3 1 5 , 3 1 9, 3 2 4 ,
3 5 3> 3 5 9, 3 64, 3 8 9 ; SENATE JOUR., 1 844, pp. 2 3 0 , 245 , 246, 2 5 1 .
"' Mich. Pub. Acts (1 844) , pp. 1 9-2 1 .
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three of them, were authorized to select the reporter, who
would hold office entirely at their pleasure. For those cases
which were considered to be of enough importance, they were
directed to send full notes of the decisions to the reporter, who
was to prepare them for publication, along with condensed
arguments of counsel, in volumes of approximately six hun
dred pages. Of the one thousand copies ordered to be printed,
nine hundred were to be sold at a price not over three and
one-half dollars each in Michigan or five dollars each out of
the state ; the remaining one hundred copies were to be sent
to the secretary of state, whose duty it was to distribute two
of them to the Library of Congress, one to each of the state
libraries of the United States, one to each county clerk in
Michigan, and the remaining ones to the Michigan State
Library. A very fundamental change, however, was made by
the fourth section of the law, which relieved the reporter of
the risk of publishing the works at his own expense. This
desirable removal of responsibility was to some degree
neutralized, however, by the requirement that payment to
him for cost of publication was to be made only after comple
tion of a volume. In addition the reporter's compensation was
reduced to five hundred dollars annually; however, he was
still entitled to any profits from the sale of reports. 6 8
Although this act was given immediate effect, the justices
and the chancellor, apparently anticipating by one day their
powers thus conferred, reappointed Harrington as reporter on
February 2 8 , 1 844. 69 This action constituted definite endorse
ment of his services as reporter since 1 83 9, but it was not
'"' Id. The act specifically repealed those provisions of the Revised Statutes
and of the law of 1 843 which concerned the reports and the reporter.
60 SUP. CT. JouR., Ist eire., vol. I , p. Z99· The appointment was dated
Feb. z8, I 844, but the entry does not appear to have been made in the Journal
until May 3, I 844. It is possible but not certain that the appointment was not
made until the later date, but was effective retroactively to the former. Justices
Ransom, Whipple, Felch, and Goodwin and Chancellor Manning signed the
appointment.
of

I 83 8
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destined that Harrington should live to vindicate himself of
the last vestige of suspicion concerning the adequate perform
ance of his duties ; he died in early August, I 844, a little over
five months after his second appointment and before a single
volume of reports, either of the supreme court or of the court
of chancery, had been issued to the public.70
In addition to the evidence already presented to indicate
that the justices of the supreme court before I 843 wrote more
opinions than are known to be extant, there is good proof that
Harrington himself possessed many more opinions of that
period than we now have. For instance, it was said as early as
January 2, I 8 43, that "All the present justices of the supreme
court, have furnished to the reporter their written opinions in
cases decided by them previous to the January term of I 842,
which, together with the opinions now in the hands of the late
chief justice for revision, will make a volume of reports of
that court." 71
Again in I 844 it was stated that the reporter had sufficient
manuscript opinions delivered by the supreme court justices
to make a volume of about six hundred pages, which, along
with the volume of chancery court reports (the publication
of which had already been commenced), would "embrace all
the decisions of the supreme court a.nd court of chancery, of
" The Proceedings and Resolutions on the death of Harrington, adopted
by the Bar of Detroit on Aug. s, 1 844, may be found in SuP. CT. JouR., 1 st
eire., vol. 1, 350 ( 1 8 4 5 ) , and in the FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 1 844. J. A. Van
Dyke, Harrington's law partner, expressed his great respect for the deceased,
and H. N. Walker and G. C. Bates were appointed members of a committee
to write the resolutions of the bar. It was resolved in part that "we cherish
the highest respect for the professional learning of the deceased, for the purity
and uprightness of his public and private character, for his uniformly honorable
and correct deportment in every relation of life, and for the many excellent
qualities which belonged to him as a man." Id.
n Annual Address of Governor Barrv, HousE JouR., 1 843, p. 1 6. The
"late chief justice" referred to was W. A: Fletcher, who, it would seem, still
had in his possession several opinions to revise. Possibly some or all of them
were the eleven Fletcher opinions delivered in 1 842 which are now in the :files
or in later reports.
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sufficient importance to report from the organization of the
state government down to the present time.m 2 Some time
previous to June 22, r 844, Harrington had made overtures
and had received a proposition for the publishing of a volume
of supreme court reports/3 but there is no proof that any had
been printed before his death. The wide discrepancy between
the number of opinions which would have been necessary to
constitute a volume of supreme court reports of approximately
six hundred pages74 and the number of opinions which are
known to e�st-many of which ·are, indeed, quite brief
makes it appear that, even if the decisions which never came
into the possession of the reporter are disregarded and not
counted, the j ustices of the state supreme court wrote opinions
in more cases during the first seven or eight years of their
incumbency than the thirty-seven which are now in the files
or included in later volumes of reports.
In September, r 844, Henry N . Walker was appointed by
the supreme court justices and by the chancellor to be the
second state reporter.75 Mr. Walker, a graduate of the
Academy at Fredonia, New York, came to Michigan in r 835,
entered the office of Elon Farnsworth and A. D. Bates as a
law student, and was admitted to the bar, becoming Bates'
partner after Farnsworth was appointed chancel1or.76 Walker
•• Report of H . N. Walker from the select committee to consider the
petition of E. B. Harrington, HousE JOUR., I 844, p. I I 8.
" A memorandum written by Harrington on June z z , I 844, assured the
firm of Wilcox and Harsha that they could depend upon publishing the second
volume of his chancery reports "according to the proposition to publish the
Suprem� Court Reports. . . . " E. W. MoRGAN PAPERS (Burton Coll.) .
" There were nearly sixty opinions, delivered between I 843 and I 845,
printed in the first volume of Douglass' Michigan Supreme Court Reports, and
several of them were of great length.
15 FREE PREss, Sept. 1 0 , I 844.
76 See the obituary of Walker in 9 'MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 8 8-89
( I 8 8 6) . This law partnership of Bates and Walker was changed during the
late thirties and early forties first to Bates, Walker, and Douglass, then to
Douglass and Walker, and finally to Walker, Douglass and Campbell, the two
new members being S. T. Douglass and J. V. Campbell, both of whom later
became justices of the supreme court.
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had been elected to serve in the I 844 session of the legislature,
where, it will be recalled, he introduced and supported in the
house the bill, which later became law, providing for restora
tion of the reporter's salary and for publishing the reports of
the supreme court and court of chancery. 7 7 Quite likely his
legislative work on this bill had some influence on his selection
by the justices and the chancellor. Walker's efforts to obtain
the position indicate that he desired it and that it was neither
unwanted nor thrust upon 'him without notice:78 His appoint
ment was approved by th� Democratic press of the state and
probably by the bar in general.79
Undertaking his duties immediately, the new reporter
soon brought out the first large volume of reports of the
decisions of any court in Michigan's history, those of the court
of chancery under Chancellor Elon Farnsworth, I 8 3 6- I 842.
It was fittingly termed Harrington's Chancery Reports, inas
much as practically all of the work on it had been done by the
first reporter and not by Walker. In fact, as early as I 84I
nearly three hundred pages of chancery opinions had been
printed by Harrington at his own expense. 80 Although the
"' See notes 64 and 6 5 above.
78 On Aug. 24, I 844, he wrote to Lucius Lyon that the supreme court was
about to appoint a reporter, that his (Walker's) name had been presented as
a candidate, and that he wished Lyon to write to Chief Justice Ransom in his
favor because of Lyon's "strong influence" with the Chief Justice. LYON
LETI'ERS (William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) .
.., "The high legal attainments and untiring industry of Mr. Walker render
him peculiarly well qualified for the proper discharge of the duties of the
office in question." FREE PREss, Sept. 1 0, I 844.
80 Harrington's bill for printing ($8J I ·43) was not allowed by the legisla
ture because the reporter had been required to publish the volumes at his own
expense, although the statute had not been very clear on the question. See
HousE JouR., I 843, p. I 6, and id., I 844, pp. I I 7-I I 8. A committee of the
house recommended in I 844 that Harrington should be reimbursed for the
reports already printed and should be paid reasonable compensation for his
services (id., I 844, p. I I 9) , and an act of the same year authorized the state
treasurer, auditor general, and secretary of state to settle his claim. Mich. Pub.
Acts ( I 844) , pp. 20-2 1 . In the "Annual Report of the Auditor General" dated
Nov. 30, I 844, an item shows, that the sum of $2,J2 J.66 had been paid for the
supreme and chancery courts' reports, including the salary of reporter, but
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burning of the printing office destroyed a portion of the rest
of the manuscript, the volume was prepared almost entirely
by Harrington and the last half of it was partly in press
when Walker assumed office.81 A contemporary newspaper
notice stated that "A portion of the volume is composed of
the pamphlet volume of reports published sometime prior to
Mr. Harrington's decease, and the remainder has since been
made up from his manuscripts and notes,"82 which would in
dicate that some of the sets of pages printed by Harrington in
I 84I and I 842 were perhaps bound into pamphlet form
before the full volume was issued. However, no copy h as
been found, nor even any confirmation that one ever existed.
Although Walker was appointed attorney-general of
Michigan by the governor and the senate on March 24,
I 845,S3 this date does not mark the end of his activities as
reporter ; at least, the preface he wrote to the second volume
of chancery reports, published under his auspices, bears the
date April 1 0, I 845,84 and his successor was not named until
the following July. However, in the preparation of this
second volume Walker was aided by Chancellor Manning,
there is no indication of how much of this went to Harrington or his estate,
to the printer, or to Walker. }OINT DoCUMENTS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (hereafter cited as JOINT
Docs.) , I 845, No. 2, p. I o.
"' See the preface by H. N. Walker to HARRINGTON, MICHIGAN CHANCERY
REPORTS.
82 FREE PRESS, March 1 3, I 845. There is evidence that in the summer of
I 84I the first portion of the volume, containing decisions through I 84o, was
bound up in some fashion and offered for sale at three dollars per copy. See
the advertisement in DAILY ADVERTISER (Detroit) , July 7, I 84I. No copy of
this volume has been seen or located by this writer.
88 FREE PREss, March 25, I 845.
"' Governor Barry claimed too optimistically on Jan. 6, I 845, that the
second volume of chancery reports was already in press and would be published
the ensuing month. "Annual Message of the Governor," }OINT Docs., I 8 45, p.
6. Walker authorized J. V. Campbell to act as his agent in the sale of the
volumes. See the power of attorney and the agreements for sale made by
Campbell, March 5 and 6, I 845, in H. N. WALKER PAPERS (Burton Coli.) .
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whose decisions between April, I 842 and March, I 845 were
recorded therein, and who personally inspected the work,
offered suggestions, and even wrote some of the headnotes.85
In addition, it is probable that Harrington before his death
had labored to some extent upon the manuscript which later
constituted this volume,86 but the major credit must be given
)
to Walker. Both volumes of chancery reports were well
executed for their time, but they have been superseded for
most practical purposes by later annotated editions. 57 It is not
to be supposed that Walker confined himself in his capacity as
reporter solely to the decisions of the court of chancery ; on
the ·other hand, no reports of supreme court cases were pub
lished while he was in that office, and the only discovered
contemporary reference located from which could be inferred
any intention on his part to publish such reports lacks authori
tative support and appears to be erroneous. 58
Upon Walker's tranfer to the office of attorney-general,
several candidates for the position of reporter appeared and
an active campaign was carried on for at least two months be
fore an appointment was made. The three men most promi
nently mentioned as worthy of holding the post were Samuel
T. Douglass, Andrew Harvie, and G. V. N. Lothrop, with
"" MICHIGAN CHANCERY RE;PORTS (Walker) , Preface ( I 845) .
Harrington wrote that a part of the manuscript for his second volume
of chancery reports would be ready by the first of August I 8 44. E. B. Harring
ton to Wilcox and Harsha, June zz , 1 844, in E. W. MoRGAN PAPERS (Burton
Coll . ) .
"' In I 87z and I 8 7 8 second editions, edited b y T. M. Cooley and J . V.
Campbell respectively, were p ublished.
88 It was stated by Governor Barry on Jan. 6, 1 845, that the first volume
of reports of supreme court decisions was in the hands of the printer and that
there was hope that it would be completed before the session of the legislature
ended. "Annual Message of the Governor," JOINT Docs., 1 845, p. 6. Actually,
the first volume was not printed until 1 846. It is interesting to note that the
governor anticipated "most salutary results" from the publication of the reports,
because "A judicial construction will thus be given to the statutes, and a uni
formity secured in the administration of justice in the various circuits, and in
courts of inferior jurisdiction throughout the state, which could not otherwise
be obtained." ld. 7 ·
80
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Douglass apparently having the greatest number of advocates.
Among the prominent supporters of Douglass were George
Miles, who soon became a justice of the supreme court, Jeffer
son G. Thurber, who later was speaker of the house of repre
sentatives, and James B. Hunt, a representative in Congress
from Michigan ( r 843-r 847) ; however, Douglass was op
posed quite bitterly by the former attorney-general, Peter
Morey.89 Douglass himself was not above soliciting support ;
following the example of Walker (his law partner) he re
quested Lucius Lyon, an influential personage in Michigan
politics at that time, to recommend him to the justices and to
the chancellor for the position.90 His comments in his letter to
Lyon are illuminating:
"The office will necessarily be filled by someone re
siding here. It is not worth at the most as far as I can
judge over $700 & will occupy nearly all of a persons
[sic] time for the next two years at least and always a
great part of it. My acceptance of it will be a pecuniary
sacrifice but a sacrifice which I feel willing to make for
the sake of the more active life it would enable me to
lead, requiring as it would my attendance upon the terms
of the Sup : & Ch : cour [t] 's in the several circuits.-It
is my intention in case I receive the appointment to
retire from my present business connexion. My health
suffers too severely from my present confinement."91
'"' In letters to Justice Alpheus Felch, Miles wrote on April z8, I 845, that
Douglass had the two very important requisites of accuracy and great industry ;
Thurber wrote on May 3 1 , 1 845, that Douglass was a gentleman of integrity,
ability, good legal acquirements, and an irreproachable character ; and Hunt on
Sept. 23 [ ? ] , 1 845, wrote that Douglass was a sound lawyer, a good Demo
crat, and would give general satisfaction. On the other hand, Morey wrote
Felch on May I , I 845, that he believed Harvie was the best fitted for the
position ; he also protested against "the principle of permitting Mr. Walker
to transfer the office of Reporter to his partner [Douglass]" and stated that
"Douglass is a Whig every inch of him." These letters may be found under the
appropriate dates in the ALPHEUS FELCH PAPERS (Burton Coll . ) .
90 S. T. Douglass t o L . Lyon, Detroit, June 1 3 , 1 845, LYON LETTERS
(William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) .
81 I d.
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Why the reporter would have to reside in Detroit is not
clear, unless Douglass meant that the largest share of the busi
ness of the supreme and chancery courts was done in the first
circuit, but the argument was proved unsound by the fact that
both of the next two reporters were not residents of Detroit.92
Presumably Douglass believed that only two hundred dollars
in profits could be made annually from the sale of the reports,
because the salary of the reporter was still five hundred
dollars per year, and, as he stated, anyone who gave up a
lucrative business to accept the office of reporter would entail
a "pecuniary sacrifice." However, it should be noted that,
contrary to his expressed intentions, Douglass did not retire
from his law partnership when he received the appointment,
but continued in active practice of his profession throughout
the period of his incumbency as reporter.93 His appointment,
announced in Detroit on July 7, I 84S/4 was probably made
at the July term of the second circuit of the supreme court
held at Ann Arbor. 95
Although Samuel T. Douglass was born in Vermont in
I 8 I 4, his parents moved to New York state when he was still
a young child. There he was educated at Fredonia Academy,
and later studied law in the offices of James Mullet and of
Esek Cowen, both noted attorneys . He came to Michigan in
I 83 7, was admitted to the bar in I 8 3 8, and, after a few
months spent in Ann Arbor, settled in Detroit, where he
.. Randolph Manning of Pontiac and George C. Gibbs of Marshall.
93 See 8 DoUGLASS, WALKER, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BooK, 1 847I 85o, in the Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan.
"' The FREE PRESS, July 7, 1 845, commended the appointment highly :
"The selection is an excellent one. Mr. Douglass is a sound, well read and
industrious lawyer ; and both in professional and private life has, in an unusual
measure, secured the confidence and respect of his fellow citizens." Justice
Ransom called Douglass his "own much esteemed friend . . . to whom I am
strongly attached, & whom I regard as one of the most valuable & promising
men of his age, in our profession-." E. Ransom to H. N. Walker, Aug. 22,
1 846, H. N. WALKER LETTERS (Burton Coli.) .
"' Inasmuch as the JouRNAL for the second circuit of the supreme court,
I 8 3 6-1 85 I , is missing, we have no official record of the appointment.
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entered the law firm of Asher B. Bates and H enry N.
Walker. When Bates retired in I 8 40 a partnership was
formed with Walker under the name of Douglass and
Walker, and in I 845 James V. Campbell was added as a part
ner. Douglass. held the offices of city attorney of Detroit and
of president of the Detroit Young Men's Society in I 843.
Somewhat interested in science and geology in addition to the
law, he accompanied his cousin, Douglass Houghton, the first
state geologist of Michigan, on at least two of his j ourneys
to the Lake Superior regions. A Democrat in politics, but not
strongly partisan, he was highly regarded both legally and
personally, and, until he was elected to the bench in I 8 5 I,
his law firm ranked among the best and most prominent in
Detroit.96
Soon after his appointment Douglass exhibited vigor in
the prosecution of his duties as reporter, taking steps to secure
and edit the opinions delivered by the justices of the supreme
court.97 By October 7, I 845, he wrote that he was so hard at
.. These facts have been gathered from the following biographical sketches
of Douglass : Buel, "The Bench and Bar of Detroit," 3 MAG. WEST HIST.
669 at 700-704 ( I 8 86) ; Chaney, "The Supreme Court of Michigan," 2 GREEN
BAG 3 7 7 at 3 8 5-386 ( I 89o) ; CYCLOPEDIA OF MICHIGAN I 70-I 7 I ( I 89o) ;
FARMER, THE HISTORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN, biog. ed., I I I 5-I I I 6
( I 8 8 9 ) ; I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 249 ( I 9 24) ; 2 W. W. PoTTER, CouRTS
AND LAWYERS OF MICHIGAN I I 66-I I 67 (unpublished MS., I 93 6) ; G. I.
REED, BENCH AND BAR OF MICHIGAN 244 ( I 897) ; R. B. Ross, THE EARLY
BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT 48-5 3 ( I 907) ; Walker, "The Detroit Bar," 2
MICH. L. ]. I at I 2- l 3 ( I 89 3 ) ; MICHIGAN, NISI PRIUS CASES (Howell)
342-343 ( I 8 84) ; 0. Kirchner, I 2 I Mich. xxxv-xliv (I 899) . Some discrepancy
exists in the dat-es cited by these as to the year when Douglass was admitted
to practice, Farmer, Potter and Reed stating that it was I 837, but the Cyclopedia
of Michigan and a "Roll of Michigan Lawyers" in the Appendix of Reed's
Bench and Bar, both cite I 8 3 8. The last named source seems to be the best
since it supposedly was copied from the original roll of attorneys kept in the
office of the clerk of the supreme court.
97 Felch sent his earlier opinions to Douglass on Sept. 29, r 845, but re
served the remainder for use and reference in the circuit courts. A. Felch to
S. T. Douglass, Sept. 29, I 845, FELCH PAPERS (Burton Coli.) . C. W. Whipple to
S. T. Douglass, Pontiac, Dec. r, 1 845, HERBERT BowEN PAPERS (Burton
Coli.) . Whipple said that he wrote an opinion in the case of Ketchum v. Pierce,
(Sup. Ct. Calendar, 3d eire., No. 7 2 [r 844] ) which he was unable to find at
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work that he could not find even an hour's leisure time.98
Douglass seems to have entertained some thought of pub
lishing the opinions of the supreme court which had been
written before I 843, but Ransom, chief justice since I 843,
counseled against such a move, stating that "a report of them
would be neither useful to the publik or the Profession, nor
very creditable to the Court. The truth is, that while Judge
Fletcher was on the Bench, most of the decisions were
announced orally, by him, & the opinions written out-I
speak of those held by myself-were but hasty & imperfect
sketches of the decision.m9 It is quite probable that Douglass,
through his predecessor and law partner, Walker, fell heir to
the papers, notes, and opinions gathered by the first reporter,
Harrington. At least we know that Walker employed Har
rington's manuscript for nearly all of the first, and part of the
second, volume of chancery reports, and there is little reason
to suppose that Walker did not turn over to Douglass all of
the materials pertaining to the office of reporter.
No opinions before I 843 were included in the first volume
(I 846) of reports published by Douglass, but in his second
volume (I 849) there are six, one of which had been delivered
in I 84o, one in I 84I , and four in I842.100 He himself ex
plained as follows the failure to print more of them :
"No complete series of the decisions of the court
prior to I 843 can now be obtained, and the recent rea later date. C. W. Whipple to S. T. Douglass, Pontiac, Aug. 2 I , I 846, HER
BERT BoWEN PAPERS. It has never been published or located.
98 S. T. Douglass to Silas H. Douglass, Detroit, Oct. 7, I 845, S. H. DouG
LASS LETTERS (University of Michigan Library) .
99 E. Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. I , I 845, HERBERT
BOWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) .
100
All six were printed as footnotes to later cases in which similar questions
were involved. They were : Davis v. Ingersoll, 2 Doug. 3 72 ( I 840) ; Owen
v. Farmers' Bank of Sandstone, 2 Doug. I 34 ( r 8 4 I ) ; Caswell v. Ward, 2
Doug. 3 7 4 ( I 842) ; Chamberlin v. Brown, 2 Doug. I 20 (I 842) ; Royce v.
Bradburn, 2 Doug. 3 7 7 ( r 842) ; and Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. 334
( I 842 ) .
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vision of the statutes has rendered many of those which
have been preserved, of comparatively little value. Some
of them, however, are of permanent interest, and these,
together with the decisions made subsequently to the
time when the above mentioned volume closes, will be
published in another volume now in the course of prep
aration, and which it is hoped will be issued from the
press during the next summer." 101
Of the six earlier opinions printed in volume two, a manu
script copy of only one of them is known to exist /02 this fact
suggests the possibility that Douglass might have possessed
many more manuscript opinions which never were filed with
the clerk of the supreme court. As late as I 848 Douglass
wrote that a manuscript opinion in a certain case decided in
I 842 "is now before me.moa
Governor Alpheus Felch, who had been a justice of the
supreme court from I 842 to I 845, in January I 846 estimated
that probably three volumes would be required to report the
supreme court cases already decided ; in actuality, however,
less than a volume and a half were filled by the decisions
which, by a strict interpretation, should have been compre
hended in the period mentioned by Felch. 104 Although the
101

FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, I 847·
.
Chamberlin v. Brown, Sup. Ct., I st eire., file No. I 95·
103 S. T. Douglass to H. C. Wright, Detroit, Feb. 22, I 848, in 8 WALKER,
DouGLAss, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS B oo K 263 (Mich. Hist. Coli.,
University of Michigan) . The case was that of Moses v. Steamboat Missouri,
which was printed in I 8 5 2 in I Mich. (Manning) 507 Appendix ( I 842 ) .
1.. "Annual Message of the Governor," JoiNT Do cs., I 846, p. 6. Governor
Felch also called attention to the great importance of publishing the decisions,
and said that Douglass intended to present during the year I 846 the reports
of all important cases in both the supreme court and the chancery court. Id.
No opinions of the court of chancery between March I 845 and March I 84 7,
when the separate chancery court"'eeased to exist, have ever been printed.
Manning remained chancellor until the Revised Statutes of I 846 (which
provided for the abolition of the r.ourt in I 847 ) were adopted, when he re
signed ; former chancellor Elon Farnsworth was reappointed to �he post in
June I 846, and served for the remaining months of the court's existence.
Nothing has been found except the reference by Felch that Douglass intended
to publish a volume of chancery reports.
102
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governor may have been mistaken or misinformed, his reputa
tion for accuracy and truthfulness permits one to conjecture
upon the possibility of the existence of many other opinions
that were not printed. It is certain that when Douglass in
I 8 50 delivered the manuscript opinions to his successor in
the office of reporter, Randolph Manning, only those after
I 845 and none prior to I 843 were included. 10 5 Nevertheless,
a search of the available Douglass papers has failed to dis
close any supreme court opinions.106
Douglass had planned to issue a third volume in August
or September of I 8 so, but he retired from the office before
that time/07 It appears that he was instrumental in the selec
tion of Randolph Manning, former chancellor,108 as the new
1.. Douglass drew up an inventory which listed, according to the year and
to the justice who delivered them, all of the manuscript opinions which he was
turning over to his successor. When Manning received them on July r r , r 85o,
he had to acknowledge by his signature that the opinions were in his possession.
Although it is not important in the present study, this list is significant because
it proves that many supreme court opinions were written after r 843 that were
never included in the printed reports. Nearly forty opinions, composed between
r 8 46-r 8 5o, that have not been published and are not known to exist in manu
script, were cited by Douglass. 8 WALKER, DouGLAss , and CAMPBELL, LETI'ER
PRESS BooK 847-852 (Mich. Hist. Coli., University of Michigan) . Douglass
himself wrote that he had an opinion for the case o f Stowell v. Walker (Sup.
Ct., r st eire., file No. 3 1 8) decided in 1 844, but ' that he was not publishing it.
See r Doug. 524, note ( r 845) .
108 While searching through a part of Douglass' papers in his old home
stead on Grosse Ile, the writer and Mr. Henry Brown of the Michigan
Historical Collections located five of the eight volumes of letterpress books kept
between 1 8 37 and r 85 o by the law firm of which Mr. Douglass was a member.
Volume 8 has proved most helpful.
101 GRAND RAPIDS ENQUIRER, Jan. r 6, r 85 o, quoting the DETROIT FREE
PRESS. There must have been some public interest in the reports, because Doug
lass wrote the editor that he had received many inquiries as to when the third
volume would be published. Douglass offered his resignation at the May 1 850
term of court and it was accepted by the supreme court in July. FREE PRESS,
July 6, r 85o.
108 Biographical sketches of Manning may be found in the following:
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF EMINENT AND SELF-MADE MEN:
REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF MICHIGAN, part VI, p. 49 ( 1 8 7 8 ) ; Baldwin,
"Judge Randolph Manning," 1 4 MICHIGAN PIONEER AND HISTORICAL CoL
LECTIONS 41 8-421 ( r 8 9o) (Michigan Historical Commission) ; Felch, "Michi
gan's Court of Chancery," 2 1 id. 325 at 329 ( 1 8 94) ; 2 MICHIGAN BIOGRA
PHIES 73-74 ( 1 924) ; G. I. REED, BENCH AND BAR OF MICHIGAN I 2 ( 1 897) ;
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reporter. 1 09 Manning's appointment was conferred the first
week in July, when the supreme court was in session at Jack
son. 110 His first and only volume of reports was not published
until I 8 52. It is important here to note only that in the ap
pendix he included one opinion which had been written and
delivered before I 84J.111 Since this opinion had been in the
possession of Douglass in I 848 112 but was not cited in the list
of those which Douglass had turned over to Manning in
I 8 s o, one might be tempted to draw the hasty conclusion that
Douglass had transferred all of the decisions of the supreme
court which he possessed, while making a record of only those
dating after I 845 . However, because inquiries had been made
about this particular opinion, it seems more logical to suppose
that Douglass himself had determined to publish it in the
third volume of reports which he had contemplated issuing
in I 8 so, in consequence of which Manning had acquired it
along with any other work Douglass might have done on
volume three. The entire matter is highly conj ectural and
with present sources cannot be determined with finality.
It is not known definitely whether Manning resigned or
was removed from the office of reporter ; at any rate George
C. Gibbs of Marshall113 was appointed to the position on
R. B. Ross, THE EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF DETROIT I 3 I- I 3 3 ( I 907) ;
MICHIGAN, NISI PRIUS CASES (Howell) 343 (I 8 84) ; remarks by A. C.
Baldwin, A. B. Maynard, Chief Justice Sherwood, and Justice Campbell in
65 Mich. li-lix ( r 8 8 9 ) .
109 Manning wrote to Douglass that he knew of nothing "to prevent my
accepting the appointment mentioned by you, should the Judges of the Supreme
Court think proper to confer it on me." Pontiac, May I S , r 8so, HERBERT
BowEN PAPERS (Burton Coil.) .
11°
FREE PREss, July 6, I 85o. As the Journal for the second circuit, 1 8 3 6I 8 5 1 , is missing, no official record of the appointment has been found.
m Moses v. Steamboat Missouri, I Mich. 507 ( 1 842) .
112 8 WALKER, DOUGLASS, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BOOK 2 6 3 (Mich.
Hist. Coil. University of Michigan) .
,
113
For a sketch of Gibbs' life, see I MICHIGAN BIOGRAPHIES 3 2 3 ( I 924) .
A contemporary said of Gibbs that "A discriminating mind, accurate education,
habits of thought and industry, and above all a courteous hearing, fully qualify
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January 6, I 8 53. 114 During the four years in which he held
the office, Gibbs published as many volumes (three) of su
preme court reports as had his four predecessors in twelve
years or as had his two immediate predecessors in seven years,
but in none of them did he print any opinions that had been
written before I 843. There is no evidence that he possessed
such material, or that any manuscripts had been transferred
to him by Manning. However, the next state reporter,
Thomas M. Cooley, obtained and printed in I 8 6o an opinion
in a case that had been decided in I 84I ! 11 5 It would seem that
until a law of I 8 55 made it the duty of the reporter to have
accurate copies of the supreme court opinions made and the
originals returned to the proper offices for filing, 116 the' re
porters had been in the habit ot retaining the original manu
scripts in their personal possession, at least until the end of
their term.
In view of the fact that the early supreme court records
are incomplete11 7 and that the available opinions are not
numerous, it is to be regretted that the newspapers of the day
did not devote more space to the business of the court and to
its decisions. Prior to I 847 the discussion in the press of su
preme court cases was very spasmodic, limited mainly to de
cisions which were of great public moment or in which the
editors themselves might have had a personal or political
interest.118 Only one instance has been found before that date
him for the discharge of the responsible duties of the station." FREE PRESS,
Jan. 8, r 85 3 . Just why a "courteous bearing" should be important for the
office of reporter is not clear. See also the MICHIGAN ARGUS (Ann Arbor) ,
Jan. 1 2 , 1 85 3 .
114 2 SuP. CT. JouR., rst eire., 26o ( r 8 5J ) .
'" Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463 ( r 84 r ) .
116
Mich. Pub. Acts ( r 8s s ) , pp. 46-47.
117 For a description of the supreme court calendars, journals, and :files
known to be extant, see Norton, "Missing Supreme Court Documents," 26
I
M ICH. HISTORY MAG. 5 1 8 ( 1 942) .
118
For example, discussion of individual cases appeared in the MICHIGAN
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in which an attempt was made to list even so much as the
names and judgments of all cases decided at a particular term.
However, that one article proved most helpful because the
journal is not extant for that session of the court.119 Not until
I 845 did any Michigan newspaper, as far as is known, print
a copy of a full opinion delivered by a justice of the state
supreme court.120
If we discount the headnotes of chancery opinions pub
lished through the efforts of Harrington in I 842 and I 843/21
no systematic account of superior court decisions appeared in
the newspapers until Samuel T. Douglass, as reporter, under
took the task of providing one in I 847 ; 1 22 during his remain
ing years in office he supplied the Free Press, the main organ
of the Democratic Party, with abstracts of many of the
supreme court opinions, lists of j udgments, and names of
justices who delivered opinions in the cases not abstracted. 123
This practice was followed by later reporters, while in addi
tion the same newspaper often published synopses of decisions
and proceedings in court written by some attorney or staff
member who was present at the session. 1 24
I O and May 3 I , I 843, and May 2 7 , I 846 ; in the
MICHIGAN STATE JouRNAL (Ann Arbor) , Feb. 28, I 844 and Oct. I , I 84s ;
in the FREE PREss, Oct. 7, I 8 3 7> March 3, I 843, and Feb. 1 2, I 6, and 2 3,
.
1 844 ; in the PONTIAC COURIER, May I 8 , I 8 3 8.
110 The MICHIGAN ARGUS (Ann Arbor) , Jan. 24, I 839, listed eight de
cisions given by the supreme court at its Jan. term, I 8 39, in Ann Arbor. No
ARGUS (Ann Arbor) , May

other record is known to exist for three of the cases-Culver v. Raney, Carter
v. Clark alias Turrill, and Davidson v. Smith-and the exact judgment of the
court was not known for three of the others.
"" FREE PREss, April 2, I 845, published Felch's opinion in Cahill v.
Kalamazoo Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Doug. I 24 ( I 845 ) .
121
See note 59 above.
"" FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, I 847.
123 Abstracts of opinions or lists of the j ustices who delivered opm10ns
will be found in the FREE PRESS for the following dates : Jan. 2o, M arch 24
and 26, April 2, 3, 6, 24, 27, and 3 0, May I, June 2, July 22, 23, and 2 7,
Aug. 7, Dec. 7, I 84 7 ; Jan. 24, Feb. 1 4, March 2, 6, and I 8, May 3, 4, and
5, I 848 ; March 23 and 29, I 849 ; March 7, 1 9, and 2 I , May I I , 1 8 5o.
"" See the FREE PRESS for Jan. 20, 24, 2 8, 30, and 3 I , Feb. I I , April I ,
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Some of the weeklies throughout the state occasionally
copied the information given in the Detriot papers about the
January terms, but rarely did they take the initiative to print
such news originally, even when the supreme court was
holding its term in their particular localities.125 It is ex
asperating to note how, year after year, the journals of Ann
Arbor, Jackson, Pontiac, Kalamazoo, and Adrian, all towns
in which the supreme court met annually at different times,
rarely did more in their pages than to call attention to the
fact that the court would soon begin its session, or had j ust
6
closed its term, or had admitted certain persons to the bar ; 12
seldom before I 84 7 did they print so much as a list of cases
on the docket or of the decisions rendered at any particular
term.
Conclusion
It should not be supposed that the Supreme Court of
Michigan between I 8 J 8 and 1 843, or between 1 843 and
I 8 57, delivered written opinions in the majority, or even
one-half, of the causes which they decided during those years.
As a matter of fact, opinions are available for but a little more
than one-tenth of the total number of cases disposed before
I 843, and for about one-fourth of those disposed before
I 8S r ; March 1 3, I 8S 2 i March 1 2 and I4, I 8S 3 i Jan. I I , I 4, I S, 27, 2 8 , and
3 I , Feb. I, 2, 3, s, 7, 8, and I o, March s, and ro, I 8S4 i Jan. 3, 9, 1 3, I 6,
I 8, I 9, 2 o, and 3 I , Feb. 2, March 8, 9, I 4, I 6, I 7, and 20, July I I , I 8s s ;
Jan. u , 26, 27, Feb. 6, 7, 8, 23, 27, March I 4, I S, I 8 s 6 ; Jan. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
I I , q, I S , and 3 I , March I o, I 8S 7·
125 See the OAKLAND GAZETTE (Pontiac) , Jan. 2 7, I 847 ; PoNTIAC JACK
SONIAN, Dec. 2s, I 8s o ; PoNTIAC GAZETTE, March 24, I 8SS, and Feb. 7, I 8S 7 ;
LANSING REPUBLICAN, March 1 8 and 26, April I , I 8s o ; MICHIGAN EXPOSITOR
(Adrian) , July I I , I 8S7· However, the ADRIAN WATCHTOWER en July 1 2,
I 8S 3 > carried a rather full and very useful account of the court's session held
there earlier in that same month.
126
See the STATE JoURNAL (Ann Arbor) , Jan. 1 2 , I 8 3 7 ; PoNTIAC JACK
SONIAN, Jan. 2 r , I 842 ; KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 1 842 ; MICHIGAN
STATE JOURNAL, Jan. 2S, I 84 3 ; PoNTIAC JACKSONIAN, Jan. 2o, I 843 ; OAK
LAND GAZETTE (Pontiac) Jan. 20, I 847•

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

xlvii

I 8 58.121 In the early years it was quite common for many
decisions to be given orally or for no formal opinion in addition
to the judgment of the court to be rendered.128 There is proof
that as late as I 84�, if a case was of no great importance, the
court might not direct an opinion to be written for it.m Not
withstanding, the evidence seems incontrovertible that many
more decisions were written by the .justices of the supreme
court before I 843 than those which were published or which
still remain in the files. Although it is not pertinent to the
present inquiry, it might be mentioned that a total of fifty-six
other opinions for which no copies are available have been
cited in various contemporary sources as having been de
livered between I 843 and I 8 58.130
The fate or present whereabouts of these and other
opinions which probably were written cannot be answered
satisfactorily. Thomas. M. Cooley intended in I 8 58 to publish
at least some of them. 13 1 Although he was forced to relinquish
that plan,1 3 2 he did include in one of his later volumes two
127 See NoRTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN, r 8 3 6- r 8 5 7, Table XXII, Appendix, p. 3 1 ( 1 940) .
128 E. Ransom to S. T. Douglass, Kalamazoo, Dec. r , 1 845, HERBERT
BoWEN PAPERS (Burton Coli.) .
329 The reporter stated in r 849 that he had been informed by Judge Wing
"that no written opinion was delivered by the Supreme Cour_t in the license
case, at Jackson, the case having been decided upon a point not deemed of any
practical importance . . . . " S. T. Douglass to [ ? ] Smith [? ], Detroit, Sept.
1 4, 1 849, 8 WALKER, DoUGLASS, and CAMPBELL, LETTERPRESS BOOK 6 7 1
(Mich . Hist. Coli., University of Michigan) .
130 See NORTON, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN, r 8 3 6- r 8 5 7, Table XXIII, Appendix, p. 3Z ( 1 940) .
""' A note in the front of Cooley's first volume of reports (5 Mich . ) , dated
at Adrian, December, r 8 5 8, stated : "The unreported decisions of the late
Supreme Court, it is hoped, may be collected and included in the next volume.
There are, among them, some cases of importance which the profession would
doubtless be glad to have preserved in an accessible form."
""' A note in the front of his second volume ( 6 Mich.) explained why he
failed to report them as he had contemplated : "The hope was expressed . . •
that the unreported decisions of the former: bench could be collected, and
included in this volume. It has, however, been found impracticable to obtain
the most important of th ose decisions, and the intention to publish any is
therefore abandoned." This statement would seem to indicate that Cooley
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opmwns, dated I 84I and I 8 57 respectively, giving as his
reason for doing so the fact that many inquiries had been
made about them.1 33 The certainty that Cooley had access in
I 86o to an opinion which had been written as early as I 84I
may or may not be of great significance. If he obtained it from
the official files, there is little cause for worry ; but, if it was
only one of many more which he might possibly have in
herited by virtue of his office as reporter, that fact would be
most disheartening and disconcerting to anyone searching for
more decisions of the supreme court, because many of Cooley's
earlier papers were destroyed about I 8 94. 1 34 There is no
doubt that the justices of the supreme court frequently bor
rowed from the reporter, previous to their publication, various
opinions that had been written either by themselves or by
their brethren on the bench ; 1 3 5 likewise, it is certain that the
reporter in turn withdrew the opinions from the files of the
court for the purpose of reporting. 1 36 With such a system of
record-keeping it is conceivable that many original manuscript
opinions might have found their way into the private papers
of any one of twenty-five or more contemporary dignitaries
and have been lost, destroyed, or interred in some unknown
depository.
knew about the existence and the location of at least several opinions which,
for some reason, he could not obtain for publication.
m Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 M ich. 463 (I 8 4 I ) ; Jackson v. Evans, 8 Mich.
477 ( I 85 7 ) .
,.. "Most of m y letters prior to I 8 8 z were destroyed Jan. z , I 894." Index
to Scrapbook, p. A, CooLEY PAPERS (Mich. Hist. Coll., University of Michi
gan) .
1"' For example, see a series of letters by Justice George Miles to the re
porter, S. T. Douglass, requesting the loan of several different opinions. Aug.
I I and I 7, Sept. u , I 847, and Aug. 6, I 849, HERBERT BowEN PAPERS (Bur
ton Coll. ) .
136 Gibbs in I 8 5 6 wrote to E . Hawley, clerk of the court at Detroit, asking
Hawley to send him three opinions field by Justice Copeland "subsequent to the
time I [Gibbs] called for the opinions o f last Jan. term, I presume. If filed will
you have the kindness to forward to me by express." Marshall, Feb. 71 I 8 5 61
Sup. Ct., Miscellaneous files.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

xlix

In respect to the publication of its highest court decisions,
the state of Michigan was unfortunate during the first years
of its existence. The first volume of reports did not come from
the press until I 846, and, during the whole twenty-one year
period from the appointment of the first justices to the
establishment in I 8 58 of the so-called "independent" su
preme court, there were but six volumes of supreme court
cases and two volumes of chancery court cases issued. Only
a few supreme court opinions delivered before I 843 have
previously been printed, while many of those which were
rendered both before and after that date are not available
at present. The men who were selected as reporters, all
of whom were able, industrious; and well qualified for the
position� were not solely at fault for the delay and omissions ;
the legislature, and even a few of the justices of the supreme
court, exhibited at times much lethargy in their support of
the reports and the reporter. Furthermore, it must not be
forgotten that the history of reporting in many other states
had been quite similar to that in Michigan, that often private
individuals rather than public officials had undertaken the
publication of opinions, and that Michigan is not unique in
the lack of full, complete reports. But to any student who is
interested in judicial history and the development of law,
this deficiency, while possibly excusable, is extremely regret
table.
The long-existing incompleteness in early Michigan court
reports has not in the past presented a mere academic question
of no practical importance. Ignorance of these formerly un
available opinions of the supreme court has not been confined
to the layman, or even to the attorney ; on occasion no less a
figure than a member of the highest state bench could have
profi.ted if it had been possible for him to examine the unpub
lished opinions of former justices. For instance, Justice

1
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Warner Wing, in a decision rendered in I 849,137 while
referring to a case which had been decided more than ten
years previously/38 wrote that "The opinion of the supreme
court was not reduced to writing, and, therefore, we can only
state the fact handed down to us by tradition."139 As a matter
of fact, the opinion in the earlier case had been written by
Justice Ransom, is still extant in the files of the court, and is
printed in this volume for the first time/40 The present pub
lication of all the known supreme court opinions before I 843
will partially fill a heretofore unfortunate gap· in Michigan
legal records.
Sept�mber, I 944·

CLARK F. NoRTON

Scott v. Smart's Executors, I Mich. 295 ( I 849) .
Calhoun v. Cable, Sup. Ct., r st eire., Chancery Calendar (I 8 3 8 ) , case
I J , p. 25.
1 39 I Mich. at 298 ( 1 84 9 ) .
140 Mich. Terr. Sup. Ct., file No. 1 49 I ; see infra, p. 4·
137

138

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
William A. Fletcher, July r 8 36-April r 842
George Morell, July 1 83 6-July r 843
Epaphroditus Ransom, July 1 83 6-December r 847
Charles W. Whipple, April 1 839-0ctober r 85 5
Alpheus Felch, April 1 842-November r 845

Fletcher was chief justice. Upon his retirement
Morell became chief justice.
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Opinions
EDITOR's NoTE : The original manuscripts o f the following opinions,
together with other records of the Michigan Supreme Court prior to
1 8 5 7, are now in the Legal Research Building at the University of
Michigan. The notes following the opinions have been prepared from
data gathered by Dr. Norton, author of the Introduction, in the
course of his study of the early history of the court.

EDWARD MUNDY versus JOHN SARGENT
January 9, 1 83 8

1 . A person may not be sued in a justice's court in a county
other than that of his residence except when the action is
commenced by warrant and it appears that the defendant is
about to REMOVE from the county or the plaintiff is in
danger of losing his debt. {Terr. Laws of r 833, pp. r95,
2 09.)

2. Where the only bas�s for issuing a warrant against a non
resident was the fact that he was about to LEAVE the
county, the justice erred in not sustaining a plea in abate
ment.
Supr�me Court, Second Circuit. Certiorari to a justice of
the peace, Jackson County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment
reversed.
Edward Mundy, in propria persona.
. . . . . . Morgan, attorney for defendant in certiorari.

[ INDORSEMENT]
Edward Mundy
vs.
John Sargeant
In Error
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[OPINION]
Edward Mundy
vs.
John Sargeant

�

Sup. Ct. Second Cir. Jan. Tr.
r 8J8.

Certio. to Justice of the Peace.
By return of Justice it appearsThat original action was commenced by warrant Feb. r 834
before Justice Thompson, Co. of Jackson, on application of
Justice GoodwinBoth parties resided out of Co. of Jackson
Plf. & Deft. resided in Co. of WashtenawThe Deft. plead in Abatement "that he was a resident of
Washtenaw Co. Mich. that he was sued out of the Co. in which
he resided without proof to the Justice, that the Plf. was in
danger of losing his debt or that Deft. was about to remove
from the Co. of Jackson .
The plea overruled-]ustice decided on the ground that
Deft. residing out of Co. in which action was brought, was a
non resident, within meaning of the StatuteA question was also made, touching authority of Goodwin,
to appear for Plf. Not necessary to decide that question here
First point perfectly clearBy our Statute, no person may be proceeded against, except
by warrant, out of the Co. in which he residesBy 4 1 . Sec. Justice Act. it is provided that no person who is
a resident of Michigan shall be sued out of the Co. in which
he resides, unless it be by warrant obtained on the same proof
as warrants are obtained where both parties are residents of
same Co.By �th Sec. same Act it is provided that any person his
Ate &c applying for warrant, shall prove to the satisfaction of
the Justice-One of two things, that the Deft. is about to

·

MuNDY v. SARGENT
remove

from the Co.

or

3

that the Plf. will be in danger of

losing his debt &0 unless the process agst Deft. be by war
rant-

The Stat. evidently, requires the same proof in cases where

warrants are applied for agst Deft.

out

of Co. in which he

resides, as would be, where he proceeded agst in Co. in which
he resides-

The reason is apparent-were otherwise might be con
tinually embarrassed by arrests, when going out of their Cos
on business-

The same reasons apply to both casesThe reason, for which a warrant is granted is in our case,

when Deft. is about to remove-is that Plf. may not be put

to inconvenience of going into another County or out of the

State perhaps, to collect his debt of Deft. The Plf. need not

lie by & see Deft. remove his person

& effects, out of Co.

So, if Deft. be making such disposition of his property, as

would endanger Plf's debt unless he proceed forthwith, he is

enabled by the Stat., to take warrant, & arrest the Deft. at
once-

Was there proof in this case of either fact which authorizes

Justice to issue warrant ?

Goodwin as agt of Plf. applied for warrant, & on oath testi

fied to Justice, that he was not afraid of Defts. responsibility

but that ·he was about to

leave the

Co. not

remove.

The Justice decided on the ground, that the Deft. not living

in Co. of Jackson where action was brought, was a

resident'' he

so returns expressly-

[.ee l

non

This was· clearly erroneous-the j udgt of the Justice must

therefore be reversed & the Plf. in Error recover his costs-

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in file No. 1 1 5 8 (as renumbered in 1 902 )
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. A draft of a report by Harrington
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is also in the file. The case was transferred to the Supreme C ourt
from the territorial Superior Circuit Court, Washtenaw County.
The Judgment Record of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, con
tains : p. 1 27 ( March 5 , 1 834) affidavit of Mundy ; p. 1 29 (April
4, 1 834) writ of certiorari ; p. 1 29 (July 8, 1 834) return of ]. P . ;
p. 1 3 1 (Jan. 9, 1 838 ) judgment of reversal.

A. B. CALHOUN versus DAVID CABLE, A. H.
STOWELL, and CALEB CROSS
January 1 3 , 1 8 3 8
I.

2.

3·

4·
5·

The schedule of the Constitution of I835, declaring that
all writs, actions, etc., pending in the territorial courts
shall continue, preserves these matters until the legislature
acts. After the legislature has acted, any matter not pro
vided for abates.
The act of March 2 6, I836 (Pub. A cts, I 813 s-36, p. 3 o ) ,
which provided that civil suits AT LAW and criminal prose
cutions be transferred to the state supreme court or to a
circuit court of the state, did not authorize the transfer of
suits in equity.
The act of March 2 6, I8;3 6 (Pub. A cts, I 835-36, p. 3 8),
which provided that suits in equity be transferred to the
state court of chancery, excluded cases in which the
chancellor had served as counsel.
This suit, being one in which the chancellor served as
counsel, and no provision having been made for its trans
fer, has abated.
As the legislature has no power to revive suits which have
abated, the act of February I I, I 8:3 7 ( Pub. A cts, r8g7,
p. I I) directing that suits in which the chancellor is inter
ested be transferred from the territorial supreme court to
the state supreme court is invalid.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. In chancery. Motion to
strike from docket. Opinion by Ransom, J. Stricken from
docket.
H. N. Walker, for the motion.
A. S. Porter, contra.

CALHOUN
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CABLE

'V.

[INDORSEMENT]
[ None ]

[ OPINION]
A. B. Calhoun
vs.

David Cable et als.
In Chancery
cause from the docket.

l

Supreme Court-First
Jan. Tr. 1 83 8

Circuit

On motion to strike the

This action was ori&inally commenced in the Sup. Court

of the late territory of Michigan

&

was there pending when

that Court was abolished by the Act of the State legislature,
approved March 1 8 3 6.
When the territorial Courts ceased to exist, all matters

therein pending, also expired, unless continued in life by
some legislative enactment.

That causes pending in any court are abated by the expir

ing of that court, seems not to be questioned.

Does the Act of March, 1 8 3 6, wrest this cause from the

operation of the common law principle just attended to ?

I think, most clearly it does not. By the 8th Sec. of that

Act, all civil suits
indictments

then

&

at law &

criminal prosecutions, appeals

all cases where there might be a trial by j ury,

pending in any of the courts of record-All writs

warrants

& process whatever relating to

any civil suit

or criminal prosecution, which had issued

&

at law,

then existed, or

which shoul� be issued before the 4th day of July then next
were transferred & made returnable to the Supreme or Circuit
Court of the State, as they severally might have j uridiction

thereof.
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And by the same section all the dockets records documents
writings & proceedings of causes, civil & criminal, are in like

manner transferred to the Supreme or Circuit Courts. And

those courts are empowered to hear, try & determine

all such causes & matters so transferred &c. Stat. of

P. 3 I-J2.

I 836

What class of cases did the legislature intend to transfer

from the territorial courts to the State Courts, by that Act ?

Evidently, all suits at law, civil & criminal & no others.

It is said in argument, that inasmuch as all the dockets,
records, documents, & proceedings of causes, civil & criminal,
making no express reservation of the dockets &c. &c. per
taining to the cases in chancery, are, by the Act, transferred

to the Supreme & Circuit courts, that this court

jurisdictiol). of this cause .

may

assume

If that be the legitimate construction of the Act of

all the

causes, as well,

in chancery

as

at law,

I 8 3 6,

pending in the

territorial Courts, at the time of their extinction, were, by

that act transferred to the Supr�me and Circuit Courts of the
State.
A construction so broad in its application, it seems to me,

can hardly be contended for, indeed such a construction is

entirely precluded by the provisions of the Act to establish

a court of chancery, enacted cotemporaneously with the act

creating the Supreme & Circuit Courts.

By the second Section of the Act establishing the Court

of Chancery, exclusive original jurisdiction, in all matters

properly cognisable by courts of chancery, is conferred on the
Chancellor, by the

3d

Section, all the powers & jurisdiction

conferred on the Supreme Court of the late territory of

Michigan by a certain A ct, are conferred on the Court of
Chancery, and by the 9th Sec. all suits & matters in Chancery

pending in any of the territorial courts-all writs or process

whatsoever, which then had issued &c. concerning matters

CALHOUN
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in chancery, and all the dockets, records, documents, writings

&

proceedings in said suits

&

matters, are in like manner,

transferred to the court of chancery.

The legislature obviously intended to confer j urisdiction

of all matters

at law &

such only, on the Sup.

&

Circuit

Courts, and of matters in chancery on the Court of Chancery.

-But in the same 9th Sec. of the Act last alluded to, it is

expressly provided, that no suit or matter, in which the
Chancellor may have been interested, as Counsel or otherwise,

shall be transferred to the Court of Chancery, but that such

suits

&

matters shall be proceeded in by the Courts in which

the same originated-

I f then, by the Act, creating the Supreme Court, no

suits or matters in chancery be transferred to that tribunal,

and if also, by the Act establishing the Court of Chancery, all
causes in which the Chancellor was interested, be excluded

from his jurisdiction, it necessarily follows, that when the

Supreme Court of the territory was abolished by the Act of
March

r8

3 6, this cause, being one in which the Chancellor

was interested as counsel, was abated.

Now the question arises whether the legislature by a

subsequent Act could revive, and confer on this or any other
Court, the power to rehear

& try, a cause, which by operation

of law was abated and consequently determined?

Suppose a suit was abated for 'any ordinary cause, would

it be competent for the legislature by subsequent enactment

to declare that such suit should be revived, and the parties

compelled, in violation of the settled rules of law to proceed
to a trial of the merits? That will not be pretendedDoes this case differ from the one supposed ? I confess,

I am unable to discover any distinction.

But it is insisted again in argument, that the Act of the

legislature in this case only affects the remedy, not the rights
of the parties.

8
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The argument is correct in principle, but as it strikes me,

wrong in application.

If this cause were abated & determined by the abolition of

the Court in which it was pending the rights of the parties

were thereby fixed, and in any view could not be disturbed

by any subsequent legislation.

The constitutional provision, relied upon, does not affect

this case-By the first Section of the Schedule of the Con
stitution it is declared that all

writs, actions

&c shall continue

as if no change had taken place in the government-Suppose

no change had taken place in the government, and the

territorial legislature had abolished the then existing courts

& substituted others, making the same provisions the state

legislature has done, would not this cause have been abated?
Unquestionably it would-

The constitution preserves the matters pending in the

territorial courts, for the future action of the state legislature,
-that action has been had, and the purpose of the constitu

tion fully accomplished.

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in file No. 149I (as re-numbered for Trans
actions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Micmgan, Blume,
ed. ) . A draft of a report by Harrington · is also in the file. Volume I
of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the fol
lowing entries: p. 2 8 (Jan. 2, 1 838) defendants move to strike from
docket; p. 3 1 (Jan. 5, 1 83 8 ) motion argued and submitted ; p. 40
(Jan. 1 3, 1 838) stricken from docket. For later proceedings in this
case see p. 70, infra. In 1 849 the act of February 1 1, I 837, was
held valid. Scott v. Smart's Exrs., I Mich. 295·
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NATHAN HUBBLE versus ETHEL BURCH
January 1 3 , r 8 3 8 .
r.

2.

3·
4·

S·

The justice did not err in permitting an attorney at law
to appear for the plaintiff on the trial, without express au
thority, the attorney having appeared many times without
objection.
Where the defendant has pleaded the general issue and
a special plea and the return of the justice states that issue
was joined, the appellate court will presume that plaintiff
added a similiter to the general issue and traversed the
special plea. The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of
form which is aided by verdict.
In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution it
is not necessary that the jury find specially that the officer
consented or was negligent. A general verdict is sufficient.
In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's
deputy who released the prisoner on an insufficient bond
was interested in the event of the action, and, therefore,
properly rejected as a witness.
In an action for an escape, it is error to reject as a witness
the escaped prisoner when called by the defendant. If
interested, his interest is against the party calling him.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of the
peace, Monroe County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment
reversed.
P. R. Adams and R. McCleland, attorneys for plaintiff
in certiorari.

A. Felch, attorney for defendant in certiorari.

( INDORSEMENT]
Ethel Burch Deft.
in Error
vs-

Nathan Hubble
Plf. in Error.

IO
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[ OPINION]
Ethel Burch Deft.
in Error.
v-

Nathan Hubble Plf.
in Error

I

Sup. Court, First Circuit JanY Tr.
I 8J 8 .

Certiorari to a Justice of the Peace.

This cause is brought into this court upon a writ of

certiorari to a Justice of the Peace.

By the return of the justice it appears that the Deft. in

Error, on the 6th day of Oct.

I 8 32,

before P. P. Ferry a

j ustice of the peace, recovered a j udgment against one

Couture for about $74 which judgt he afterwards assigned

to H. B. Hopkins-that on the first day of March 1 8 34 an
execution was prayed out on the j udgt and delivered to John
Mulholland, (a deputy of the Plf. in Error Hubble, who was

then sheriff of the County of Munroe) , to levy serve &

return-That on the 2 1 st day of April then next, Mulholland
arrested Couture, and proceeded with him to the common

j ail of the County-that Couture with a view to obtain the

benefit of the prison limits, gave a bond, to

H. B. Hopkins,

conditioned that P. P. Ferry should not depart without the

prison limits &c. and that upon the delivery of that bond to
the keeper of the prison, Mulholland permitted Couture to

go at large-

That afterwards on the 2 8th day of June 1 8 34 a suit was

instituted by Burch against Hubble, before Justice Curtis
that on the return day of the writ, the PH. declared against

Hubble in debt, upon the escape of Couture, in one count for

a voluntary escape & in another for a negligent escape, suf

fered by Mulholland-that to this declaration the Plf. in
Error, plead the general issue, and specially also that Couture

had been committed to prison on the Plf's execution & having

HuBBLE

v.

BuRcH

II

given a limit bond pursuant to the Statute, was admitted to

the benefit of the prison limits-that issue was j oined and the

cause continued from time to time till the 4th day of Aug.
I 8 34 when it was tried by a j ury, a. verdict for $69. 2. 1 Dams

returned for the Plf. and judgment rendered on the verdict.
It further appears that this suit was commenced in the

name of the Plf. Burch, by A. Felch Esq. an Attorney duly
admitted to practice law, in the courts of this state-that

said Felch had appeared & answered to the suit, without
objection being made by the Deft. until the day of the final

trial, when the Deft. obj ected to Felch's being permitted
to prosecute the suit farther without proof of authority from

the Plf.-the obj ection was overruled by the j ustice-on the
trial of the cause the Deft. Hubble, to prove the issue on

his part, offered as witnesses, the said Couture & Mulholland,

they were obj ected to by the Plf. on the ground of interest

& rej ected by the Justice.

To these proceedings the Plf. in Error, takes exceptions

he contends-First-that the justice committed error in

permitting Felch to appear & prosecute the suit without ex

press authority from the Plf. Burch. But without deciding
that question, it is sufficient to say that this case is relieved

from all difficulty upon that point, by the fact, that Felch had
been perciitted to appear for the Plf. many times, without

objection, and we think the magistrate correctly decided that
the objection, if tenable under any circumstances, came too

late in this case.

Another objection is that no issue was made, which the j ury

could properly try-

Technical nicety or legal precision is not required in
Justice's Courts, when this court can reasonably intend that

the merits have been fairly tried, we will not test by technical
rules, the formality of the pleadings.

!2
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It would seem, however, in this case, the pleadings were

sufficiently formal. Whenever one of the parties concludes
to the country, he refers the trial to the jury & the issue is
j oined & ready for tdal, by the adverse party's adding the

similiter,

and the similiter being no part of the pleadings,

but a mere matter of form, it would seem that its omission

should be aided by verdict.

The Justice's return here shews that the general issue

was plead & also a special plea in bar, and upon those plead
ings issue was j oined-we feel bound to presume from this

return that to the general issue tendered the Plf. added the

similiter & traversed the special plea in bar, making a material

& proper issue for the j ury.

The third exception taken, is, that, agreeably to the

declaratory act concerning the escape of prisoners in certain

cases, no judgt could be rendered against the Deft. in this

case-that it should appear from the record that the j ury

expressly found that the debtor escaped with the consent, or
through the negligence of the Deft. or that he might have

been retaken & that the Deft. neglected to make immediate
pursuit. Had the debtor been in custody upon mesne process,
the obj ection would be well founded-but the statute ob

viously creates a distinction, between escapes of debtors

arrested upon.mesne process & those taken in execution.

By a proviso to the act j ust referred to, any sheriff or

other officer, who shall have taken the body of any debtor in

execution,

& shall wilfully or negligently suffer such debtor

to escape, is made liable to the execution creditor, in an action

of debt, for the amount of the execution-this case is clearly

within the contemplation of the proviso-and a general

verdict of the j ury sufficient.

Again it is said the Justice erred in rej ecting the witnesses,

Mulholland & Couture, offered by the Deft.-We think

HuBBLE v. BuRCH
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Mulholland was properly rej ected, being directly responsible
to his principal, Hubble, for the amount of any j udgt that

might be recovered against him for the escape of Couture
Since it is apparent from the return that Mulholland failed

to comply with the requisitions of the Statute in the service

of the execution-he neither committed the e:J[i debtor to the
keeper of the prison nor did he take a proper limit bond, be
fore discharging him from custody-But the rej ection of the
debtor, Couture was manifest error, if interested at all in

the event of this suit, his interest was against the party calling
him

he was therefore a competent

witness and should have been permitted to testify-

The j udgt of the justice must be reversed therefore, and

the Deft. Hubble recover his costs.

EorroR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in file No. 70, Supreme Court, First Circuit
Law. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file. The case
was transferred to the Supreme Court from the territorial Superior
Circuit Court, ..Monroe County. Volume I of the Journal of the
Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 30
(Jan. 4, 1 8 38) argued and submitted ; p. 40 (Jan. 1 3, 1 838)
judgment reversed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I, case
No. 70.
HIRAM WHITCOMB

versus

IRA PORTER

January 1 3 , 1 83 8 .
1.

2.

In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to,
levy or return a writ of execution {Terr. Laws of z 833, p.
2 0 0) a justice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdiction
by rendering a judgment for more than $z oo.
A renewal of an execution at the instance of the officer
without the request or consent of the plaintiff will not
defeat a claim against the officer for failing to levy or
return the writ in time.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of the
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peace, St. Clair County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judgment
affirmed.
E. B. Harrington, attorney for plaintiff. in certiorari.
A. D . Fraser, attorney for defendant in certiorari.

[ INDORSEMENT]
Ira Porter Deft. in Error
vsHiram Whitcomb Plf. in Error

l

[OPINION]
Ira Porter Deft. in Error
vs-

. Hiram Whitcomb Plf.
in Error

Sup. Ct. first Circuit JanY Tr.
r 83 8

Certiorari to a Justice of the Peace.
By 'the record certified to this Court by the justice, it

appears that on the 2 9th Dec• 1 8 3 5, the Deft. in Error, Porter

recovered a j udgt before Justice Baker against one Chamber
lin, for $ 8 8.2 o--execution was stayed pursuant to the Statute,

on the 20th day of Jany 1 8 3 7 Porter prayed out an execution

upon the j udgt which was renewed by a proper endorsement,

by the Justice on the 2 1 st May 1 8 3 7, and on the same day

placed in the hands of Whitcomb, then a constable of the town
of
to levy serve and return-On the 2 9th
day of the same May, Whitcomb, having made no levy or

return of the execution, and the time having elapsed in which
it could be levied, the creditor moved the Justice that j udgt

be entered in his favor against the constable, Whitcomb, for
the Amt of the execution, with damages, interest & cost-On

the same day the j ustice issued a citation to Whitcomb to

appear before him on the 7th June then next, and shew cause

WHITCOMB

v.

PoRTER

IS

why he should not be held to pay the Amt of said execution
with damages interest & costs agreeably to the statute.

And it further appears, that both parties appeared before

the Justice on the said 7th day of June-Whitcomb admitted ·

that he had reed the execution for collection and that he had
not levied the same-Collected the money thereon, nor com

mitted the debtor, Chamberlin to prison, and showed no cause

satisfactory to the Justice, why j udgt should not be entered
.
against him for the Amt of the execution &c.
Whereupon the said Justice entered a j udgt against said

Whitcomb for the said $ 8 8 .20 the Amt of said ex" with twenty

five per cent. damages on the original j udgt interest & costs
computed at $ 3 2 .06, Amounting in the whole to $ 1 2 0. 3 6-

To these proceedings the Plf. in Error obj ects-First

That the execution alluded to, had been renewed by the

Justice on the 2 2d day of May 1 8 3 7 & consequently had not
expired at the time the judgt was entered against him-

It does not appear by the return, that any evidence was

offered on the hearing before the Justice, upon the said mo

tion- of such renewal of the ex" the Justice certifies that on
the sd 22d of M ay a renewal was endorsed on the ex" at the

instance

creditor.

of Whitcomb, without the request or consent of the

Had that fact been proved before the justice it could not

have availed the party-

When the execution expired in the hands of the officer,

without a levy or return being made, the right of the creditor

to a j udgt against the officer or his sureties, immediately vested
& could not be defeated or delayed by a renewal of the ex"

made by the procurement of the officer himself-

Again it is insisted the proceeding is erroneous, because

the Am t of the j udgt entered against the officer exceeds the

sum

$ r oo.

beyond which, it is contended a Justice's j urisdic

tion does not extend-
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We think this obj ection is not well founded, the Statute
provides a two fold remedy for the creditor, in case the officer
neglect to serve or return the execution-he may bring an

action of debt against the officer himself, or his securities in

which case he must resort to a court having j urisdiction of
the

Amount,

of the j udgt sought to be recovered. Or, if he

choose to rely on the responsibility of the officer alone, on
his own motion, the j ustice may cite the officer before him,

to shew cause why he should not be held to pay the Amt of tlie

Ex" And unless good cause be shewn execution shall issue

against him for the Amt of the original ex" with
dam" interest & costs.

25 pr. ct.

This is a summary proceeding provided for this class of

cases alone, the j ustice derives his power to act in the matter,

from the particular section of the Act creating this remedy,

not from the first section which confers his general jurisdic

tion.

It can hardly be said that the magistrate performs a

j udicial act in these cases, the facts of which he is to enquire

are whether the ex" has been served & returned, �r discharged
by the creditor, which must generally appear by his own files

& records-he is the mere agent thro . which the law declares
its j udgt-the measure by which the Amt of the j udgt is

determined, is fixed by the statute-the j ustice is simply to

make the computation.

The judgt below must be confirmed with costs.

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in file No. 88, Supreme Court, First Circuit
Law. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file. Volume I
of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the fol
lowing entries : p. 35 (Jan. 9, 1 838) argued and submitted ; p. 4 1
(Jan. 1 3, 1 83 8 ) judgment affirmed. Also see Calendar, , First
Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No. 88.

BuRHANS

v.

REYNOLDS

ISAAC BURHANS versus ABNER REYNOLDS
January 1 9, r 8 3 8

r . Where labor is performed under a subsisting special agree
ment, recovery may not be had under the common counts.
But if the agreement has been fully performed by the
plaintiff or rescinded by mutual consent, the rule is other
wise. From the contradictory evidence in this case it is
difficult to determine whether the labor was performed
under a special agreement, but it is unnecessary to decide
because of other error.
2. In justices' courts jurors are judges of the law as well as
of the facts. The justice in this case erred in directing the
jury that inasmuch as the defendant had proved that the
plaintiff had received one-half of certain crops, the jurors
were bound by their oaths to allow credit for the same.
3 · The above direction was not harmless as being in favor of
the plaintiff in error {defendant below) because the jury
might not have found against the defendant at all but for
such direction.
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of

the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judg
ment reversed.

0. Hawkins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari.

J. Kingsley, attorney for defendant in certiorari.

(INDORSEMENT]
Isaac Burhans Plf. in Error
· vsAbner Reynolds Deft Er.
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[OPINION l
Isaac Burhans
vs
Abner Reynolds

------

�

�up. Ct. Sec' Cir. Jan. Tr. 1 83 8 .
Certio. t o Justice o f the Peace.

I . By return of Justice, it appears that the parties some

years since entered into an agreet to work together on Burhans
land, in clearing & raisi.ng grain-were to continue to work

there, three or six years- and were to divide all grain raised,
equally between them-That the parties went on under sd

agreet until they had cleared twenty eight acres of land

about one & half years-

That Reynolds performed other labor for Burhans in erect

ing log houses & upon the highway-

Disagreements arose between the parties, and the contract

to clear land &c together, was abandoned

Reynolds then

brought his action against Burhans to recover pay for his

labor in clearing the land together with other services per

formed by himself & boys for Burhans, and for money lent

Burhans-Reynolds declared in gen 1 indebitatus Assumpsit
for work & labor, & money lent-

Burhans plead gen1 issue & gave notice of set off

The cause was tried by j ury in May

I 8 34·

Counsel of Burhans insisted & requested court to charge the
jury, that, it appeared in evidence that the labor performed
by Reynolds was done under a special agreet-and that he

could not recover upon the Common Counts should have de
clared on special agreet

Justice refused so to charge the jury-

After the cause was submitted to j ury & they had retired

-the justice was sent for by jury, and his opinion asked,

upon a point of evidence-viz : Whether they could allow

BuRHANS v.

REYNOLDS

I9

Burhans anything for corn & wheat which Reynolds had rec4

Justice told jury "that inasmuch as Burhans did prove that
Reynolds had one half the crops they were bound by their

oath. to allow him for the same according to the testimony

given them in Court"

Jury returned a verdict of

$ r 29.6o-

Remititer [ Remittitur J was entered by Reynolds to
-Judgt rendered for $ r oo-

$29.60

To these proceedings, two objections are urged-

r . That, inasmuch as it appeared on the trial that the labor

of Reynolds was performed under special agreet should have
declared upon it--cannot recover in the gen1 counts-

2. That the Justice erred in going into jury room & giving

his opinion in a matter of fact, after cause was submittedIt is a general rule of law, that when labor is performed,
under a special agreement the terms of which at the time of

action brought, subsist in full force, a recovery cannot be

had under the Common Counts-the party performing the
labor, cannot waive the contract & resort to to an implied

assumpsit-the special agreet should be set forth in the

declaration, that the Deft. may be apprised of the contract
he is charged with violating, and may have an opportunity

to shew the want of performance, on the part of the Plf. of

those stipulations, which may have been the consideration

of the promise made by the Deft. But if the terms of a special
agreet have been fully performed on part of the Plf. or if

the contract be rescinded by mutual consent, after part

performance by Plf.-he may recover the value of the work,

in an action of gen1 indeb. Assumpsit, and need not set forth
the special contract-

In this case it is insisted by Plf. in Error, that there was a

subsisting contract, between the parties, under which the

labor was performed-
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Deft. in Error, contends that the contract was mutually

rescinded & abandoned by both parties-

The testimony returned by the j ustice is so contradictory

& uncertain, that it is difficult to determine, what the precise
facts of the case were, and we deem it unnecessary to decide
upon this point, inasmuch as the case may be determined on

the other point made by the Plf. in Error, which we think

free from all difficulties.

-The justice committed manifest error, in directing the

j ury, as to matters of fact, after the cause was submitted to
them by the parties-In justice's Courts, the j ury are judges
of the law as well as of facts, and the j ustice had no authority,

whatever, after the cause was submitted, to direct the j ury
how to find-we think it would be dangerous to tolerate such

a

practice-

It was urged in argument at bar, that what was said to the

j ury, by the Justice was in favor of the Plf. in Error, & that

therefore he cannot take exceptions to it-but that was well
answered by Plfs. Counsel, "that the j ury might not have

agreed upon a verdict, at all, against the Plf. but for the
direction of the j ustice-

The j udgt of the justice must be reversed & the Plf. in

Error recover his costs-

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in an unnumbered file of the Supreme Court,
Second Circuit. A draft of a report by Harrington is also in the file.
The case was transferred to the Supreme Court from the territorial
Superior Circuit Court, Washtenaw County. The Judgment Record
of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, contains : p. I 32 (Oct. 2 7 ,
I 834) writ of certiorari ; p. I33 (July I 3, I 835) return of J. P. ;
p. I 38 (Jan. I 9, I 838) judgment of reversal. The writ of certiorari
and other papers will be found in File I I 6o (as renumbered in I 902) .

NoRRIS v.

HAwKs
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MARK NORRIS versus CEPHAS HAWKS,

JAMES HUTCHINSON and MARCUS LANE.
January 1 9, 1 8 3 8
1 . Payment of rent to one of three joint owners -is a discharge

of the joint claim.
2. Where a justice of the peace had been informed by one
joint owner that rent sued for in the names of three joint
owners had been paid, the justice erred in rendering judg
ment against the defendant in his absence at the instance
of another of the joint owners.
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of

the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Ransom, J. Judg

ment Reversed.

0. Hawkins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari.

M . Lane, attorney for defendants in certiorari.

(INDORSEMENT]
Norris
VS

Lane et al.

�

( OPINION ]
Mark Norris
vs.
Marcus Lane et al.
-------

Sup. Ct. Sec' Cir. Jan. Tr. 1 8 3 8

Certio. to Justice of the Peace.
Plf. in Er. & Defts. Lane &
Hawks

By a stipulation of the parties, the affidavit is substituted

for the return--it is agreed that the facts set forth in the

affidt shall be the facts in the case on which the court decide--

22
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By affit it appears, that Defts. in Error, were joint owners

of certain real estate, called Brewery property-that Plf . in

Er. occupied said Brew. prop. under a lease or agreet of the
Defts.Plf. in Er. paid the rent, amounting to about

$ ro.oo

to

Lane one of j oint ownersIn July last, Hutchinson, one of the j oint owners of the

sd property, commenced an action agst Plf. in Er. in name of
all the Defts. in Er. for recovery of the rents, which had
accruedAfter the commencet of the suit, & before the return day

of the writ-Lane informed PH. in Er. that the suit should
be discontd & that he need not give
. himself any trouble
about itIn pursuance of this agreet Lane, before the return day of

the summons-directed the Justice to discontinue the suit
informed the Justice that the suit was brought in his name

contrary to his wishes, and that the Plf. in Er. had fully

accounted to him for the rents, to recover which the action
was brought-

The Plf. in Er. did not appear before the justice, to defend

the suit, in consequence of the agreet of Lane to discontinue

At the instance of Hutchinson, one of the Defts. in Er.

Justice proceeded to hear the cause and rendered Judgt for

Plfs. to recover

$ 9 .85

Dams & their costs That there was no

evidence of a privity of contract, between the parties, on the

hearing before the Justice

Plf. in Er. excepts to this proceeding, insisting, that the

rents for which the action was brought having been paid to

one of the joint owners of the leased property, that Plf. was

thereby forever discharged from liability to either & all the
DeftsAnd that this fact having been made known to the Justice,

NoRRIS
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& he directed to discontinue suit committed Error, in pro

ceeding afterwards to render j udgt in the case-especially in
absence of Plf. and without proof of privity of contract,
·

between parties-

The payts of the rents by the Plf. to one of the j oint

owners, was unquestionably a finale & complete discharge �f

the Plf's. liability to the j oint claim of the Defts-

Judgt being rendered for Defts. to recover amt of debt,

after the lease had been fully paid & discharged-is erroneous
-& the judgt must be reversed

his costs-

&

the Plf. in Er. recover

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Ransom, was found in file No. 66 ( Nos. 1 1 53 and 1 1 5 7 as re
numbered in 1 902 ) of the Supreme C ourt, Second Circuit. A draft
of a report by Harrington is also in the file. The Judgment Record
of the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, contains: p. 1 5 8 (Aug. 9,
1 83 7 ) writ of certiorari ; p. 1 5 9 (Jan. 1 6, 1 838) return of J. P. ;
p. 160 (Jan. 1 9, 1 838) judgment of reversal.
JOSIAH R.

DORR, WILLIAM

B. ALVORD, and

JAMES STETSON versus CHRISTIAN W. DREYER
August

I.

3 0, I 8 3 9

A ll objections to process are waived by a general appear
ance.
2. Testimony by a person claiming to be agent that he was
"authorized by the DEFENDANTs to . . . employ workmen
for them" is sufficient basis for infe"ing that the defend
ants, sued as "traders under the style of the Detroit
Iron Co.," constituted such company. Furthermore, it does
not appear that the point was raised in the lower court.
3· Where there is "some evidence'' to support the judgment
of a justice of the peace, the supreme court "will not stop
to enquire whether it was so full or ample as to render the
case entirely free from doubt."
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to a j ustice of the
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peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J . Judgment

affirmed.

G. E. Hand, attorney for plaintiffs in certiorari.

B . F. H. Witherell & Buel, attornies for defendant in
certiorari.

[ INDORSEMENT]
Dorr, Alvord &
· Stetson
vs.
Dreyer.

[oPINION]
Josiah R Dorr
William B Alvord &
James Stetson

VS

Christian W Dreyer

Sup Court : r•t Circuit
July term I 839Certiorari :

The plaintiff below sued out process against the defend

ants as "traders under the style of the Detroit Iron con in a

plea of Trespass on the case, and declared generally for
"work, labor, damages &c" & at the same time filed a bill of

particulars : the defendants, as appears by the return of the
Justice appeared by Hand their Attorney" and plead "non

assumpsit." The Justice after hearing and considering the
cause rendered judgment in favor of the plff for $52.25
damages &

$2.56

costs of suit ; to reverse which j udgment

a certiorari was sued out by the pHis' in Error:

The following are the principal points relied upon by
o,s
the plffs to reverse the judgment. (here insert brief) N
I-2

-
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It i s a well settled rule that objections o f the nature
suggested in the first point must be taken advantage of on
the return of the process by a motion to quash or by plea

in abatement : the defendants below having appeared by an
agent and pleaded generally to the declaration waived all
objections to the process.

2:

Upon an examination of the return of the Justice, it

appears, that the Detroit Iron

CO pr F A Willis by a written

authority autqorized one A. W Wood "to engage two or
three good, steady, faithful & temperate men, to work at
finishing in their establishment, and that to such men con

stant employment and good wages payable every Saturday

night would be given." Wood produced & proved the execu

tion of the authority, which he states was given to him by

Willis by the direction of Alvord, one of the plffs in error,
who remarked that it (the authority) was correct : Wood

further testified that by virtue of this authority he engaged

the plff below, Dreyer, at Rochester, N Y ; that he was such

a man as he was authorized to employ, having been recom

mended to him as a temperate man and a good workman :

that Dreyer came to Detroit with his wife & two children,

the latter part of August I 8 3 7, pursuant to the engagement :
and further that he had seen Dreyer at work, and that

$2

per

day were the wages paid for finishers :-The witness also
testified that the charges for travelling expenses were reason

able, altho' there was no understanding that such expenses
would be paid : Another witness Gorman, testifies that Dreyer

was a good workman, that he was discharged sometime in
the beginning of Oct I 8 3 7-and that he knew no reason

for his discharge : Upon being recalled Wood further stated

that Dreyer's work w�s trimming & filing: that he saw him
at brass work, & that it was well done : The plff below having

rested his case, the defendants below introduced one George
Brundit, who testified that Dreyer worked at the foundry
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at finishing; that he was no chipper

& ignorant

of the use of

the lathe : did not know why he was discharged-that he was

good enough at filing and further, that workmen are paid

$2

per day : Geo A Fletcher another witness testified, that he
worked at the foundry & in the same room with Dreyer ;

"that his filing was done very well," but that it might have

been done sooner :-thinks his services worth

I2

or 13s per

day ; and that he did not seem to understand the use of the
lathe."
Upon a review of the above, which seems to have been

all the testimony introduced on the trial below, it is difficult

to perceive how this court can sustain the obj ection taken

by the plff in error that the evidence does not shew any

undertaking or assumpsit on their part : The testimony of

Wood is conclusive on this point : he exhibited the authority

by virtue of which he had hired Dreyer which authority was
subsequently recognized by permitting Dreyer to enter

&

work in the foundry : he further states that he commenced
work the latter part o f August and it is in proof that he

continued until some [ time] in the beginning of Oct. when
he was discharged, but for what cause, none of the witnesses

were enabled to state : There is an apparent discrepancy in

the testimony of the witness with respect to the skill of
Dreyer as a finisher, but all concur that his work was well

done : But it is objected, thirdly, that there was no evidence

to establish the fact that the defendants below constituted the
Detroit Iron

CO. The return of the Justice by which we are

bound, does not support this allegation, for it is expressly
stated by Wood, that he was "authorized by the

defendants

to go to New York and employ workmen for them :" from

this testimony the Justice had a right to infer that the

CO

was constituted of the plff's in Error. Besides it does not

appear from the return that the obj ections stated in the brief

of the plff's were made at the trial of the cause below: it has

DoRR v. DREYER
been repeatedly decided by this Court, that in order to avail

himself of irregularities or errors in the court below, obj ec

tion must be made at the proper time during the progress
of the trial, otherwise this Court will not give a party the

benefit of such irregularities or error.

Upon the whole, it appears that there was, to say the

least, some evidence to support the judgment, & this Court
will not stop to enquire whether i t was so full or ample as

to render the case entirely free from doubt.

Judgment affirmed-

Hand for plff in Error.
Buel for deft in Error.

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Whipple, was found in file No. 1 06, Supreme Court, First Circuit
Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following
entries : p. 47 (Jan. 2, 1 839) motion to quash certiorari ; p. 5 7
(Jan. 9 , 1 839) continued ; p. 8 4 ( Aug. 30, 1 839) judgment
affirmed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No.
1 06.
JOSEPH W. BROWN versus EZEKIEL G. MOORE
and AMASA JACKSON
September 4,

1 83 9.

1. In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the

certificate of a notary public that he presented the note for
payment, that payment was refused, and that he mailed
notice of protest, is not admissible under the common law
to prove these facts.
2. The statutes relative to notaries public (Terr. Laws of
r 833, p. 2 44; Revised Statutes of r 8.3 8, p. so) have not
changed the common law in the above respect.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court,
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment re

versed.
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Daniel Goodwin, attorney for plaintiff in error.

H. N.

Walker, attorney for defendants in error.
[ IIIlDORSEMENT]

!

Sup Court
Brown
vs.
Moore
-------

I

Cir. Aug. I 8 3 9

Memo of Opinion
Aug. I 8 3 9-Judgt reversed and

venire de novo ordered-

Goodwin for Plff in Error
Walker-Deft.

H N.

�

(OPINION]
Joseph W. Brown
vs.
Ezekiel J. Moore
Jackson
& Amasa �

------

----

Writ of Error to Wayne Circuit.

The Bill of exceptions, forming a part of the record in
this cause, sets forth the only ground, upon which error is
now allegedThe Plff in error was the Deft below, and was sued as

the indorser of Fargo & Boughton on their promisory note

dated I4 July '3 7 for
of Tecumseh

$ I 223. 1 4 payable in 6

mo at the Bank

To prove presentment for payment and refusal thereof
at the Bank, and notice thereof to the Deft below as in

dorser-The plaintiff below offered in evidence an official

certificate in due form of Geo. W. Jermain, a notary public

of the County of Lenawee setting forth that on the day &c

he duly presented the said note to the Bank for payment and
that the same was refused; and that he caused notice of said
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protest to be put in the post office at Tecumseh, directed to
the Deft &c- The attorney for the Deft below obj ected to
the [a] dmissibility to prove these facts-, but the objection
was overruled, and the evidence received.
There was no other evidence to prove these facts-The
only question therefore is whether the evidence was properly
admitted?
It was contended by the counsel for the Defts in Error
that by the provisions of our Statute relative to Notaries
public have enlarged the authority of a Notary public, and
that his official certificate is made competent evidence in
other cases than those recognized by the Com. Law. The
only provision relied on for this purpose is that which de
clares due faith shall be given to all the protestations, attesta
tions and other instruments of publication of notaries public.

(The Rev. Stat. is in other words-ack:. of deed, adm. oaths,
and perform such other official acts as have been customarily
performed by N. P.
A protest of an m1and b'll
1
6 Wheat. I 46. Young vs. Bryan
·
t
o
ex
pro.
no
e
IS
no
f
&
t
.
.
.
.
.
1d. 572 Umon Bank vs. Hyde
necessary, nor 1s 1t eV18 1'd . 3 2 6 N'1ch o1as vs. Webb
d ence.
•

l

·

.

.

Chit. Bills 405. Rule at Com. law, only in case of Foreign
"But a protest made in England must be proved
by the notary who made it, and by the subscribing
. 1'f any [ "] .
Wit.,
6 Serg & R. 484 Brown vs. Philadelphia Bank
3 24 Stewart vs. Allison
" "
Where it was held that under the act of the Leg. of Penn.
of I 8 I 5 the official certificate of a notary was competent evid.
to prove notice of non pai to the indorser of an inland note
By the act referred to it is declared that the official acts, pro
tests and attestations of notaries public certifi.ed according to

JO

MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS

law under their respective hands and seals of office may be
received in evidence.
The Stat. of Penn. goes farther than our own, it makes the
official acts &c evidence generally when duly certified
But the safer course, and indeed the only, is to follow the
established rule-unless &c &c·

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Ch. J.
Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 3 7, Supreme Court, First Circuit
Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following
entry : p. 89 (Sept. 4, 1 83 9 ) judgment reversed. Also see Calendar,
First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case 1 37.

OLIVER ROSE versus SOLOMON SIBLEY
September 4, 1 8 3 9 ·
I.

Where a case is submitted to a trial court on an agreed
statement of facts which does not "contain all the facts
necessary to turn the case into a question of law," the trial
court's determination of the fact$ is conclusive if the state
ment contains evidence tending to prove. the facts found.
2. In this case the evidence tended to prove that the plain
tiff's flgent knew that the money claimed by the plaintiff
was being collected by the defendant's former partner af
ter the · defendant had retired from the practice of law,
hence the finding for the defendant is conclusive.
3 · In the absence of statutory authority, an agreed statement
of facts is not a part of the court's record and, therefore,
cannot be considered on a writ of error.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court,
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment
affirmed.
H. S. Cole & A. S. Porter, attornies for plaintiff in error.
E. Farnsworth & D. Goodwin, attornies for defendant in
error.

l
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[ INDORSEMENT]
1 st Circuit
Memo of opinion- .
Aug. 1 8 3 9J ugt affirmed

------

�

[ OPINION]
Oliver Rose
vs.
Sol. Sibley Survivor
of himself & A. G. Whitney

This cause is before this court on Writ of Error brought
to reverse a J udgt rendered in the Circuit Court for the
County of Wayne.
The suit was originally brought in the Circuit Court by
Rose the present Pl:ff in Error against the Deft, Survivor of
himself, and Andrew G. Whitney, deceased, late partners,
in the profession and practice of law.The Pl:ff declared specially on the undertaking of Deft,
and also on the common money counts, and an account stated,
to which the Deft pleaded the general issue. The Counsel
for the parties afterwards waived the trial by jury, and upon
the facts set forth in a case made and stated between them,
submitted the whole matter to the decision of the Court.
The material facts stated in the case are the following:
Mark H. Sibley of Canandaigua, the Attorney of 'Oliver
Rose transmitted to Sol. Sibley in Jany 1 8 1 9 an exemplifica
tion of a Judgt rendered in the State of New York in favor
of Rose vs. Wm G. Taylor-When this claim was reed by
Sol. Sibley he was in partnership with Mr. Whitney-Sibley
and Whitney in their j oint names prosecuted the claim to and
obtained judgt thereon in the Sup. Court in October 1 822,
for the sum of 45 2· 5 6 :
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--On the I O Sept. I 82J, a fi. fa. was issued by S. & W.,
but nothing was made thereon.
The Deft. Sol. Sibley was appointed a Judge of the Sup.
Court of the Territory of Michigan on the I I th Feby I 824,
and continued in commission until after the Judgt in this
Suit below, and wholly ceased practice as an Ate & Counsel
lor at law during that time. Sibley and Whitney, as between
themselves settled their partnerShip business, leaving all un
closed business of their clients in the hands of Whitney, who
was generally considered a good lawyer, a vigilant collector,
responsible and punctual in paying over money.
By the agreement between them, the fees which had
accrued up to the time of the appointment of Sibley as judge
were to be equally divided between them, all fees accruing on
any unfinished business after the said appointment, were to
accrue to the benefit of Whitney.
On the I 2 April, I 824, Whitney filed a praecipe for a
Ca. Sa. on the said judgt signed by himself for the late firm
of Sibley & Whitney which was issued, which was returned
non est. Mark H. Sibley was the agent of Rose, and had an
interest in the j udgt obtained in the State of N. Y. against
Taylor.
On the 25 Nov. r 82 4 Whitney filed a praecipe signed by
himself alone, for an alias fi. fa.-upon which there was
made the sum of $263 . 8 8, which was paid over to Whitney
in November I 82 5, and after deducting fees, costs, and
charges, there remained in Whitney's hands $2 I 6. 73, which
was deposited by him in Bank to his individual credit. Mark
H. Sibley was in the City of Detroit in the Summer of r 825
on a visit. Mr. Whitney died in September I 826-and the
money collected as above stated, was never paid over.
No other money was collected on the original judgt of
Rose vs. Taylor. Mr. Whitney's estate was represented in-
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solvent-and no claim on the part of Rose was ever exhibited
against the estate, and the time for presenting claims against
the estate expired before the commencement of this suit
below.
There are also several letters from Sibley and Whitney
to Mark H. Sibley reporting the progress of the suit against
Taylor, and a letter from Mark H. Sibley, all of which are
annexed to, and made a part of the case submitted, but to
which it is not necessary particularly to advert at present.
Upon this statement of facts it was submitted to the
judges of the Circuit Court, whether the Deft Sol. Sibley
was liable in this action for the Payt of the [ $ ] 2 I 6. 7 3 col
lected by Whitney.-if the court should be of the opinion
that he was liable then judgt to be entered against him for
that sum & interest thereon.-And if not judgt was to be
entered for the Deft for costs.
The arguments before this court, as to the liability of
the Deft, have been, by the Counsel of both sides, based upon
the facts set forth in the case submitted to the Circuit Court.The principles of law relating to copartners, and their
liabilities, have been adverted to, as applicable to the present
case ; but the view which we have taken of this case renders it
unnecessary to determine any of the points raised upon this
subject. The case agreed upon, and submitted to the judges
of the Circuit Court, did not contain all the facts necessary
to turn the case into a question of law.
Some facts were required to be found by the Court, before
it could be determined whether the Deft was liable in this
case as a retiring partner, · and as there was evidence con
tained in the case submitted, tending to prove those facts,
the determination of such facts by the Court to which the
cause was submitted, must be final and conclusive.
On looking over the evidence submitted it is manifest
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that it tended to prove that Mark H. Sibley had a knowledge
that the Deft had wholly retired from the practice of the
law, and that Mr. Whitney was proceeding in his own name
to collect the money on execution, and although it does not
appear upon what grounds the Court below decided the case,
yet there can be no doubt that the evidence submitted had a
material bearing upon the merits of the case and the decision
of the Court. Upon this part of the case this court cannot
decide, having no authority, as a court of errors, to review
the determination of the Court below settling the facts upon
the evidence submittedBut there was another obj ection taken by the counsel
for the Deft, that this court, on a writ of error, has no
authority to revise the decision of the court below on a state
ment of facts submitted to that court ; however clearly and
well ascertained the facts may be which are contained in the
case, and properly presenting a case, to which the rules of
law may be conveniently and well applied. It was contended
that by no principles of the Common [ Law] could this court
take jurisdiction of such a case on writ of error : that it was
like a submission to arbitration, where the arbitrators deter
mine the facts and the law, and whose decis [ion] is final and
conclusive-In support of this position no authorities were
cited by the Deft's counsel,-But on examining the authori
ties many case [ s] are found sustaining the obj ection.
a. 3 Peters 3 69. b. 2 Greenl. R. 336. c . 7 Mass. R.
3 80. d. 9 do. 329.
These decisions go to establish the proposition, that where
the facts are not determined and spread upon the record in
virtue [of] some Statutory regulations, or according to the
principles and usages of Courts proceeding according to the
course of the common law, they cannot be reviewed on writ
of error, by reason that the court into which the record is
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removep. has n o jurisdiction of such matters o f fact, or the
determination thereon. The statement of facts agreed on in
the court below was sufficient to give jurisdiction to that
Court of the matters submitted, but it forms no part of the
record so as to authorise its removal to this court on a writ
of error. It is not therefore so much the undoubted certainty
of the :facts, as it is the mode and manner of authentication
which will confer jurisdiction Upon this court to revise and
correct the proceedings of subordinate courts on writ of
error. This was the assumed principle in the case in 3 Peters,
-The point of difference between the judges of the Circuit
Court which alone gave the Sup. Court of the U. S. j urisdic
tion, not being certified according to the Act of Congress,
although it might easily have been ascertained by inspection
of the whole record-the Court refused to entertain juris
diction So also in 2 Greenleaf, where the parties assented to
the facts stated in a Bill of Exceptions, but which was not
regularly certified by the judge who tried the cause. And
in the 9 Mass, where in the statement of facts submitted to
the Court of Com. Pleas, the parties further agreed that it
should form a part of the record, and be removed by either
party, to the Sup. Court on writ of error, the Sup. Court say
that the consent of parties cannot give that court jurisdiction
in a case where it is not conferred by law-and that if either
party intends or expects to bring a writ of error and wishes
the facts spread upon the record it will be necessary to have
the facts found by the jury in a special verdict, according to
the English practice.
5 Cowan R. 5 8 7 Rensselaer Glass Factory vs. Reid in
Court of Error. Case referred by the Court to Refferees,
and on their report being made, obj ections were made and a
statement of .facts agreed upon by the Atty and certified
and signed by the presiding Judge-and by writ of error
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was removed to the Court of Errors, it was then objected by
the Counsel for Deft in Error that the case made and certified
was no part of the record, and could not therefore be removed
and revised on writ of error.
Sanford, Chancellor and Colden & Spencer Senators in
giving their opinions tacitly admitted that if the case were
voluntarily made by the parties that the objection would have
been valid-But they overruled the objection solely on the
ground that the reference of the cause was directed by the
court under the Act of the Legislature and not by consent
of parties-and that the Legislature did not intend in this
mode to put it out of the power of either party to have his
case reviewed in the Sup. Court of Errors-.
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Ch. J.
Fletcher, was found in file No. 14 5 1 (as renumbered for Transac
tions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, Blume ed. ) .
The case was transferred to the state Supreme Court from the
Supreme Court of Michigan Territory. Volume I of the Journal,
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 38 (Jan. 1 2, I 83 8 )
continued by consent ; p. 49 (Jan. 3, I 839) argued and submitted ;
p. 89 (Sept. 4, I 839) judgment affirmed. Also see Transactions of
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan r825-r836, Blume
ed., Vol. I, p. I 48.

FRANCIS HENRETTY versus CITY OF DETROIT
September 2 8, r 8 39.
Section 2 of the ordinance under which the defendant was
convicted (providing that ccno person shall sell meat except
in the stalls rented from the corporation") is invalid, being
unreasonable and in restraint of trade.
(Opinion of one judge) .

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Mayor's
Court, City of Detroit. Opinion (not found) by Fletcher,
Ch. J. Dissenting opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment affirmed
insofar as it imposed fine and costs ; reversed insofar as it
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ordered that plaintiff in certiorari be imprisoned until fine and
costs are paid.
C. Tryon, W. Woodbridge & Backus, attornies for plain
tiff in certiorari.
J. A. Van Dyke & A. D. Fraser, attornies for defendant
in certiorari.
[ INDORSEMENT]
First Circuit
Francis Henrietty
vs
City of Detroit
Opinion of
C W Whipple,

DISSENTING:

( DISSENTING OPINION]
Francis Henretty
VS
The People

-------

!

Supreme Court : First Circuit.

Cer1 to Mayors Court of the City of Detroit.
The plaintiff in error was prosecuted in the Mayor's
Court of the City of Detroit for an alleged violation of an
ordinance of said City entitled "A law to regulate public
•
markets :" The complaint was founded upon the r t & 2nd
Sections of the ordinance, which provides in substance that
"all public markets in said city shall be held at the market
houses therein" and secondly; that "no person shall sell meat
except in the stalls rented from the corporation." The ih
Section prescribes as a punishment for a violation of any of
the provisions of the ordinance, "a fine not exceeding $so,
and imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or either." Upon
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a plea of not guilty being interposed a jury was empannelled,
who after hearing the evidence returned a general verdict,
of guilty: whereupon a judgment was entered in the words
following: "Said Mayor's Court then & there fined the said
Francis Henretty, for said offence, of which he was found
guilty by the jury, as aforesaid in the sum of fifty dollars and
the costs of prosecution and ordered that he should stand
committed until the fine and costs should be paid." The de
fendant feeling himself aggrieved by the j udgment & pro
ceedings in the Mayor's Court, made the necessary affidavit,
upon which a certiorari was allowed and subsequently issued
to remove the cause to this court.
The points made by the Counsel for the pl:fi. in error and
upon which they rely for a reversal of the judgment below
are of the gravest character, involving questions which have
never before been adjudicated upon by the judicial tribunals
of this State or of the late Territory of Michigan ; and which,
if sustained by this court would affect most vitally the in
terests not only of the City of Detroit in its corporate ca
pacity, but a very large class of private individuals. The im
portance, therefore, of the question at issue taken in connec
tion with the magnitude of public & private interests at stake,
have induced me to give to the cause, a careful and deliberate
examination, the results of which I shall now proceed to state ;
and I may here remark that the opinion now to be expressed
will contain little else than the conclusions of my mind upon
the various points argued at the bar, without entering very
much at large into the course of reasoning by which I have
been conducted to these conclusions : contenting myself for
the present, with a statement of such reasons in support of
my conclusions as appear to me most obvious and striking,
without referring to others which may have influenced but
not controlled my judgment.
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I shall consider the various points argued by the Counsel
for the plff. nearly in the order in which they are stated in
the very elaborate brief with which I have been furnished.
I:
It is contended that the Legislative Council of the late
Territory of Michigan had no authority to pass the law
entitled "An A ct relative to the City of Detroit." This propo
sition tho' the same in substance, is different in terms from
that stated in the very ingenious written argument of one
of the Counsel, where the word charter is frequently adopted
and as I think misapplied: In the argument of this question
a much wider scope was indulged in, than was necessary for
its determination ; which depends upon the true construction
to be given to the powers granted to the Legislative Council
by the Act of Congress of March 3 rd, I 823 : What then were
the powers conferred upon that body? In the Second Sec of
the Act it is provided "that the same powers which were
granted to the governor, Legislative Council, the House of
representatives, of the North Western territory, by the
h
ordinance of Congress, passed on the I J t day of July I 7 8 7,
&c are hereby conferred upon, and shall be exercised by the
governor and Legislative Council." What, then, were these
powers? By reference to the ordinance it appears that "the
Governor, Legislative Council, and House of Representa
tives" had "tJtUthority to make laws, in all cases, for the good
government of the district, not repugnant to the principles
and articles in this ordinance established and declared." The
question now recurs had that body, by virtue of the broad
powers conferred upon them "to make laws, in all cases, for
the good government of the district," authority to pass the
Act cited in the proposition I am now considering: To solve
this question it will be necessary to define what is to be
understood by a municipal or public corporation : Without
discussing the propriety of the metaphysical and quaint defi-
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nitions given by some of the ancient legal authors, I propose
to adopt one which for simplicity and comprehensiveness,
appears to me to be the best I have met with : I refer to the
one given by Willcock who defines a public corporation to
be "the investing of the inhabitants of a particular place with
its local government." From this definition the nature &
objects of such a corporation may be ascertained: Its nature
& general characteristics are familiar to every lawyer ; its
objects the government of a portion of the state, & to this
end it is endowed with a portion of political power: Is it not
then manifest that the general authority to make laws for
the government of the District includes the authority to in
corporate subordinate communities for the government of
a portion of that District? : I think it does : In expressing the
opinion that the Legislative Council were inve�ted with au
thority to pass the law in question, I desire it to be understood
that it is not my purpose to affirm or disaffirm the views
expressed by Counsel respecting the powers conferred upon
the Govr & judges while performing the functions of a Legis
lative body: that question is not involved in this case, and
does not, therefore call for a decision.
Secondly : admitting the authority of the Legislature to incorpor
ate the City of Detroit, it is contended that all rights acquired
by the City, ceased on the formation of the State Government
unless expressly preserved:
The erection by Congress, of the Territorial Government,
was certainly for temporary purpose·s : the ordinance of 1 78 7,
which was the fundamental law of the whole Northwestern
Territory, contemplated a state of things when the people of
the several Territories, which were to be carved out of that
immense extent of Country, should throw off the Colonial
condition, and assume the more imposing attitude of a state
of the Confederacy, clothed with all the attributes of sov
ereignty & independence which belonged to the original
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states: The people of the Territory of Michigan availing
themselves of the rights secured by the ordinance, did, in the
month of June, I 835, meet together, by their representatives,
in Convention, and formed a Constitution & state govern
ment, which was to take effect upon its ratification by the
people : that the Legislative Council could not establish or
ordain political or public corporations, which should outlive
the temp orary government, is very true, and that the Con
vention which formed the state Constitution representing the
people in their sovereign capacity had ample authority to
annul all charters of the nature referred to is equally true :
The question then arises was the act incorporating the City
of Detroit preserved by the Constitution of the State : This
question turns upon the construction to be given to the 2d Sec
of the schedule which ordains that "all laws now in force in
the Territory of Michigan, which are not repugnant to this
Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their
own limitations, or be altered or repealed by the Legislature."
Was then, the -law- incorporating the City of Detroit in
"force" at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? It
certainly was: Were any of the provisions of that law "repug
nant" to the Constitution? It is contended by the counsel for
the plff in error, that the act of incorporation was repugnant
to the Constitution in this that the members of the Council
Council are clothed with Legislative & Judicial p owers,
whereas the Constitution declares that "The powers of the
government shall be divided into three distinct departments:
the legislative, the executive, and the judi�ial; and one de
partment shall never exercise the powers of another, except
in such cases as are expressly provided for in this Constitu
tion." This provision, it is believed, is incorporated not only
in the Constitution of the United States, but in the Constitu
tions of the several States of the Union : indeed it has become
a settled maxim in the science of government, that it is

·
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essential to liberty, and to the harmonious action of the whole
to keep separate the three great departments by which the
government is administered & that each should move within
the sphere prescribed by the fundamental law and never
assume to exercise power granted exclusively to the others.
Does then, the authority conferred upon the Common Coun
cil of the City of Detroit in their legislative capacity to enact
laws, and then to sit as judges when their validity is drawn
in question, and also try those charged with their infraction,
involve a violation of the article of the Constitution j ust
quoted? I think it does not: The "government" mentioned in
the Article, means the STATE GOVERNMENT; the three "de
partments" referred to, means the three great departments of
this state government: The Constitution prescribes and limits
the powers of each of these three great departments, and in
the article above quoted, it was the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to guard against the Exercise by one of these
three departments, of the powers conferred upon either of
the other departments : To illustrate this position : Sec r ,
art VI o f the Constitution provides that "The Judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other
Courts as the legislature may from time to time establish."
Pursuant to the powers conferred up on the Legislature by
this Article, they proceeded to establish a Supreme Court, a
Court of Chancery, and a Circuit Court : These Courts are the
administrators of the Judicial authority of the State, or of
one of the three great departments of which I have been
speaking: Now: if one or the other of these courts should
attempt the exercise of legislative power, their act [would]
be void, because it would violate the fundamental principle
to which I have adverted : If I have succeeded in giving to
the Constitution a just construction it will follow, that the
exercise of a limited legislative and judicial authority by a
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body constituted like the Common Council of the City of
Detroit, is not repugnant to the Constitution : Like powers
have been conferred by almost every Legislature in the
Union, and the highest evidence of the validity of such a
grant of power, is to be found in the fact that it never has
been seriously questioned ; and that if invalid, it should to this
day have escaped the observation of the most eminent judges
and lawyers who have adorned the Bench and the Bar in this
Country. But while I admit the validity of the law conferring
legislative and judicial powers on the persons composing the
Common Council of the City of Detroit, I cannot permit
the occasion to pass, without the expression of an opinion
that such a combination of power in the same persons, violates
in spirit, the very principle recognized in our Constitution,
which I have endeavored to illustrate : If it is impolitic &
dangerous and contrary to all our notions of government, to
invest the Supreme Judicial Tribunal of the State with legis
lative powers, why should it be thought politic, safe, and con
sistent with correct principles to permit such powers to be
exercised by an inferior jurisdiction ? It is impossible that a
body of men clothed with such authority, can gain that
confidence & conciliate that respect so necessary to impart
to their adj udications that moral influence without which
judicial decisions are of little value : To grant legislative
powers to a body of men, and at the same time invest them
with the authority of judges to decide on their validity and
to enforce obedience to them is putting into their hands an
instrument of power which may be wielded for the worst
purposes : In voting for the passage of law, it is fair to pre
sume that the law maker is satisfied with respect to its validity,
for his mind up to this period is open to conviction,-he
weighs with impartiality all the arguments in favor & against
it: Let the same lawmaker sit in the capacity of a judge, and
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let arguments drawn from the Constitution be directed
against the very law of his own creation,-his pride o f
opinion i s a t once awakened,-he construes the argument
into an attack upon the correctness of his judgment,-upon
his wisdom as a legislator,-these combined produce a state
of mind unsuited to the character of a judge :-who should
be free from all influences but such as may tend to clear the
way for a full, fair, impartial, and enlightened administration
of law & justice : The views I have thus expressed, it must
be understood, are directed against the structure of the
Tribunal called the Mayor's Court, and not against the indi
viduals who have heretofore, or who now, constitute that
tribunal : the best evidence of their respectability and char
acter is to be found in the fact that their fellow citizens have
called them to the discharge of duties, so honorable & re
sponsible.
Having, thus far, endeavored to prove that the Legisla
tive Council had the authority to pass the law incorporating
the city of Detroit, and that it has not been expressly or im
pliedly repealed, I shall now proceed to consider whether
the enactment of the by law in question was a competent
· exercise of p ower on the part of the Common Council . It
was urged with becoming zeal, and much ability that the by
law is void because: I "t There is no authority for prescribing
that "all public markets in said city shall be held at the
market houses therein" and 211, "That no person shall sell
meat except in the stalls rented from the corp oration"
To determine these questions we must look at the act
incorporating the City of Detroit, which is its constitution. By
that act the Common Council are empowered to "establish
keep & regulate one or more public markets" and "to make
by laws relative to the p ublic markets." Under this grant of
p ower had the Com Council authority to ordain that all pub-
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lie markets should be held at the market houses in the City
of Detroit ; Corporations have such powers and no others
than those given them by the laws which give them a legal
existence : they can take nothing by implication. Applying this
rigid & inflexible rule to the present case I yet think the
power claimed for the Com Council can be sustained: The
public health , & the public convenience, two objects of pri
mary importance, especially in a populous town or city im
periously demand some regulation as to the time & place
when & where public markets should be held: These facts
which are unquestionable, should be looked to in giving a
construction to a power granted in terms so general as those
employed in the act of incorporation. But it is insisted upon
with much force that the grant of power set forth does not
authorize the corporation to restrain all persons from selling
meat ccexcept in the stalls rented from the corporation."
It was argued that such a regulation is in restraint of
trade, and that, as a consequence the authority to pass such a
by law cannot be fairly inferred. After giving to this question
the most patient investigation I have come to the conclusion,
founded on principle and authority that the second section
of the by law which imposes the restraint I have just sug
gested is void: It is void because it is both unreasonable, and in
restraint of trade : To test the correctness of this opinion let
us look to the practical effects of such a restriction if rigidly
enforced. And firstly: It precludes all persons from selling
meat except such as the Common Council may choose to
rent a stall, and to such only as have the ability to pay the
rent that may be exacted: Secondly : the effect of such a
restriction is to create a monopoly, and if the act was rigidly
enforced such a monopoly as would preclude many at some
seasons of the year from obtaining animal food: Thirdly : it is,
in effect prohibitingthe inhabitants of the City from purchas-
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ing meats, except from the few who may have been so fortu
nate as to obtain a stall, & fourthly, it puts the whole com
munity in the power of the few who have rented stalls so
far as regards the supply of meats and the price to be paid:
For these reasons I think the by law so far [ set] forth un
reasonable, unnecessary and I must say oppressive : It will
follow from what I have already stated that according to
my conception, the Second Sec of the by-law, is also in re
straint of trade. It was argued by the able counsel for the
defts, that the restraint imposed was not general but particu
lar : that it merely fixed the place where meats were to be
sold; this is very true, but is it not apparent that such regula
tions both with regard to time & place may be so restrictive
in their character as to be obnoxious to the general principle
that all laws in restraint of trade are void: To illustrate my
meaning: let us suppose that the Common Council should
pass a law prohibiting the sale of meats except in one of the
stalls of the public market, and that such sale should be made
but once a week: now this regulation would regard time &
place, yet it would hardly be contended that it could be sus
tained, because of its unreasonableness, and because the effect
would be to restrain trade : But let us suppose a case which
frequently occurs, & to which I took the liberty of directing
the attention of the Senior Counsel for the defendants during
the progress of his argument : Farmers residing out of the
limits of the city and in adj oining counties are daily seen in
our streets during the winter season with wagons laden with
fresh beef, pork, mutton, veal & venison : Now according to
the 2 d Sec of the by-law in question, they could not sell their
meats unless in the stalls rented from the Common Coun
cil :-without subj ecting themselves to fine and perhaps im
prisonment : But it may be said, that no notice would be
taken of such a violation of law, or that the law was not
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intended to apply to such cases : The learned Counsel is the
Recorder of the City of Detroit, and usually presides at the
Mayor's Court and I should do injustice to his ability as a
judge, if with the plain provision staring him in the face
declaring that "no person shall sell meat except in the stalls
rented from the Corporation," he should charge the jury
impannelled to try the case that the law was not intended to
apply to such cases: Would he not rather say, that the law
was so plain as to admit of but one construction : that where
the meaning of a law was obvious & apparent, it was not the
province of a judge or j ury to intend, that the law makers
did not mean what they have clearly expressed: This would
undoubtedly be the language of the Recorder, unless like
myself he should think the law unreasonable & in restraint
of trade :
The suggestion that the provision of the by law I am
considering would never be enforced, cannot influence the
decision of the case : I am bound to suppose that it is enforced :
But without resorting any further to those principles by
which the validity of by laws of corporations are tested, I
shall conclude this branch of the case by referring to one
reported in the I O of Wendell p 99 : I shall notice it with
some particularity as it not only sustains the views I have
expressed upon the point under consideration, but fully con
firms some of the positions I have laid down in the progress
of this opinion : One Webster was sued for a violation of one
of the by laws of the Village of Buffalo, which made it un
lawful for any person during certain months to hawk about
or sell by retail any kind of fresh beef, pork, lamb or mutton
for the consumption of the inhabitants of the Village, except
at the public markets, or within certain limits around the
same : The defendant agreed with a grocer to let him have
a quarter of lamb and to receive in payment goods out of his
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grocery, and the sale & payment accordingly took place : On
this evidence the Justice who tried the case imposed a penalty
of five dollars ; The judgment was removed to the Court of
Common Pleas where the j udgment of the Justice was re
versed. Whereupon the Trustees of the Village sued out a
writ of error from the Sup Court : Chief Justice Savage
delivered the opinion of the Court as follows : "By the act
incorporating the Village of Buffalo the trustees are au
thorized to make such prudential by-laws, as they may deem
proper, relative to the public markets &c and the only question
is whether the by-law is valid: At the Common Law corpora
tions have power to make by-laws for the general good of
the corporation. they must be reasonable & for the Common
benefit : They must not be in restraint of trade, nor impose a
burden without an apparent benefit . A by-law for the restric
tion of trade and imposing particular restraints as to time &
place is good, but general restraints are bad : For example, a
by-law that no meat should be sold in the Village would be
bad, being a general restraint ; but that meat should not be
sold except in a particular [place] is good, not being a re
straint of the right to sell meat, but a regulation of that
right : Laws relating to public markets must necessarily em
brace the power to require all meats to be sold there, not that
every man who sells meat shall rent a stall; nor is there any
such objection to the present law; any one may sell meat in
the street adjacent to the markets." This opinion which I
have quoted literally establishes the following proposition :
I "t : That the power to regulate public markets embraces the
power to require all meats to be sold there : so far this de
cision affirms the right I have claimed on behalf of the Com
Coun. to require all public markets in the City of Detroit to
be held at the market houses : 2 1 r : By-laws must be reasonable
& for th� common benefit : 3 1 r : that general restraints are
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bad,-particular ones good: 4 1r: that a by-law requiring every
man who sells meat to hire a stall would be bad:
Now the 2 d Sec of the by law of the City of Detroit pro
hibits any man to sell meats except in the stalls rented from
the corporation : If so, it follows that in order to enable a
man to sell meat he must first hire a stall from the corpora
tion : Such a by law, altho' a mere regulation of trade, a
particular restraint is according [to] Chief Justice Savage
bad, & for the plain reason, that it is manifestly unreasonable
and not for the common benefit: It being essential to the
validity of a by law that it should be reasonable, and for the
common benefit-not for the benefit of the few.
The counsel for the clefts cannot fail to perceive the analogy
between the case I have just reviewed, and thaf which I pro
pounded to him during the argument of the present case:
the right of the trustees of Buffaloe to pass the law was
affirmed on the principle that it was reasonable to require the
farmer who brot' his quarter of lamb to the Village to repair
to the public market and there dispose of it, but disaffirmed
the right to require those who thus sold meat to hire a stall.
EDITOR's No TE : The above dissenting opinion, in the hand
writing of Justice Whipple, was found in file No. 1 5 9, First Circuit
Law. A memo. by Harrington, stating that Ch. J. Fletcher delivered
the majority opinion, is also in the file. Volume I of the Journal,
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 73 (Aug. 6, 1 839)
motion to set aside writ of supersedeas ; p. 76 (Aug. 8, 1 839) order
that writ of supersedeas be set aside unless bond filed ; p. 8 3 (Aug.
1 5, 1 839) argued and submitted; p. 9 1 (Sept. 28, 1 839) judgment
affirmed in part ; reversed in part. Also see Calendar, First Circuit
Law, Vol. I, case 1 5 9· Several papers pertaining to thise case will
be found in Woodbridge Papers ( Wallet for June-Sept., 1 839,
August Folder) , Burton Historical C ollection, Public Library, Detroit.
·
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CALEB F . DAVIS versus ISAAC W. INGERSOLL
January I 8, I 840 .
.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to three Justices
of the peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J . Judg
ment reversed.
J._A. Van Dyke, attorney foe plaintiff.
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in a footnote
in 2 Douglass (Mich. ) 3 7 2 ( I 849 ) . It deals with the substantive
allegations necessary in an action of forcible entry and detainer.
Volume I of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, con
tains the following entries : p. 7 3 (Aug. 6, I 83 9 ) motion that
justices make a more complete return ; p. 74 (Aug. 7, I 8 39) specific
points given on which return should be made ; p. 9 5 (Jan. I 3, I 840)
argued and submitted ; p. I oo (Jan. I 8, I 840) judgment reversed.
Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case I 5 3 · The original
MS. opinion is not in the files.

JONAH BREWSTER, MARTHA BREWSTER,
GEORGE BREWSTER, MARY BREWSTER, and
BENJAMIN BREWSTER versus EUROTAS P.
HASTINGS, SHUBAEL CONANT, and
HENRY S. COLE, Executors, etc.,
of FRANKLIN BREWSTER, Deceased.
March 7, I 840.

I . A declaration made by a person in his last sickness, which
was read over to him, approved by him, and declared by
him to be his will in the presence of five persons who signed
as witnesses at his request, is a NUNCUPATIVE will under
section 3 of the statute of I 8i8 (Terr. Laws of I 82 o, p.
2 0} not a WRITTEN will which is defective because not
signed by the testator:
2. A valid NUNCUPATIVE will which purports to dispose of
both real and personal property does not come within the
terms of section 9 of the above statute (providing that a
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defective 'Will in WRITING which purports to dispose of
both real and personal property ccshall not be allowed and
approved as a testament of personal estate only"), hence
may be allowed to stand as to personalty.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Appeal from the Probate
Court, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree
affirmed.
A. D. Fraser, attorney for appellants.
D. Goodwin, attorney for respondants.

[ INDORSEMENT]

}

Sup. Court 1 Circuit
Brewster et al
vs .
Hastings et al
Opiniondelivered March 7, I 84o
By Fletcher Ch . Jus .

Fraser for Appellants
Goodwin for Respondants-

l

[OPINION]
Jonah Brewster et al
vs.
Eurotas P. Hastings
& Shub1 Conant

�

This was an appeal from the decree of the Judge of Pro
bate for the County of Wayne, passed the 2d Feby 1 8 35, by
which an instrument purporting to be the last will and
Testament of Franklin Brewster, deceased, was approved and
allowed.
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The Appellants are heirs at law of the testator, and the
Respondants are the executors named in the will.
Several reasons for the appeal were duly filed by the
appellants, but only one of them is now relied on, which is
that the will purporting to be a disp osition of Real and Per
sonal property, and not being executed and attested so as
to operate as a devise of the real estate, canl!ot be allowed as
to the personal.
The will was a nuncupative will made by the testator in
the Summer of I 8 34 in his last sickness-! t 'was reduced to
writing according to his directions, and read over to him, and
approved. He then declared it to be his last will and testa
ment in the presence of five persons who subscribed the same
at the time, as witnesses by request of testator. The testator
did not sign the will.
(Read copy of the will)
It is contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that
this will, purporting to be a disposition of real and p ersonal
estate, comes within the provisions of the 9 th Section of the
["] Act Prescribing the manner of devising land, tenements
and hereditaments," adop ted July 27. 1 8 1 8 .
The preamble to the 9 th Sect. of that act is in these words
"And as it may sometimes happen that a will respecting
"lands and tenements and personal estate, through inattention
"or otherwise, may be attested or subscribed by a less number
"of credible witnesses than this act directs for devising land
"tenements and hereditaments, which if approved and al
"lowed as a testament of the personal estate only, might de
"feat the original intention of the devisor respecting the
"settlement of his estate"-Then follows the enacting clause,
"-Be it further enacted that any will in writing hereafter
"offered for probate, which purports a disposition of both
"real and personal estate, that shall not be attested and sub-
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"scribed as this act directs for the devising of lands, tenements
"and hereditaments, shall not be allowed and approved as a
"testament of personal estate only."By the I8 Sect. of this act it is declared that any person
lawfully seized of any lands, tenements or hereditaments in
the Territory, being of the age of 2 I years, and of Sane mind,
shall have power to devise the same by last will and testa
ment in writing-And by the 2 d Sect. it is declared that all
devises and bequests of any lands or tenements shall be in
writing and signed by the party devising or by some person
in his presence, and by his express direction ; and shall be at
tested and subscribed in the presence of the devisor by three
or more credible witnesses, or otherwise shall be void-This
will is not executed so as to operate as a devise of real estate,
not being signed by the testator nor by any other person for
him in his presence and by his express direction.
But the counsel for the appellants contend, [ I ] that al
though the will is not executed & signed as required by the
Statute, still it is a will in writing and comes strictly within
the prohibition contained in the 9th Section of the Act ; and 2.
That if it is not within the strict terms of that Section, it
comes clearly within the scope of the remedy intended by the
Legislature-and ought to be considered as within the equity
of the prohibition-and that it cannot, therefore be allowed
as a will of the personal estate.
I . "Is it a will in writing within the terms of the Statute?
By the 3d 4th & 5 th Sections of the same Stat. the right
to make nuncupative wills is recognized under certain restric
tions and regulations therein provided.
A nuncupative will is a testamentary disposition of prop
erty made by verbal or oral declaration, of the testator-And
. are uniformly contradistinguished from written wills, signed
and executed by the testator-The term nuncupative imports
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merely verbal or oral declarations-And although such dec
larations should at the time be reduced to writing, and read
over to the testator, and fully approved by him, yet if he
should not sign it himself or by some other under his direc
tion it would be a nuncupative will only, and not a will in
writingThis distinction between a will in writing, and a nuncupa
tive will is expressly recognized in the Stat. 2 9 Ch. II. Chap.
3 · commonly called the Stat. frauds, and also in our own
Statute before referred to-By the 2 9 Ch. II. it is enacted
that no written will shall be revoked or altered by a subse
quent nuncupative will except the same be, in the life time of
the testator, reduced to writing, and read over to him and
approved. By the 6 th Section of our own Stat. it is enacted,
"that no will in writing concerning any goods, chattels or
personal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause or
bequest therein be altered or changed by any words or will,
by word of mouth only, except the same be committed to
writing, and read to the testator and allowed by him." &cThis distinction has been uniformly made or recognized
It is quite clear that this is not strictly a written will within
the express terms of the Statute.
2. But, although not strictly within the express words of the
Stat. it is further contended that it comes within the scope
of the mischief intended to be remedied by the Stat., and that
the same reasons and principles apply to it, and that therefore
it should be held to be within the equity of the Stat.In the construction of Statutes the first object is to ascer
tain the intention and meaning of the Legislature. When
from the terms used by the Legislature the intention is plain
ly expressed, there is no room for construction. But when
the intention is not manifest, every part of the Stat : other.
Statutes upon the same subj ect-the general scope and object
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of the Act ; the preamble & the title may be resorted to for
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature
Is the Statute in question, therefore, as to the intent of
the Legislature, plain and obvious, or doubtful, and still
to be ascertained by judicial construction?
In the first place "a statute is the best expositor of it- ·
self."d
•t
The r & 2 Sections of the Act declare who may devise
lands-and direct that the will shall be in writing and signed
by the devisor and be attested or subscribed in his presence
by 3 or more witnesses--or else shall be utterly void, and
of no effect.
d t
The 3 4 h & 5 th Sections relate to nuncupative wills. The
d
3 Section declares that no nuncupative will shall be good,
when the estate thereby bequeathed, shall exceed the value
of $ r so, that is not proved by the oath of 3 witnesses at least,
that were present at the making thereof, nor unless it be
proved that the testator at the time of pronouncing the same
did bid the persons present, or some of them, to bear witness
&c &c.
The 4th & 5 Sections regulate the time and manner of
proving and allowing such nuncupative wills- .
By these provisions the right to dispose of personal
property by a nuncupative will is most expressly recognized,
the mind of the Legislature was directly employed in pro
viding against the evils which might attend such a testa
mentary disposition, either from accident or fraud-and all
these regulations respecting the circumstances under which
such a will may be made, how it may be made, the time and
manner of the proof and the probate and allowance, are
essentially different from those which are provided for a
devise of real estateHaving made these separate and distinctive regulations
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upon these different subjects, the Legislature further pro
vided in the 9th Sect. that a will in writing purporting a dis
position of both real and personal estate, that should not be
attested and subscribed as directed by that act for devising of
lands, tenements and hereditaments, should not be approved
and allowed as a testament of personal estate only. The will
in question certainly purports to dispose of real, as well as
personal estate-But in what part of the Stat. can it be dis
covered that the Legislature intend to subj ect an unwritten
will to the operation of the 9th Section?
There is nothing in the terms employed by the Legisla
ture indicating such intentionBut it is contended in general terms by the Counsel for
the appellants that the mischief is the same in permitting an
unwritten will purporting a disposition of real and personal
estate, to stand as to the personal only, as in case of a written
will, and as the Legislature intended to prevent the mischief
in the case of a written will ; the court will extend the remedy
beyond the strict letter of the Stat. so as to reach and correct
the same evil which will be occasioned by the allowance of a
nuncupative willWhether the evil is the same in each case it may not be
necessary now to determine, but it is manifest that the Legis
lature did not intend to put them on the same footing or
subject them to the same rules and the reasons for this dis
tinction are obvious.
Greater formality has always been required in the disposi
tion of real property than of personal.
In the case of written will the testator may and most
generally perhaps does make it in health, upon mature de
liberation and by the assistance of Counsel-whereas in the
case of a nuncupative will-it must be made in sickness and
frequently without time for advice or the formal execution of
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written instruments-It is quite natural therefore that the
Legislature should intentionally make a difference as to the
regulations and rules respecting a nuncupative will which
must be made in extremis, and those respecting a formal
instrument intended to operate as a devise of real estateIt seems to me therefore as well from the apparent in
tention of the Legislature as ascertained from the terms and
manifest object of the Statute, as also from the obvious rea
sons arising from the subject matter respecting which the
statutory regulations are made, that by extending the pro
visions of the 9 th Sect. to an unwritten will, we should be
directly contravening the express will of the Legislature.
But it is further contended by the Counsel for the
appellants, that the Stat. in question was adopted from
Masst"-that it has reed a construction in that state, that prin
ciples have there been established which if applied to this case
would fully support their objection to this will-And that
such adj udications should be adopted here as good authority,
upon the principle that when a statute is adopted from
another state, the construction of the Stat . which had obtained
in such state-is also adoptedThe rule contended for is a sound and salutary rule, so
far as it relates to open and well ascertained adjudicationsThe case of Brown vs. Thorndike I 5 Pick 3 8 8 has been re
lied upon as sustaining fully the position taken by the Counsel
for the appellants, that the will in question should be held
to [be ] within the spirit and equity of the 9 th Sect. of the
Stat.Brown vs. Thorndike I 5 Pick 3 8 8-C. Thorndike made
his will on the 2 8 Feby I 82 5 , duly excuted and attested to
pass real estate, and purporting on the face of it to dispose of
both real & personal estate-In June, I 8 29 he wrote and
signed upon the will the following declaration.
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"It is my intention at some future time to alter the tenor
"of the above will, or rather to make another will ; therefore
"be it known that if I should die before another will is made,
"I desire that the foregoing be considered as revoked, and of
"no effect"There was no subscribing wit to this memorandum.
The testator afterwards died without having made any other
will.
It was contended by the counsel for the Appellant in
support of the will that a revocation of a will although not
expressly named in the 9 th Sect. of a Statute of that State,
(which Section is precisely like our own) yet that revocations
are within the mischief-the same reason and principle apply
ing to them, and therefore that they ought to be held to be
within the equity of the Stat.
But before this question was decided the Counsel for the
Respondants contended that at the time of the revocation the
testator had no real property upon which the will could
operate, and offered to show this fact by evidence,-This evid.
was admitted by the Court by which it appeared that all the
real estate held by the testator at the time of making his will,
had been aliened before the revocation. And the Court then
say that, as the testator at the time of the revocation, had
only personal property upon which the will could operate, the
will should be regarded as a will of personal property only,
and might be revoked without any attestation of subscribing
.witnesses-They also say that the testator is to be presumed
to h.ave a knowledge of the situation of his own property, and
being in fact only possessed of personal property, and the
effect of a revocation executed in the manner that one was,
must be presumed to be known to the testator,-and that to
give effect as a revocation of a will of personal property only,
would advance, and not defeat the general intent and purpose
of the testator-
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-The Court then remark in relation to the equitable con
struction of the statute as claimed by the Appellants, that
"to apply the provisions of the statute by any supposed equity
"of construction, to such a case, would, we think, be going
"contrary to the reason and purpGse of the Statute, and would
"be not only defeating the intent of the testator, but the in
"tent of the Legislature."-How any principle established in
this case can be properly be urged as tending to bring the
will under consideration within the equity of the Stat. it is
difficult to preceive, because in that case the revocation was
held not to be within the words or spirit of the statute.
There is another case cited from Masst• by the Counsel
for the Respondants, the case of Deane vs. Littlefield, I Pick.
R. 239·
In that case a minor made a will duly signed by him and
attested and subscribed as required to a devise of real estate,
and purporting a disposition of both real and personal estate.
It was contended in opposition to the will, that it came
equitably within the 9 th Section of the Stat.But the Court say, "At common law 'a will which was
good to dispose of personal estate, but not for real, might be
set up for the former, though not for the latter ; and the 9 0
Section of the Stat. was intended to repeal the Common Law;
it must therefore be limited in its operation to the case in
tended by the Legislature ; and it is very clear that the pro
vision had respect only to such wills as should be insufficient
to dispose of real estate only because they were not attested
and subscribed in the manner required by the Stat.
- In that case the will was duly attested and subscribed to
pass real estate, which the court decide took it out of the
9 th Sect. of the Statute-and declare that it neither came
within the words nor spirit of the Stat.
That case is quite similar to the one before us, and de
pending upon the same principles•
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In that case a will of a minor purporting to dispose of
real and personal estate, was not provided for by the Legis
lature-and was considered as standing as at the Com. Law
In this a nuncupative will purporting to dispose of real &
personal estate does not come within the provision of the 9th
Section, because a written will only is mentioned, and that
made inoperative by the Stat. only because not attested and
subscribed as required to devise real estate. The obj ection to
the will in either case is not on the ground that it was not
thus attested and subscribed, but on an intirely different
ground-in the case of Deane vs. Littlefield on the ground
that the testator was not 2 r years of age, and in the present
case because it is a nuncupative will, and cannot therefore
operate as a devise of real estate.
In the case of Deane & Littlefield the Court laid some
stress on the circumstance that as the testator had by his will
given the whole of his estate to his mother, who was his heir
at Law, an allowance of the will as to the personal estate
could not defeat the intention of the testator. And in the
present case if the will should be disallowed, the whole in
tention of the testator will be defeated, for then it will all
pass to the father, to whom he has giv�n nothing by the will
It is not necessary however for us in this case to give any
weight to this consideration in this case.
There is another difference between the two cases which
shows still more clearly that this case ought not to be con
sidered as coming within the equity of the Stat. In the case
of the minor, the will was not considered as within the
Statute because the ground of the obj ection did not relate to
the insufficiency of the attestation and subscription, and the
Court say they must limit the operation of the 9 th Sect. to
the case specified by the Legislature.
In the case at bar the same rule must be applied because
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the reason i s the same-and in addition to this, there is
another reason in this case equally conclusive, the fact here
tofore alluded to, that the legislature have made specific
regulations in the same Statute and entirely different in
character, . respecting written and unwritten wills, and have
limited the operation of the 9th Section expressly to written
wills.
On this ground therefore the present case is more clearly
left to stand as at Com. Law, than the case in 1 Pick.·
But is was further insisted by the Counsel for the appel
lants that at Com. Law a will purporting to dispose of real
and personal estate, and not executed so as to operate upon
the real estate, could not be allowed to stand as to the per
sonal.
This position, however, cannot be maintained. The rule
that the will may be set up as to the personal estate, has been
to long established to [and] too generally recognized, I think,
to [be] now disturbedWith these views I am of the opinion that this will be
approved and allowed as to the personal estate only of which
to testator died possessedEDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. I I 2, First Circuit-Law. The
case was transferred to the Supreme Court from Wayne Circuit
. Court, Michigan Territory. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit,
contains the following entries : p. I I (Jan. I O, I 83 7 ) argued and
submitted ; p. 42 (March I , I 83 8 ) moved by appellants that a real
or feigned issue be formed and sent to Wayne Circuit Court for
trial ; p. 4 3 (March 2, I 83 8 ) ordered that a real or feigned issue
be formed and tried by jury in Wayne Circuit Court ; p. 5 4 (Jan. 8 ,
I 8 39) moved that decree o f probate court be affirmed ; p . s 8 (Jan.
I o, I 8 39) argument opened ; p. I o I (March 7, I 840) will of
Franklin Brewster allowed and established as a good and valid
nuncupative will ; decree of probate court affirmed. Also see Calendar,
First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case I I 2 .
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GEORGE HILL versus DAVID PADDOCK and
GIDEON 0. WHITTEMORE
January 23, I 841 .

1 . In the absence of evidence, a court cannot presume that a
memorandum at the foot of a promissory note ("A t I 2
per cent int D. P.") was made when the note was made or
that the letters "D. P." meant David Paddock, one of the
makers of the note.
2. Where it does not appear that a memorandum at the foot
of a note is a substantial part of the note, proof of the note
and memorandum is not a material variance from a plead
ing which describes the note without mentioning the
memorandum.

Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by the
Circuit Court, Oakland County; certified to the Supreme
Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme
Court that objection to note as evidence on the ground of
variance was properly overruled.
John P. Richardson, attorney for plaintiff.
William Draper, attorney for defendants.

[ INDORSEMENT]
Sup. Court. Pontiac
]anY I 84I
Hill
vs.
Paddock et al

-

Memo of opinion
Same term-

�

HILL

'tl.

PADDOCK

( OPINION)
George Hill
vs.
David Paddock &
Gid. 0. Whittemore

�

-----

On a question of law reserved &
certified to this Court by the
Pres. Judge of the Circuit for the
County of Oakland.

The action below was assumpsit on a promissory note,
drawn in the following manner
"One year from date for value reed we
j ointly and severally [ promise] to pay George
Hill or bearer four hundred dollars & interest.
Pontiac FebY I I , I 837
Signed D. Paddock
G. 0. Whittemore
At I 2 per cent int
D.P."
The Plff declared upon the note without noticing the
memo at the foot of the note.
On the Trial the PHI proved the execution of the note
by the De£ts, and offered the same in evid. in support of his
said action. To this the Defts Ate objected on the ground
of variance between the note offered in evid. and that
described & set forth in Pl:ffs declaration, in this, that the
memo at the bottom of the note offered in evid. formed a part
of the note, and that it was therefore materially variant from
that described in the declaration.
This objection was overruled by the Circuit Court, and
the note was given in evid. A verdict found thereon for the
Pl:ff.
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The Defts moved the Circuit Court for a new trial, and
as a reason in support of their motion insisted that the
Circuit Court erred in permitting the note to go to the jury.
And the question now is whether there was a material vari
ance.
On the part of the Defts it [was] urged that there was
a variance, because the memo formed a part of the note, and
should therefore have been declared on-and that having
omitted to declare on the note according to the terms of the
note itself, there is a misdescription of the note in the declara
tion .
On the part of the PHI it is insisted that the memo upon
the note is unmeaning or insensible in the absence of any evid.
explanatory of its meaning. that neither the Circuit Court
nor this Court can undertake to affix a meaning to the memo
for the purpose of affecting the plain and manifest terms of
the noteI . Can the Court in the absence of all evid. intend or
presume that the letters D. P. mean David Paddock
one of the makers of the note? or
2. that the memo was made at the time of the execution
of the note by the Defts-?
This Court certainly cannot, in the absence of proof,
affix any meaning to the letters D. P. nor can th'ey say that
the memo was made at the time of making the note, or was a
part of the contract. We cannot therefore regard it as a
substantive part of the note.
What affect might be given to this memo upon the assesst
of dam•, whether the Plff producing the note with this memo
upon it would not be bound by it-and thereby bring himself
within the penal stat., giving a forfeiture where usury has
been reserved it is not necessary now to determineWe are of the opinion that the obj ection was properly
overruled--certified accordingly-

H I LL

'V.

pADDOCK
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. I 9, Fourth Circuit. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 6 {Jan.
2 1 , 1 84 1 ) argued and submitted ; p. 1 0 {Jan. 23, 1 84 1 ) certified
that objection to note was properly overruled. Also see Calendar,
Fourth Circuit, Case No. 1 9 .

CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT versus SAMUEL GANTT
January 23, 1 84r.
1 . In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had
"robbed" a ballot box by taking out ballots for Crary and
putting in ballots for Wells, leaving only I 57 for Crary),
evidence that zoo persons had voted for Crary was in
admissible in mitigation of damages in the absence of evi
dence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery."
2. The fact that plaintiff was clerk at the polls and had law
ful custody of the ballots at the time of the alleged "rob
bery" does not connect the plaintiff with the "robbery."
Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by the
Circuit Court, Oakland County; certified to the Supreme
Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme
Court that the proposed evidence was properly rejected.
G. W. Wisner, attorney for plaintiff.
A. H . Hanscome, attorney for defendant.

[INDORSEMENT]
Sup. Court 4th Circuit

Rosevelt
vs.
Gantt

�l

Jany 1 841 .
PontiacQu. reserved
Oakland Circuit.

------

Memo of Opinion
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[ OPINION]

l

Sup. Court 4 th Circuit Jany T. 1 84 1 .
Cornelius Rosevelt
vs.
Sam1 N. Gantt

-

This case comes before this court on a question reserved
and certifi.ed by Hon. C. W. Whipple the Presiding Judge of
the. Oakland Circuit Court.
The Plff sued the Deft below in an action on the case for
a libel.
The publication charged the Plff and 3 others with having
robbed the ballot box, and taking· therefrom ballots for Isaac
E. Crary, and putting in other ballots for Hez. Wells, at the
Special election for Member of Congress, in the Town of
Pontiac.
The publication further stated that Plff was clerk at the
Polls and kept the ballot box on the night after the first days
ballotting, and charged that the robbery was committed at
that time. It further stated that most of the principal persons
in Pontiac believed that Plff and the others had committed
the robbery. The Publication was signed by Benj . Irish-The
Deft was charged with having put the papers in circulationThe Deft pleaded only the general issue.
After the Plff had rested his case, Deft called a Mr
Henderson to prove that 200 persons had made affidt• before
a Justice that they voted for Crary, (then having only 1 5 7
ballots found for him on the canvass) and that this fact was
known to the Deft before his publication of the libel-for
the purpose of mitigating the damages-To this evid. the
Plffs counsel obj ected, as inadmissable-The court below
rej ected the evid. and the only question made here is whether
that rejection was proper.

RoosEVELT v. GANTT
We are of the opinion that the evidence was properly re
jected-The facts offered to be proved by the witness furnish
no excuse or palliation to the Deft, for having charged the
Plff with the robbery-The proposed evid. does not connect
the Plff with the robbery, and if the Deft will from such
facts select out the Plff as the person who committed the al
leged offence, he is certainly without excuse, so far as his
knowledge of these facts is concerned. It is stated in the
publication that the Plff had charge of the ballot box as
clerk, the night on which it was alleged that it had been
robbed, and what reason has the Deft to charge Plff with
being the robber, merely because 200 men swear that they
voted for Crary.
The Plff lawfully had a lawful custody of the ballot box,
during the time, and the proposed evid. lays no foundation for
a charge upon him.
The utmost latitude which has been allowed under the
most liberal rule as to mitigation in slander or libel, never has
been carried to the extent here contended for. The report
current or information of the Deft respecting the guilt of the
party slandered, has been allowed in mitigation, because there
is a reasonable ground upon which the Deft may urge his
excuse by way of rebutting the presumption of malice, and it
has been properly submitted to the jury in such cases, to say
how far the Deft in making the charge has acted bona fide
upon such report or informationBut in this case the information of the Deft that a greater
number of persons had sworn that they had voted for Crary,
than there were ballots found for that candidate, has no bear
ing whatever upon the fact that the Plff committed the
robbery-nor can 1 perceive how the evid. if it had been reed
could have warranted the jury in presuming an absence of
malice.
The charge was not that somebody had robbed the ballot
·
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box-the evid. offered might have been a reasonable ground
to suppose that the box had been robbed-but it does not
warrant the Deft in fixing it upon the Plff.
Upon such information, if the Deft will of his own accord
charge the act of [to] the Plff he must justify or abide the
·
result-It is the opinion of this Court that the evid. was properly
rejected-and it is ordered that this opinion be certified [to]
the Circuit Court.
The above was the substance of the opinionOn looking over the case after argument Judge Whip
ple stated that some material facts had been omitted in
making up the case, which he thought might have a material
bearing upon the question submittedAfter I had given the opinion of the Court he assented
[to ] it as th"e case was madeEDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 5 , Fourth Circuit. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 5 (Jan.
20, 1 84 1 ) argued and submitted ; p. 1 0 (Jan. 23, 1 84 1 ) certified
that proposed evidence was properly rejected. Also see Calendar,
Fourth Circuit, case No. 15.

D. W. OWEN and I. OWEN versus the PRESIDENT,
DIRECTORS and COMPANY of the FARMERS' BANK
of SANDSTONE
January [ ? ] , 1 84 1 .
Supreme Court, Second Circuit. Error t o the Circuit
Court, Lenawee County. Opinion by Ransom, J . Judgment
reversed.
A. D. Fraser, attorney for plaintiffs in error.
P. R. Adams, attorney for defendants in error.

OWEN v. BANK
·

EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in a footnote
in 2 Douglass (Mich. ) , I 34 ( I 849 ) . It deals with the necessity of
proving corporate existence. Several papers pertaining to this case
will be found in file No. 5 7, Second Circuit. The original MS. is
not in the file,

MONIQUE GODFREY versus AMBROSE BEACH
March 4, 1 84 r .

The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to
endow a widow in wild land.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by Cir
cuit Court, Monroe County ; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion by Whipple, J. Certified by Supreme Court that
Circuit Court correctly overruled obj ections to certain evi
dence, etc., and properly instructed the jury on the case.
McClelland & Christiancy, attornies for plaintiff.
Wing, Noble, Felch, Romeyn, attornies for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : In Campbell, Appellant, 2 Douglass ( Mich.)
I 4 I (at p. I 44 ) , Justice Ransom quoted from an opinion said to
have been delivered in I 84 I by Whipple, J., in Godfroy v. Brooks.
The case referred to was, no doubt, Godfrey v. Beach, which was
an action of ejectment for dower. The MS. opinion has not been
found. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following
entries : p. I 05 (Jan. 7, I 84 I ) argued ; p. I I 9 (March 4, 1 84 1 )
certified that Circuit Court correctly overruled objections made by
defendant to the introduction of a certain deposition, evidence, etc.,
and properly instructed the jury on the case. Also see Calendar, First
Circuit, Vol. I, case I 88.
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A. B . CALHOUN 'Versus DAVID CABLE,
A. H . STOWELL, and CALEB CROSS.
March 4, 1 841 .

I . A bill in equity which alleges that the plaintiff assigned a

2.

3·

4·

S·

land contract to one of the defendants to secure him and
another defendant against liability as indorsers on certain
notes is not demurrable on the ground that it appears the
assignment was made in fraud of creditors, although the
bill also speaks of securing a retreat for the plaintiff and his
family, refers to a nominal consideration, and alleges that
the assignee was to hold the contract subject to the plain
tiff's directions.
A bill in equity which directly charges that a person to
whom a land contract was assigned for a particular purpose
'Violated his trust by disposing of the contract in a manner
not warranted by the terms of the assignment alleges
enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the
assignee.
A bill in equity which alleges that the maker of a land
contract procured from a trustee, to whom the contract had
been assigned for particular purpose, a wrongful assign
ment so as to destroy the plaintiff's interest in the land,
and then con'Veyed the land to a third person, alleges
enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the
maker of the contract.
A bill in equity which alleges that the purchaser of certain
land knew that it had been sold to the plaintiff under a
land contract states an equitable claim against said pur
chaser.
A ,bill in equity which claims a general right in which all
the defendants are interested is not multifarious although
each defendant has a separate and distinct interest.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. In chancery. Demurrer to
bill of complaint. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Demurrer
overruled.
·
H. Chipman, for the demurrer.
H. N . Walker, contra.

CALHOUN v. CABLE
(INDORSEMENT]

�

Sup. Court
Calhoun
vs.
Cable et al

-

I

Circuit.

In Chancery

Demr to Bill
Memo bill-argument.
& opinion-

(STATEMENT]
Sup. Court

I

Circuit.

A. B. Calhoun
vs.
David Cable et al

-

�

In Chancery.

The Bill sets forth
That on the 26 March '33 Cable sold to PHI a certain lot
of Land of 40 acres, and gave him an agrt in writing
. The consideration $250., $ 1 00 to be paid down, and the
hal" in 90 days-Cable to give a deed when the whole
amt was paid, or as soon thereafter as PHI should direct2. That PHI paid the whole amount of the purchase money
according to the agrt-but did not take a deed, as he had
full confidence in Cable being his brother in law3 · That PHI took poss. of the land, and with the knowledge
and consent of Cable, and expended 7 or $8oo thereon
in building, and improving the land4· That PHI and Peter N. Girardin in the Spring of '34 be
ing in partnership-procured Cable and A. H. Stowell
to indorse for them in their Co business 2 notes for
I.
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$309.49 each pay• at the Bank of Michigan, dated the 1 6
Ap. '34, one pay" in 6 and the other in 8 months5· That in the fall of '34 some of the Creditors of Plff and
Gir�rdin becoming alarmed, they made an assignt of of
their j oint debts, effects and stock, to the Stowell and
Garry Spencer, in trust to secure the said Stowell and
Spencer in the first instance, and also the said Cable and
others for their liabilities as indorsers-, and others to
whom they were indebted-dated 3 Nov '34
6. That to secure a retreat for himself and family, and to
prevent a sacrifice of his individual property, for the
payt of the Copartnership debts, in case of attempts by
said indorsers and creditors to enforce payt• at an earlier
period than would have been practicable to raise funds
out of the j oint effects assigned-The Plff upon the
suggestion of Stowell, was induced, for a mere nominal
consideration, to assign all his right and interest in the
said written agrt of Cable to convey the said land to said
Stowell-That Stowell took the said assignt in strict
trust and confidence for the sole benefit of Plff.-and
solemnly promised that he would use the instrument
assigned in such manner as Plff should direct, and parti
cularly that it should be so used that in case the debts and
effects of Plff and Girardin should be insuffi�ient to pay
the said notes indorsed by Cable and Stowell, the said
Cable and Stowell should be fully indemnified out of the
private property of Plff-That it was agreed between
Plff and Stowell, and it was the only object Plff had in
view in making the assignt of the instrument to Stowell,
to get an extension of time for the payt of said Cable and
Stowell, for any advances they might be under the neces
sity of making upon ' their liabilities as such indorsers
and the said Stowell agreed to act as trustee that object in

·

CALHOUN

v.

CABLE

73

virtue of the said assignt of said agrt to him-All of
which matters the Plff informed the said Cable-and put
him upon his guard, previous to the assignt of the said
contract by s<�;id Stowell to said Cable as hereinafter
mentioned7· That the said note indorsed by .Cable and Stowell, paye
·
in 6 months was taken up after it became due, and by
some arrangement between them, one half of the note
was understood to have been paid in some way by Cable,
and the other half by Stowell, as assignee of Plff and
Girardin-And that Plff has reason to believe, altho he
has not reed a strict a/c of the same, that the funds be
longing to said trust in the hands of Stowell, are amply
sufficient for the pai of the said note, and said Cable
will be fully indemnified and paid for his advances on
a/c of said note out of said funds.
-That Stowell has actually credited himself and
said Spencer with the payt of said note, as Trustees of Plff
and Girardin.
8. That in Feby '35 Plff had a conversation with Cable in
which C. intimated to Plff that Stowell was about to
apply the interest in the contract assigned to him by Plff,
to his own private use, and that he intended to get the
land for nothing-And the said Cable told Plff, that as
his contract for the sale of the land was made with Plff
he was not bound to make a deed to Stowell, and ex
pressly agreed to make a deed to Plff and take back a
mortgage to secure him for payt• on said notes as indorser
-and agreed to give Plff one year in which to pay the
mortgage-That in pursuance of this agrt Cable and Plff
went to a Lawyer, to whom C. gave directions to pre
pare the deed and mortgage, which deed and mortgage
were duly prepared and dated in the 23 Febry '3 5 · That
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the mortgage was for $470, which was to indemnify the
said Cable as well for the full amt paid by him on the
first note, as for the whole amt of the liability of the said
Cable & Stowell on the Second note, then outstanding,
and which Cable agreed to take up in consideration of the
said mortgage9· That PHI executed said mortgage and delivered the
same together with the deed so prepared to Caleb F.
Davis, to be taken to CableThat Davis delivered the same to Cable, who with
his wife executed the said deed and delivered it to said
Davis
I O. That PHI has always been, and still is ready under the di
rection of this Court, to pay and satisfy the sum so
secured by the said mortgage to Cable! I . That soon after Cable executed the said deed and while
it was in the poss. of Davis, the said Cable, without the
knowledge or assent, of PHI, entered into negotiation
with one Caleb Cross for the sale of said Land to Cross
-That Cross being well informed of the PHis rights to
the land, and that he was in poss. of the same, refused to
purchase, unless Cable would take up the agrt of Cable
to PHI
1 2. That thereupon Cable applied to Stowell to give up to
him said agrt-and that Stowell did deliver up the agrt
to Stowell [ Cable] , and that in consideration thereof, it
was agreed between them, that Cable would assume the
payt of one or both of said notes, that Cable should take
up one or both of said notes, and deliver the same to
Stowell after Cable's name should be erased therefrom
-(Setting forth written agrt of Stowell to this effect,
-That Stowell assigned the said agrt to Cable without
the knowledge or assent of PHI-)
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13. That the notes have not been given up to Plff, or can
celled, but are still outstanding against him.
r 4· That Stowell has treated the said notes as his private
property-And has turned out, and actually passed away,
one or both of said notes in payt of his private debts
and that PHI is still liable on said notesI5. That Cable clandestinely obtained from Davis, and with
out his knowledge or assent, the said deed given by
Cable to PHI, and exhibited the same to said Cross who
had a full knowledge of all the circumstances,-That
Cross purchased the said land of Cable who executed to
him a deed therefor dated the r 2 June '3 5-but which
was not delivered until Sept. '35That the consideration paid by Cross to Cable on
such purchase was $6oo--That that sum was greatly be
low the value of said land.
-That Cross took poss. of the said land and still re
tains the samer 6. The Bill concludes with prayer for reliefr . That the deed from Cable to Cross be cancelled
and given up to Pl:fi.2. That Cable be compelled to perform his agrt with
Plff upon such conditions as the Court shall deem
proper &c.
3d That the Defts be decreed severally to make and
to execute all necessary receipts and releases and assur
ances-and 4th to account to PHI and pay & satisfy him
for any monies which shall be found due PHI from the
Defts or either of themAnd for such other & further relief &c &c.
To this bill all the Defts have demurred generally
! . To the equity of the Bill, &
2. Multifariousness-
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I. As to the Equity
-The Defts in support of their demurrer contend.
I . That the assign1 of the contract for the land, to
Stowell-was made to secure the property from the
reach of PHis Creditors( a)-Bill says to secure a retreat [for] from
himself and family(b) A mere nominal considerationThat being a voluntary con
I Story, Eq. 364
veyance, it is good between the
7 Johns. R. I 63.
parties-Altho void as to
I 6 id.
creditorsI 2 Ves. I 03.
All showing that whether
4 Mass. 354
voluntary
or fraudulent as
Roberts fraud. Con. 593, 4·
Yelverton I 97
against Creditors, it is none
4 Cow. 207. 2 I 6.
theless good as between the
8 id. 406.
parties
I I Wheat. 2 1 3
I Cowan. I 7 I .
-PHI should have set out the consideration, that the Court
might see what it was &c.-not having done so the Court will
presume that the consideration was sufficient2 Kents Com. 3 65 . Valuable consideration-what
-Benefit to the promissor, or trouble or prejudice to
the promissee-The consideration as stated in Bill is vague & un
certain.
(c)-But the Bill states that the contract was as
signed to Stowell as collatteral security to
pay certain notes indorsed by Cable & Stowell
in the event that the funds arising from the
stock and effects assigned for that purpose
by Plff and Girardin, should not be sufficient
-This was to protect the indorsers-
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Why does he then complain.
-If the assignt of the contract was made to
Stowell in trust for this purpose-Stowell
had a right to convey, whenever the con
tingency required it-It was optional with
him to wait or not-Plff cannot take it away, or ask to have it
taken away-and the only supervision which
a Court of Equity would take of the
4 Kents Com.
matter, would be to see that the trust
3 02
was carried into effect-That the colI Equity
lattery
security was applied according
Cases Abridg. 93
to the agrt of the partiesI I Ves. I 2. 22
-The Bill does not ask to have the property
applied to the purpose for which it was as
signed-but, on the contrary, without ten
dering the amt of the notes paid by Cable,
seeks to compel Cable to convey the land to
Plff.
(d. ) In addition to all this, the Bill sets out, That the Lead
ing and ONLY obj ect of the assignment of the contract to
Stowell, was to get an extension of the time for the Plff
to repay Cable and Stowell what they should pay on the two
notes-And Bill states that Plff informed Cable of the assignt
to Stowell and "put him on his guard." against bargaining
with him &c
-Clearly intending to prevent Stowell deriving any advan
tage from the assignt to him-as the assignt only could be
available to Stowell by obtaining from Cable a deed of the
land under the contractBill States
I . That a mere nominal consideration was given by Stowell

78

MICHIGAN UNREPORTED OPINIONS

on the asst and that S. reed the assignt for the benefit of
Plff-and that S. was to hold the contract, subject to Plffs
direction2. That the object of the assignt was to secure Cable and
Stowell for payt• made and to be made by them on the 2
notes in case certain funds should not be sufficient for the
purposeand
3· That the leading and only object of the assignt was to
get further time for Plff to repay C. & S. for the amt
paid by them on the notesWhich of these 3 considerations here mentioned is the
true one?-2 out of the 3 must be false.
-Pl:ff not only intended to cheat his creditors, but also his
confidential friend-The Bill next sets forth an agrt made by Cable with Plff.
in Feby '3 5, several months after the assignt to Stowell, by
which Cable agreed to make a deed to Plff--and states that
the deed was accordingly made and put into the Hands of
Davis, together with a mortgage back by Plff to secure Cable
for payment of the notes-Now by Plffs showing what equitable interest
in the land had Cable?
By the Bill itself this was clearly an attempt to
defraud Stowell of the benefit of the assignt as
a collatteral security &cStat. '33
-But the deed was never delivered to Plff
P. 342- and as there was no memo in writing it is within
the Stat. of frauds-The Relief prayed is that the deed from Cable
to Cross may be cancelled-
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That Cable be compelled to perform his agrt
with PHI, upon such conditions &c In other
words his assignt to Stowell be Cancelled, and
that the property be conveyed to PHIBut if the Bill shows any equity to entitle PHI to Relief
2. It is bad for multifariousness
Storys Com. on Eq. Pleading. p. 224 §27I-definition
"The improperly j oining in
id. p . 226.
one bill distinct matters, and
Cooper Pl. I 82
thereby confounding them, as
Mitf. Pl. I 8 I
for example, the uniting in
I 8 Ves. 8o
one bill perfectly distinct mat
2 Masons R. I 8 I.ters against several clefts in
2 Sch. & Lefr. 3 7 1 .
the same bill" &c
Story Com. Eq. Pl . p. 226"So if a Bill be bought for
(id. 23 I )
a specific performance upon
a sale of an estate, it would be multifariousness to include
in such a bill a prayer for relief against third persons who
should claim an interest in it, and who are unconnected
with the sale which is sought to be inforced"-If the PHI seeks to recover upon his contract made
with Cable in Feby '3 5-then the bill is bad, because
Stowell & Cross who had nothing to do with the sale, are
made parties-If he seeks to recover on the ground that Stowell
is a trustee, and ought to account for his doings as such,
then it is bad as Cross never had any thing to do with him
in any manner-neither paid him money or received any
title from him,-neither had Cable any connection with
Stowell that would make him liable.-The same result would flow if Stowell violated his
trusts, as Cable and Cross could not be made to account.-
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If he seeks to recover the land upon the first agrt by
Cable, then it is bad for multifariousness, as Cross, who
had nothing to do with that contr;tct, is made a partyIn support of the Bill the Counsel for the PHI. contends
That the objections of Defts to the equity of the Bill are
not warranted by the case made by the Bill-PHI does not seek to have the assignt to Stowell rescinded
-He seeks to enforce it, according to the agrt of the partiesHe charges Stowell with a breach of trust in disposing of
the contract assigned, before the happening of the contingency,
upon which alone he had any right to dispose of, by the
express terms of the assignt-alleging that the proceeds of the
copartnership effects were amply sufficient to pay the notes
indorsed by Cable and Stowell,-And therefore instead of
seeking to avoid the assignt-He asks this Court to supervise
the doings of the trustee, and that he may be compelled to
execute the trustThis is certainly apparent upon the whole face of the bill2.

It is also obj ected by the Defts, that Plff intended by the
assignt to Stowell to defraud, or delay his creditors, and that
this design is expressed in the bill-But this obj ection has been already answered, on the
ground that Plff does not seek to rescind the assignt-but
to enforce its terms and the trust connected with it-and
therefore it does not lie with Stowell to urge this obj ection,
when he is ask [ ed] to execute the trust-Besides the interest assigned, is not . such to subject the
PHI to such a charge! Story, Eq Com. 3 6 r .-"To make a voluntary conveyance
property which would be liable to be taken in Execution for
void as to Creditors, it is indispensable that it should transfer
the payt of debts"
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The assignt was not absolute, but conditional coupled with
a trustIn making the assignt to Stowell as a collatteral indemnity,
Plff merely preferred two creditors to others, if indeed he
had any othersI Story, Eq. Corn 3 70.
And a debtor may do
Id. 3 64.
1 1 Wheat. 48 or 78.
this without fr3;ud5 Term R. 424-Lord Kenyon-

1 John Ch. R. 1 1 9.-"Collatteral securities to creditors are
considered as trusts, for the better protection of their debts,
and equity will see that their intention is fulfilled."
2 John Ch. R . 283
ts
I 5 John Ch. R. 57 1-Assign in trust with a power of
revocation is considered fraudulent only as regards judgt
creditors, or such as are taking measures to obtain payt of
their debts.
-So far therefore, is [as ] the charge of fraud is concerned,
it is directly against the facts stated in the bill.- The assignt
was meritorious on the part of Plff-to secure his indorsers,
in the event the co-partnership fund should prove insufficient
to pay and indemnify them &c.
-As to multifariousness-The Deft are properly made parties to the Bill,
and it would have been demurrable if either had been
omittedThey have each participated! . Stowell in disposing [of] the contract assigned
in breach of his trust,
2. Cable, with a full knowledge of the object of
the assign\ in obtaining the contract assigned,
and in executing a deed to Cross of the premises
-also in violation of Plff rights-
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3 · Cross in taking the deed, having a full knowl,
edge of all the equities of the PHI-As to the Relief prayed for-PHI not limited to the special relief prayed but under
the general prayer for relief, may have such specific relief as
his case calls for2 Madd. Ch. IJ8-"the practice now is to pray particular
relief, though if the particular relief prayed by the bill cannot
be given exactly as prayed, the Court will assist the particular
prayer under the general prayer ; but relief inconsistent with
the specific relief prayed, cannot be given under the general
prayer."-

-Memo of Opinion!.

Ground of Demr Want of Equity in the Bill.
1 . That the assignt of Contract for Deed, by PHI to
Stowell, was fraudulent, intended to delay or hinder
creditors of Pl:ff

-I think the allegations in the Bill do not show a case
which will sustain this obj ection-There is a vagueness and looseness in that part of the
bill setting for [ th] the assignment and the reasons and
inducement prompting the Pl:ff to make the assignment-It
speaks of securing a retreat for Pl:ff and his family-about a
mere nominal considerationThat Stowell was to hold it subj ect to Pl:ffs directions
all which upon the first perusal seems to look as though the
PHI was putting his property beyond the reach of creditors
But it expressly states that it was assigned for the purpose
of indemnifying Stowell and Cable for their liabilities as
his indorsers on the notes, in the event that the j oint effects
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of PHI and Girardin should not be sufficient for that pur
pose-And besides the PHI does not seek to set aside the assigntHe charges that the contract was assigned in trust to
Stowell for a particular purpose-and that S. has violated
that trust, by disposing of the contract in a manner and under
circumstances not warranted by the terms of the assignt_
That the contingency had not happened upon which S. might
have disposed of the contract, to wit, the insufficiency of the
funds arising from the j oint property and effects of Plff &
Girardin to meet the liabilities of Cable & Stowell as such
indorsers-And he avers that those funds were sufficient for
that purposeHere then is a direct charge of misapplication of the
equitable interest assigned.
-And the Plff seeks the aid of the supervisory power of this
court, to compel the execution of the agrt between the parties
-and to correct a violation of the trust by Stowell-And that such a power is among the ordinary powers of a
court of Equity will not be doubtedUpon this part of the bill I think there is enough alleged
to show an Equity between the Plff and Stowell.
The Bill then alleges that Cable having a full knowledge
of the object of the assignt and of the understanding and
agrt between Plff and Stowell respecting the use and applica
tion of the equitable interest assigned, procured the contract,
so assigned to Stowell, to be assigned to him, for the purpose
of destroying all evidence as to the equitable interest of Plff,
in the lands agreed to be conveyed by said contract to the
PlffCable had thus taken up his own obligation to convey-and
then conveyed the land to Cross.
-Upon this alleged participation with Stowell in the breach
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of trust by Stowell, and the getting up his contract to convey
the land to PHI-And then conveying the land to Cross-there is an equity
between PHI and CableThe Bill further alleges that Cross, at the time he pur
chased the land and reed the deed from Cable, had full
knowledge of all the equitable interest of Plff in the prem
IsesThis allegation, upon its face, subj ects Cross to the equit
able claim of the PlffI think, therefore that the first ground of Demr that there
is no equity in the Bill, is not sustainedAnd as to the 2 d ground, Multifariousness-! think, that,
for reasons already given, the Defts are all properly made
parties, to the suit-The Bill claims a general right, that the
legal title to the premises be delivered up to be cancelled,
and that the same be conveyed to the Plff upon terms-And
although the clefts have each separate and distinct interests,
each of them is interested in the general claim-And are
therefore properly made partiesDemr overruledEorroR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was .found in file No. I 49 I (as renumbered for
Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan,
Blume ed. ) . Volume I of the Journal of the Supreme Court, First
Circuit, contains the following entry : p. I 20 ( March 4, I 84 I ) de
murrer overruled. Entries showing later proceedings in this case will
be found on pp. I 2 I , I 2 3, I 40, I 49, I 5 7, 304. For earlier proceed
ings, see p. 4, supra. Also see Chancery Calendar, Supreme Court,
First Circuit, Case No. I 3, p. 2 5 .

RAYMOND v. WALES

ss

STEPHEN RAYMOND versus GEORGE WALES,
MATTHEW HOWARD WEBSTER, and
EDWARD WARNER.
March 4, I 84 I .

Prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes of I 838, a
summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an
officer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed
by the supreme court on certiorari, even though the statute
authorizing the summary judgment expressly prohibited
an appeal.
2. The section of the Revised Statutes which declares that no
proceeding before a justice of the peace shall be remo'J)ed
to the supreme court by certiorari or otherwise, but may be
reviewed on appeal to the circuit court (R. S. Ir838, p.
3 99), is in conflict with the above express prohibition (R.
S. I 8J8, p. 397) .
3 · A s it can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended
to take away all modes of reviewing such a judgment, the
circuit court may review such a judgment on an appeal in
the nature of certiorari.
I.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Motion for mandamus to
Circuit Court, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch.
J. Dissenting opinion by Whipple, J. Motion overruled.
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for petitioner.
G. Bates, H. N. Walker, and Douglass, attorneys for
respondants.
[Paper I ]
[ I NDORSE M E NT ]

�

Sup. Court I st Circuit.
Raymond
vs.
Warner Junr
et al.
Memo of opinion-
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Sup. Court

I "t

Circuit.

Stephen Raymond
vs.
Edward Warner Junr
George Wales &
Matthew H. Webster

( OPINION]

I

In this case a motion is made by the Counsel for the PHI
for a mandamus to be directed to the Judges of the Circuit
Court for the County of Wayne commanding them to dismiss
a suit entered in that court by the above named Defts . on
appeal from the Judgt of a justice of the peace.
The affidavit of the PHI upon which the motion is made,
sets forth that the PHI sued Warner, as constable, and the
other two Defts his sureties in an action of debt, and declared
against them, & alleged that the PHI had delivered to the
said Warner, as such constable, a certain execution issued on
a judgt rendered by J. W. Strong Esq. a Justice, in favor
of the PHI and against Abraham Starks-And that the
said constable had failed to return the execution within the
life of the same.That on the trial of that suit judgt was rendered in favor
of the PHI and against the Defts for $97.50. That the Defts
appealed from said judgt to the said Circuit Court, and caused
the appeal to be entered in the Circuit Court at the last May
term-That his attorney at the same term moved the Circuit
[Court] to dismiss the appeal, and that his motion was
denied, and that the appeal in is now pending in that Court.
That a supersedeas to the EJf on the judgt rendered by the
Justice, has been issued by the Presiding Judge at the
Circuit Court.
In support of the Mo. it is contended that the Circuit
Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, on the ground that,
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in such a case the Rev. Stat. expressly prohibit an appeal by
the constable and his sureties in actions against them for such
default of the constableThe 25 Section of the Stat. relating to Justice's Courts,
gives an action of debt against a constable and his sureties for
the neglect of the constable in serving an execution, and
authorizes the justice who shall try the case to give judgt
for the amount of the ex" and 2 5 per cent damages thereon,
with interest and costs ; and expressly declares that, in such
case, "neither the constable not his sureties shall be entitled
to any stay of ex" or an appeal, but ex" shall issue forth
with."In opposition to the Motion it is urged, that by the 33 d
Sect. it is expressly declared that no order, or proceedings
whatsoever had or made by any justice of the peace, under
the authority of any law of this State shall be removed to the
Supreme Court by certiorari or otherwise-, but may be
reviewed and corrected only by appeal to th� Circuit Court
according to the provisions of that Chapter-And that by
the 34th Section, being a part of that Chapter it is provided
that either may have an appeal to the Circuit Court, in all
matters and proceedings before a Justice, upon which here
tofore, according to the laws and usages of this State, a writ
of certiorari might have been allowed and taken, to remove
the same to the Supreme Court, and that upon inspection
and ex" of such proceedings the Circuit Court shall give such
judgt or make such order, as law and justice, and the rights
of the parties shall require.There is certainly a mainfest inconsistency in these pro
visions-one prohibiting an appeal in a given case from the
judgt of a justice-and the other giving a party in all cases
a right to appeal when by the laws and usages of this State,
prior to adoption of the Revised Stat. the case might have
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been removed by certiorari to the Sup. Court. and when
in the given cases, where by the 25 Sect. the appeal is pro
hibited, a certiorari to the Sup. Court did lay under those
prior laws and usages.
Up to the time of the taking effect of the Rev. Stat. a
Judgt against a constable and his sureties for the neglect
mentioned, could be removed to the Sup. Court by certiorari
only-the appeal to the Circuit [Court] was then also ex
pressly forbidden. And by the laws in force at the time of the
adoption of the Rev. Stat. either party to a Judgt rendered by
a Justice in all cases make [might] take his certiorari to the
Sup. Court.
By the Rev. Stat. the right to remove to the Sup. Court
was entirely abolished in the most general terms-not confin
ing it to judgt• rendered in the ordinary jurisdiction in civil
cases at law, but including all orders or proceedings of a Jus
tice whatever under the authority of the laws of the StateAnd in the same Chapter it is also explicitly declared that
in all cases when by the former laws and usages, a certiorari
might have b�en taken to the Sup. Court, either party may
appeal to the Circuit Court, and have the record inspected
and decide by that Court, as upon certiorariThe manifest intent of the legislature in this provision was
to substitute an appeal to the Circuit Court in all cases where
by the former laws a certiorari might be taken to the Sup.
Court.
It was evidently an oversight, after making this general
provision, that the prohibition of an appeal in the 2 5 Sect.
was stricken not out.
This prohibition was in all the former Stat., but then the
Defts could review the proceedings on certiorariIt can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended
to take away every mode of review or redress in cases of such
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summary proceedings before a Justice of the peace, and
where too he was authorized to inflict a heavy penalty upon
the officer and his sureties-2 5 per cent & interest upon the
am t of the ex"
With these views of the subject, the provisions of the
.Stat. conflicting in terms directly, I think the Defts are
entitled to the same remedy, to which they would have been
entitled to in the Sup . Court on certiorari previous to the
adoption of the Rev. Stat. only modifying it however, as to
the form, by taking this special appeal in the nature of a
certiorari to the Circuit Court, according to the provisions
of the Rev. Stat.
Mo. denied[ Paper 2 ]
[INDORSEMENT]

Sup Court : r•t Cirt
Stephen Raymond
vs
Edwd Warner Et al
Opinion of C. W. W.
Van Dyke for pff.
Bates, Walker & Douglass
for defendant.
[DISSENTING OPINION]

Ex parte Stephen Raymond & :
This i s a motion made by Stephen Raymond, for a
mandamus to the Circuit Court of Wayne County, directing
that Court to vacate and order, & dismiss an appeal :
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The application is grounded on the following statement
of facts, which are admitted by Counsel on both sides to be
true.
It appears that Raymond instituted an action of Debt
before a Justice of the Peace against one Edward Warner &
his sureties, under the provisions of the 2 5 Section of Chapter
5 title 2 part 3 of the Revised [Statutes] : Warner was a
Constable to whom, it would seem, an execution in favor of
Raymond was confided for the purpose of being collected :
failing in the performance of his duty in this respect the
action of Debt, provided for in the section above cited was
commenced, as well against the Constable as his sureties
George Wales & Matthew H. Webster : The Justice rendered
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, & from that judgment
the parties defendants took an appeal to the Circuit Court :
upon entering the appeal, the plaintiff appellee moved
the Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdic
tion : this motion was denied, & the plaintiff now applies to this
Court for a mandamus to the Circuit Court, directing that
tribunal to vacate the order overruling the motion to dismiss
the appeal, and further directing the Court to dismiss the
cause:
The decision of this Court upon the application, must
depend upon the construction of the 25, 29, & 33 Sections of
the Justice's Act : The 2 5 Section provides that "in case any
sheriff or constable, to whom an execution shall be delivered,
shall not levy the same on the goods & chattels of the person
against whom such execution shali be granted, and on the
return day thereof pay the debt or damages, with interest
& costs &c levied, in the hands of the Justice who issued the
same ; the said Sheriff or Constable, and their sureties, shall
be holden to pay the amount of such judgment, with interest
& costs, to the person in whose favor such execution was
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granted, to be recovered by action of debt : in which case, & in
cases where judgment is entered on motion against him,
neither the sheriff or constable, nor their sureties, shall be
entitled to any stay of execution, or an appeal, but execution
shall issue forthwith" : Section 29 provides, that "if any per
son shall conceive himself injured by any judgment of a
Justice of the Peace, except in cases where judgment is ren
dered on the report of referees or arbitrators, such party, his
agent or attorney, may appeal to the Circuit Court of the
County" &c : Sec 33 provides that "no judgment or or proceed
ing whatever, to be had or made by any Justice of the Peace,
under the authority of any law of this State, shall be removed
to the Supreme Court by any writ of Error, false judgment,
habeas Corpus Cum Causa, certiorari or by appeal ; but
may be reviewed only by appeal to the Circuit Court of the
proper County, according to the provisions of this Chapter."
Sec 34 provides� that "in all cases where either party shall
appeal from the judgment of a Justice of the Peace pursuant
to the provisions of this Chapter, the Circuit Court to which
the appeal is taken, shall have authority to inspect & examine
into the proceedings of the Justice" &c with respect to all
matters which heretofore, according to the laws of the State,
a writ of Certiorari might have been allowed & taken to re
move a cause to the Supreme Court : and upon such inspec
tion & examination the Circuit are authorized to make such
order as law & justice & the right of the parties shall require.
The 25 th Section is clear & explicit: it expressly denies
the right of appeal to a sheriff or constable and their sureties
in cases where judgment is rendered against them for a failure
on the part of the Sheriff or Constable to perform the duties
enj oined upon them by that Section:
The 29 Section is equally clear, & grants to any party
who may consider himself injured by the judgment of a
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Justice of the Peace, the right of appeal, except in certain
cases:
The 33rd & 34th Sections prohibit the removal of judg
ments &c rendered by Justices of the peace to the Supreme
Court, but provides a remedy by appeal to the Circuit Court,
which is authorized to inspect the proceedings of the Court
below, and generally, to exercise, both in reviewing the case
& in giving judgment all the powers which the Supreme
Court formerly exercised, when writs of certiorari were sued
out for the removal of causes originating before Justices of
the Peace :
The 2 5 & 2 9 Sections apparently conflict the one with
the other, and we are called upon to give such a construction
to these Sections, as will conform to the intentions of the
Legislature, & if possible, to give such effect to each provision,
as that the whole may stand well together :
The obvious intent of the Legislature - in denying the
right of appeal to ministerial officers who should fail in the
performance of their duty, was to ensure faithfulness &
fidelity on their part, & to provide a summary remedy for
those who might be injured by reason of their unfaithfulness
or infidelity The provision of law which denies the right
of appeal, is well calculated to achieve the object the Legis
lature had in view: The proceding is in its nature summary,
and the remedy somewhat stern, but not too summary or
stern for a breach of trust & a violation of duty by a public
officer, who should, in all cases, be held to a strict account.
How then can we reconcile the provisions of Sec 2 5 & 2 9 .
Simply by supposing that the legislature never intended in
one breath and in direct & intelligable language to deny a
right of appeal, & at the same time by a general provision,
emb�acing all but one excepted case, affirm that right : The
reasonable & only rational construction, evidently is, that the
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general right of appeal was intended to be given in all cases
by the 29 Sec, except such as are either expressly excepted
in that Section, or in any other Section of the same Chapter.
By this construction, each provision is made to harmonize
with the other, & no violence is done to any rule of construc
tion with which I am familiar.
But it is contended that the Legislature never intended
to deprive a party against whom a judgment may be rendered
by a Justice of the peace, of the right of having that judgment
reviewed either by appeal or Certiorari. As a general proposi
tion it is true that a party ought not to be bound, conclusively,
by the j udgment of a Justice; hence the Legislature has
provided an appropriate remedy by which such j udgment
may be reviewed : Public policy, however, as in this case, may
suggest the propriety of denying to a public officer, a remedy,
which in his individual capacity he might be entitled to ; · and
such if [as] I am disposed to think was the motive in the
cases like that under consideration.But it is by no means certain that such a judgment may
not be removed to this Court by a writ of certiorari : the 33
Sec directs that no order or proceeding of a justice of the
Peace shall be removed to the Supreme Court by a writ
of certiorari, but that the remedy �hall be by appeal to the
Circuit Court : The J'd Sec of Chap I title I part 3 of the Re
vised Statutes, gives to this Court a general superintendence
over all inferior jurisdictions, to prevent & correct abuses
therein, where no other remedy is provided by law: The
remedy by appeal in a case like the present being expressly
denied, it may be a question whether this Court may not, by
a writ of certiorari, correct any "Error or abuse," that may
occur even in proceedings against sheriffs or constables who
may be charged with a dereliction of duty: The remedy by
appeal, however, is clearly prohibited by law, & it is not
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necessary to the decision of the present question, whether any
other remedy, than that by appeal has been provided.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the mandamus should
issue as prayed for:
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinions, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher and Justice Whipple, respectively, were found in file
No. I 8 9, First Circuit-Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit,
contains the following entries : p. I 0 7 (Jan. 8, I 84 I ) motion for
mandamus ; p. I I 6 (Jan. I 4, I 84 I ) argued and submitted : p. I I 9
(March 4, I 84 I ) motion overruled. Also see Calendar, First Cir
cuit-Law, Vol. I, case I 8 9.

JOHN BT. BOMIER versus THOMAS CALDWELL
March 6, 1 841.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Appeal from Court of
Chancery. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree modified and
affirmed.
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for plaintiff.
F. Johnson, attorney for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in 8 Mich., 463
( I 86o) . It deals with specific performance, variance in pleading,
statute of frauds, past performance, etc. The original MS. is not in
the files. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the follow
ing entries: p. I 0 7 (Jan. 8, I 84 I ) argued ; p. 1 0 8 (Jan. 9, I 84 I )
argued and submitted, Whipple not sitting ; p. I 2 I (March 6, I 84 I )
decree modified and affirmed. Also see Chancery Calendar, First
Circuit, Case No. I 9, p. 3 7 . For opinion of chancellor, see Harring
ton, Chancery Reports p. 67.
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EX PARTE BENJAMIN IRISH
July 1 2, r 841.
1 . A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the com
mand of a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to
the county in which the prisoner shall be confined.
2. A writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issued from the circuit
court of Genesee county directing the sheriff of Oakland
county to imprison a judgment debtor in Genesee county
is void insofar as it fixes the place of imprisonment.

Before Whipple, one of the justices of the Supreme
Court, Fourth Circuit. Habeas corpus to Sheriff, Oakland
County. Opinion by Whipple, speaking for himself as justice,
not for Court. Prisoner released.
G. W. Wisner, attorney in person.
[INDORSEMENT]

Ex parte
Benj . Irish :
Filed July 1 2 th r 84r
A. Treadway Clerk
Sup Court 4th Circuit
[ oPINION]
Ex parte
Benjamin Irish

Habeas Corpus ad Sub[mJ

The party (Irish) was brought before me by virtue of a
writ of Habeas Corpus : The writ was directed to the Sheriff
of Oakland Courtty, who returned, in obedience to the writ
that he held Irish in custody by virtue of a capias ad Satis
faciendum issued out of the Circuit Court of the County
of Genesee.
It appears that judgment was rendered in Genesee
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County, in favor of Geo W Wisner & against Irish for $50
& costs : that the action brought by Wisner was for a libel,
which I take it for granted authorized the suing out of a ca sa,
on the judgment :
The only obj ection to the writ is, that it directs the
Sheriff of Oakland County to commit Irish to the jail in
Genesee, in the event that no goods & chattels &c can be
found to satisfy the execution : it is contended that if im
prisoned at all, he must be imprisoned in the County in
which he resides, & that, therefore, the writ should have di
rected the Sheriff accordingly.
Upon a review of the Statutory provisions on the subj ect,
I am clearly of opinion that the objection to that part of the
writ, which commands the Sheriff to commit the defendant
to the Keeper of the jail in Genesee is well taken : It is a
well established principle that the Sheriff must obey the
command in the writ: by it he must be guided : If that officer,
contrary to the command in the writ, should undertake to in
carcerate Irish in this County, he would, I think, be liable
in action for false imprisonment : this would result from the
disobedience of the command in the writ, not withstanding
the place of confinement is the one designated by law; for
the Sheriff is a mere ministerial officer, & cannot of conse
quence exercise a discretion which is strictly judicial: So much,
then, of the ca sa as directs the Sheriff to deliver Irish to the
Keeper of the j ail in Genesee, is irregular, & therefore void :
It is, therefore, ordered & adjudged, & I do accordingly
order & adj udge that the Sheriff of Oakland County do re
lease & discharge from his custody the said Benj amin Irish,
provided he be held by none other than the writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum aforesaid:
Chas W Whipple
Asso Jus Sup Court.
Pontiac 1 2 July 1 841 .
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Jusice
Whipple, was found in an unnumbered file of the Supreme Court,
Fourth Circuit. Newspaper accounts of the case out of which the
present proceedings arose will be found in Detroit Daily Free Press,
Oct. 7 , 1 837, and Pontiac Courier, May 1 8, 1 838.

PEOPLE versus PETER D. LABADIE, JR.
January 1 7, 1 8 42.
1 . A lthough, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary
to allege that issue was joined in the action in which the
perjury is alleged to have been committed, such an allega
tion is descriptive and must be proved strictly.
2. Proof (a) that a plaintiff, in an action on a jail-limits bond
before a justice of the peace, filed the bond as his declara
tion; (b) that the defendants filed no plea; (c) that, on
appeal to the circuit court, the transcript of the justice
stated "The plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file'' which
bond was attached to the transcript; (d) that defendants in
the circuit court filed a plea of nil debit; and (e) that no
similiter was added or other pleadings filed--is not proof
that issue was joined in the circuit court.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by Cir
cuit Court, Monroe County ; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Verdict set aside ; nolle prosequi
entered.
Christiancy, prosecuting attorney.
H. T. Backus, attorney f<?r defendant.
[ Paper 1 ]
[INDORSEMENT]
The People &c
vs.
Peter D . Labadie Junr
On Questions Certified to Sup. Court-from
Monroe Circuit.
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(QUESTIONS RESERVED]

To the Hon" the Judges of the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan.
The undersigned respectfully certifies and submits for
the determination of the Supreme Court, certain questions of
law which were reserved by him on the trial of Peter D.
Labadie Jun• on an Indictment charging the said Labadie
with Perjury in the Circuit Court for the County of Monroe
at the last December Term thereof-, a copy of which In
dictment is hereto annexed.
On that trial two questions were raised and reserved by
the undersigned.
First Whether the averment in the Indictment, that a
certain issue was j oined in a plea of debt, between James
Ellison Plaintiff and John D. Labadie Medard Labadie and
Anthony B. Beaubien, as set forth in the Indictment, was
duly proved on the trial of said Peter D. Labadie Jun•?
and
Second-Whether the matter testified to by the said
Peter D. Labadie Jun• on the trial of such issue, upon which
the Perjury was assigned as set forth in said Indictment,
was duly proved to have been material on the trial of said
issue ?
The Evidence on the trial of said Labadie Jun• on said
Indictment which tended to prove the averment in the In
dictment that an issue was j oined between the parties as set
forth in the Indictment ; was as follows, that is to say : that
an action of debt was originally commenced before a Justice
of the Peace in favor of James Ellison Plaintiff, and against
John D. Labadie, Medard Labadie and Anthony B. Beau
bien Defendants-that the Plaintiff filed with the Justice
of the peace as his declaration in the cause, a bond for the
Prison limits executed by the Defendants to the Plaintiff
·

·

PEOPLE v. LABADIE

99

conditioned that one of the Defendants John L. Labadie
should remain within the prison limits in the usual form
that the Defendants did not file any plea before the Justice
that the cause was tried before the Justice and that all the
Defendants were present at the trial, together with Peter D.
Labadie Junr as their attorney & Counsel-that the Justice
gave judgment for the Plaintiffs, and thereupon the De
fendants appealed to the Circuit Court aforesaid-and that
such appeal was duly entered-that while the appeal was
pending in the Circuit Court and before trial, the Defendants
Attorney applied to the Court and obtained leave to plead
in the cause and thereupon filed a plea of Nil debit-that
there was no other declaration filed in the cause by the Plain
tiff but the said bond which was sent up on the appeal by
the Justice and examined in the Circuit Court, except the
transcript of the Justice, which contained these words-"The
Plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file-["]
Upon this State of the pleadings the parties went to
trial in the Circuit Court before a Jury and the cause was
tried in the same manner as though a regular and formal
declaration upon the bond had been filed setting forth a
breach of the condition by the Departure of the said John D.
Labadie from the prison limits, and as though the Defendants
plea of Nil debit had been filed to such formal declaration
and an issue had in due form been j oined in the cause.
This was all the Evidence to show that an issue had been
j oined in the cause as alleged in the Indictment.
The second question is whether there was proper and
sufficient evidence given on the trial of Labadie Junr on the
Indictment, that the matters testified to by him on the trial
of said cause on appeal in the Circuit Court, upon which the
Perjury was assigned, were material to the issue j oined in
the cause?
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And upon this point there was no other evidence except
ing that above stated, and that hereinafter statedThe matters testified to by Labadie Junr and upon
which the Perjury was assigned related to the admissions of
John D. Labadie on the trial of the origination [original]
action before the Justice of the Peace as stated in the Indict
ment and the Evidence corresponded with the Statement.
Upon the trial of the said Peter D. Labadie Junr--on the
said Indictment, the above mentioned questions were raised
by his Counsel and by the counsel of the said Labadie Junr
the undersigned reserved the same for the decission of the
Supreme Court ; and thereafter left the cause to the Jury
as if the Evidence in both respects was sufficient in the law,
and the Jury returned a verdict of guilty.
All which is respectfully submitted.
Ann Arbor JanY r , 1 842 :
wm A. Fletcher.
[ Paper 2 ]

}

[INDORSEMENT)

People &c
vs.
Labady

I

Circuit-

Opinion-

�

[ OPINION]

The People
vs.
Peter D. Labadie Junr

-

This case comes before this Court on certain questions
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reserved and certified by the Presiding Judge of the Circuit
Court for the County of Monroe.
The Deft was indicted for PerjuryThe Indictment alleged that the Deft was sworn and
testified as witness on the trial of a certain issue j oined in
a plea of debt in a certain action wherein James Allison was
Pl:ff and John D . Labadie, Medard Labadie and Anthony
Beaubien were Defts-and assigned the perjury upon that
Testimony.
On the trial of the Deft. upon this Indictment, the prose
cutor proved that the cause between the above named parties,
was originally commenced before a justice of the peace, in
debt, and that the Plff in that cause filed, as his declaration
before the Justice, a bond for the prison limits executed by
the· Defts to the Plff, conditioned that John D. Labadie
should remain a prisoner within the limits of the County, in
the usual form-And the Justice made upon his docket the
following entry-"The Plff declares on a limit bond on
file"-I t was further proved that the Defts did not file any
plea. That all the Defts were present before the Justice, and
that a trial was had, and a J udgt rendered against the Defts
And that the Defts thereupon appealed to the Circuit Court
for the County of Monroe-It was further proved that the
appeal was duly entered in the Circuit Court, and that no
other declaration was filed in the cause, except that the tran
script of the justice was filed on entering the appeal, in which
it was stated that the Plff declared on a limit bond on file ;
and the return and filing of the said bond-That after the
appeal was entered and before trial, the attorney for the
Defts moved for and obtained leave from the Circuit Court
to file a plea-and thereupon filed for all of the Defts a plea
of Nil debit--concluding to the country-No Similiter was
added-and there was no other or further pleadings in the
cause.
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Upon this state of the pleadings the parties went to trial
before a jury, and the cause was in fact tried in the same
manner as if a formal declaration alleging a breach of the
condition of such bond, by the departure of the said John D.
Labadie from the prison limits-had been filed, and a Simil
iter had been added to the plea nil debit This was all the
evidence given on the trial upon the Indictment, tending to
prove the averment in the indictment that a certain issue was
j oined in a plea of debt. And the question is whether the
evidence supports this averment?
In support of the prosecution, it has here been urged
that the evid. substantially supports the allegation-on the
ground that formal pleadings and a formal issue are not re
quired in a suit before a Justice's Court, nor on the trial of
such a suit on appeal to the Circuit Court. That the Stat. -has
declared that appealed causes shall be tried on the pleadings
below, unless the Circuit Court shall otherwise direct, and
that it was therefore competent and proper for the Circuit
Court to try the cause in question, upon the state of the plead
ings above set forth-in the same manner as if there had
been regular pleadings and a formal issue j oined to the
country- -On the part of the Deft. it is contended, that
whether it was or was not competent and regular for the
Circuit Court to try the cause on appeal upon the State of
the pleadings set forth, yet the evid. does not support the
averment that an issue had been joined in the cause-That
having made this averment the prosecutor is bound to prove
it strictlyThere is a well settled dis [tine J tion between descriptive
allegations, which must be strictly proved, and other aver
ments which must be substantially proved-Averments de
scriptive of records, writings, and property, must be supported
by proof of every fact and circumstance which is necessary
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to establish· the identity of the matters averred-In each of
these descriptive allegations, the question, as to the sufficiency
of the proof to support the allegation, is one of identity, and
any substantial variance is fatal . The same rule upon this
subj ect applies both in civil and criminal cases.
2 East P. C. 3 Stark. Ev. 2 Russ on Cr. Arch. cr. Pl. &c.
That the averment in question is descriptive can hardly
be questioned-The subj ect matter of the allegation is the
State of the pleadings, and when the Indictment alleges that
an issue was j oined in a plea of debt in a certain specified
cause depending in a Court of Record of common law juris
diction, and proceeding according to the course of the com
mon law, we must intend, that there are sufficient pleadings
and an issue j oined in due form of law.
The pleadings are a part of the record, and when it is
averred that an issue has been j oined in a plea [of] debt, in
a suit upon a bond for the prison limits, we must legally
intend, that a declaration has been filed assigning a breach
of the condition of the bond, and that such further pleadings
have been filed as have resulted in the joining of an issue
to the country in due form-of law.
Nor is it any answer to say that the Circuit Court, on
such a State of pleadings, in an appealed case had a right
to proceed in the trial of the cause in the same manner as if
there had been formal pleadings and a formal issue . There
was no necessity to aver in the indictment that an issue had
been j oined in the causeBut although not necessary to have been averred, yet,
as it is averred, the proper and strict proof must be made and
can in no case of descriptive averments be dispensed with
Verdict set aside-And a nolle pros. entered--and that Deft
be discharged from custody, unless detained on some other
cause-
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above questions and opinion, in the hand
writing of Chief Justice Fletcher, were found in file No. 2 I 2, First
Circuit-Law. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the
following entries : p. 1 28 (Jan. 5 , I 84 2 ) case received and filed ;
p. I 33 (Jan. 8� I 842) Labadie brought from jail in Monroe County
by habeas corpus; ordered committed to jail in Wayne County ;
p. 1 34 (Jan. I O, I 842) argued ; p. I 35 (Jan. I I , I 842) argued
and submitted ; p. 1 3 9 (Jan. 1 7, 1 842 ) verdict set aside ; nolle
prosequi entered. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case
No. 2 1 2.

PEOPLE versus LURETT C. HARGER ET AL
January [ ? ] 1 842.
A n indictment which charges that defendants killed certain
hogs of one Davis and did ((thereby" destroy the personal
property of said Davis does not embrace two distinct offenses
under Revised Statutes of r838, p. 63 2 viz., (I) the killing of
another's livestock, and (2) the destruction of another's per
sonal property.

Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit. Question reserved by
Circuit Court, Oakland County ; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that
motion in arrest of judgment should be overruled.
. . . . . , prosecuting attorney.
. . . Hanscomb, attorney for defendant.
•

.

•

•

l

(INDORSEMENT)

Sup. Court 4th Cir. Jan7 '42
People
vs.
Harger et al

Indict-

Mo. in arrest
of Judgt

Memo of opinion--

The People
vs.
Harger et al

-

�

PEOPLE v. HARGER

I OS

[ OPINION]

This case was tried at the last term of the Circuit Court
of Oakland Co., a verdict of guilty was found against the
Defts-and a motion was made in arrest of judg\ and the
questions arising on that motion were reserved and certified
to this Court by the Presiding Judge of that Circuit.
The Defts were indicted for wilfully and maliciously
killing certain hogs-and on the trial were found guilty
A motion in arrest of judgt was made, on the ground
that each of the 2 Counts in the Indictt embraces two distinct
o:ffencesThe first Count of the Indict alleges that the Defts "did
wilfully and maliciously kill 25 barrow hogs of the value
of $I!o each, three sows of the value of $2 o each, the Beasts
of one Phineas Davis, and did thereby then and there wilfully
and maliciously destroy the personal property of him the
said Phineas Davis, against the Peace," &c
The 2d Count is precisely like the first except that it
alleges the property to be the property of N . T. Ludden and
Alanson Shuley.The counsel for the Defts contend that two distinct
offences are charged in each count-the charge of killing
the hogs, as one1 and the charge of destroying personal prop
erty as the otherThe statute under which this Indictt was found is in
these words.
Rev. Stat, 632 §3 8-"Every person who shall wilfully and
maliciously kill, maim or disfigure any horses, cattle, or
other beasts of another person-or shall wilfully and mali-
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ciously administer poison to such beasts, or expose any poison
ous substance, with intent that the same should be taken or
swallowed by them,-or shall wilfully and maliciously de
stroy or injure the personal property of another person, in
any manner, or by any means, not particularly described or
mentioned in this chapter, shall be punished by imprison
ment". &c &c
Several qistinct offences are here created and enumer
ated-and if any two of them are embraced in the same
Count it would be a valid obj ection to the IndiceIf after alleging that Defts. killed the hogs of Davis,
there was a distinct and independent allegation that the
Defts. destroyed the personal property of Davis, then the
objection is well takenBut I think that the averment that the Defts. thereby
then and there destroyed the personal property cannot be
considered independent of the previous allegation that the
Defts. killed the hogsThe charge altogether is that the Defts. killed 25 hogs,
the beasts of P. Davis, and did thereby destroy the personal
property of said DavisThe language here used necessarily precludes any sup
position that other personal property, than the hogs, were
intended-It is a mere conclusion of law that by killing the
hogs, they had thereby destroyed the personal property of
DavisThis concluding averment that the Defts. thereby de
stroyed the personal property, is a mere inference or con
clusion of the prosecutor, and can in no sense affect or qualify
the charge of killing, especially as the conclusion of law is
strictly trueMo. in arrest overruled
To be certified-
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EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher was found in file No. I 90 , Fourth Circuit. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries: p. I 3 (Jan.
I 9, I 842) question reserved filed ; p. I S (Jan. 20, I 84 2 ) argued and
submitted. Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 9 0 · The
question reserved will be found in file I I 8 2 (as renumbered in I 902 ) .

HENRY A . CASWELL versus SAMUEL WARD
February r 8 , 1 842 .
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to. two j ustices
of the peace, St. Clair County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judg
ment reversed.
A. & H. H. Emmons, attorneys for plaintiff.
J. F. Joy & G . E. Porter, attorneys for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : The opinion in this case appears in a footnote in
2 Douglass (Mich.) 374 ( I 84 9 ) . It deals with procedure before
justices of the peace in forcible entry and detainer. Volume I of the
Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, contains the following
entries : p. I 2 7 (Jan. 5 , I 842) motion to quash certiorari and super
sedeas ; p. I 4 6 (Feb. 4, I 84 2 ) argued ; p. I 4 7 (Feb. 5, I 842)
argued ; p. I50 (Feb. 9, I 842) argued ; p. I 5 I (Feb. 1 0, 1 842)
argued and submitted ; p. I55 (Feb. I 8, I 842) judgment reversed.
Also see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I, case No. 209. The original
MS. opinion is not in the file.
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WILLIAM BREWSTER versus JOHN DREW
March 2 9, I 842.
I . The fact that tm indorser of a promissory note received
security from the maker to indemnify him against liability
as an indorser does not make him absolutely liable without
demand on the maker and notice to the indorser of non
payment.
2. In an action by an indorsee against the indorser of a
promissory note, a declaration which alleges that the de
fendant received from the maker certain property to in
demnify him as indorser and that the defendant has not
<'sustained any damage by reason of his not having re
ceived notice of the nonpayment of said note'' is demurr
able.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Question reserved by Cir
cuit Court, Wayne County; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that
demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of declaration should be sus
tained.
G. C. Bates, attorney for' plainti:ff.
A. D. Fraser, attorney for defendant.
( INDORSEMENT]
Sup Court: I"t Cir.
Jan�' 1 842

Brewster
vs.
Drew

l

Memo of Opinion
2 9 March '42
delivered-
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(OPINION]

This case was certified to this Court by the Presiding
[Judge] of the 2d Circuit, from Wayne Cir. Court, and
presents a question raised upon Dem• to the 3 d & 4th Count [s]
of Pl:ff s declaration-These two Counts are the same, only
varied as to the description of two different notesPl:ff as the Indorsee sued the Deft as indorser of two
notes made by E. Morse & Co, and pay" to the order of, and
indorsed by the DeftIn the 3 d & 4 Counts, there are no averments of demand
of payment of the maker, or notice of non payment to the
indorser, but it is averred that the Deft, at the time of the
indorsement reed indemnity from the maker,
and that Deft
.
has not sustained any damageThat part of the Count which avers these facts, is in
these words
"And the said Pl:ff avers that at the time of the making of
said note as aforesaid, towit: on the I Oth day of March 1 83 8,
at Detroit aforesaid, the said E. Morse & Co. assigned, trans
ferred and delivered to the said John Drew a large amount
of property to secure and indemnify him the said John Drew
as indorser aforesaid, of great value, towit: of the value of
$ ro,ooo, which said security, property, and indemnity, the
said John Drew held and retained in his pos�ession as security
aforesaid at and from the time of the making of the said
note until the time the said note became due, towit, on the
1 I th June 1 83 8, at Detroit aforesaid, and the said Pl:ff
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avers that the said Deft hath not sustained any damage by
reason of his not having reed notice of the non payment of
said note, all of which said several premises the said Deft
had notice."To this Count the Deft demurs alleging for cause that
these allegations do not dispense with the necessity of pre
sentment and notice to the indorser
The only question, therefore, which is presented by the
pleadings in this case is whether an indorser of a promissory
note taking an assignment of property from the maker at the
time of indorsing as collateral security to indemnify him
against his liability as indorser, is entitled to the usual notice
of non payment?
The liability of an indorser, being conditional, and not
absolute in the first instance, the general rule is that, in
order to charge him, there must be a demand upon the maker,
and notice to the indorser of non payment.
But, on the part of the Pl:ff, it is insisted that the facts
averred in the Count in question, bring this case within a
recognized and well established exception to the general
rule. And to maintain this proposition, several authorities
have been citedThose principally relied [upon] , however, are Corney
vs. Da Costa I Esp. R. 302. 3 Kents Com. 79· Bond et
al vs. Farnham, 5 Mass. R. I 70. Mead vs. Small, 2 Green
leaf, R. 207. Barton vs. Baker, I Serg. & R . R. 334·
Prentiss vs. Danielson, 5 Conn. R. I 7 5. & The Merchants
Bank of N. Y. vs. Griswold, 7 Wend. R . I 65.
It will be necessary, therefore to examine these authori
ties, with such others as relate to the question-In the case
of Corney vs. Da Costa, the Deft was not held liable, on the
ground of his liability as an indorser merely. Da Costa & Co.
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compounded with their creditors, and drew notes payable to
the Deft, and at the same time put property to the amt of
the composition into the hands of the Deft. And it was held
that Deft was not entitled to notice-he having no remedy
over; and having in his hands the fund with which to pay
the notes.
-The Court held there that the Deft was liable at all events,
not upon any condition-And it would be a fraud for the
Deft to call upon the maker, who had provided and left in his
hand property to meet the noteIn the 3 Kents Com. 7 9 , it is laid down that "if the in
dorser has protected himself from loss by taking collateral
security of the maker of the note, or an assignment of his
property, it is a waiver of his legal right to require proof
of demand & notice."
-And in support of this proposition, the learned commen
tator cites Bond vs. Farnham-5 Mass R. Mead vs.
Small 2 Greenleaf R. & Prentiss vs. Danielson 5 Conn. R. I 7 5.
In the case of Bond et al vs. Farnham-Deft was sued as
indorser of a note made by Barker-Before the note became
due, Barker became insolvent, and the Deft having indorsed
other notes for him, he obtained from Barker an assignt of
all his property as security which was insufficient to meet the
Defts liabilities-and it further appeared that the Deft had
offered to pay the note to the Plffs if they would take foreign
bank notes.
Parsons Ch. J. in giving the opinion of the note [court]
says that "under the circumstances of this case the Deft had
no right to insist upon a demand upon the maker. It appears
that he knew such a demand would be fruitless, as he had
secured all the property the maker had. And as he secured
it for the express purpose of meeting this and his other in-
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dorsements, he must be considered as having waived the
condition of his liability, and as having engaged with the
maker, on receiving all his property, to take up his notes.
And the nature or terms of the engagement cannot be varied
by an eventual deficiency in the property, because he received
all that there was. This intent of the parties is further
supported by the offer of the Deft to the Plffs to take up
this note if they would receive foreign bank notes in payment
-We do not mean to be understood that when an indorser
receives security to meet particular indorsements, it is to be
concluded that he waives a demand or notice as to any other
indorsements." "But we are of opinion that if he will apply
to the maker, and representing himself liable for the payt
of any particular indorsements, receives a security to meet
them, he shall not afterwards insist on a fruitless demand on
the maker, or on a useless notice to himself, to avoid payt of
demands, which, on receiving security, he has undertaken to
pay."
The Ch. Jus. further adds "The case most analogous to
this is, where the drawer of a bill had no effects in the
drawee's hands. He cannot insist on a demand upon the
drawee, for he could not expect an acceptance, and he suffers
no injury for the want of it. The indorser of a note resembles
the drawer of a bill-Although once having effects, as he
had a demand on the maker, yet he has afterwards withdrawn
from the maker all his property, to enable himself to meet
his own indorsements, and had not, when the bill was payable,
any remedy, unless perhaps the miserable one of seizing the
body of a man worth nothing: and that remedy he has never
lost."
It will be seen that the decision in this case, does not
support the rule laid down in 3 Kents-The ground of this
decision was not that the indorser had merely taken security,
·

·
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or an assignment by way of indemnity against his conditional
liability as indorser-But that the indorser had taken all the
means of the maker, to enable the indorser to meet the
liabilityThe Court say the nature of the transaction is such, that
the indorser must be considered as having engaged with
the maker to take up the note- -That having taken all the
means which the maker had to meet the note, the Indorser
is to be regarded as having the fund to provide for the pay
ment, and is therefore, himself the principal debtor-

[

]

The case of Prentiss vs. Danielson 5 Conn. R. I 7 5. is next
refered to. This case I have not been able to find-

Mead vs. Small, 2 Greenleaf R. 207. is also cited to support
the doctrine in 3 Kent Com.
That is the only case which, in terms, goes to support
the doctrine. In that case the indorser held a mortgage from
the maker as collateral and sufficient security for the amt
of the note. The case was decided upon the authority of Bond
vs. Farnham. 5 Mass. R.
Mel,len Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court
says"These facts present a stronger case in favor of the Plff, than
those in the case of Bond vs. Farnham. There the property
pledged was not a sufficient indemnity, to the indorser, but
it was all the maker had. Here it is proved to be sufficient.
If the indorser has protected himself from eventual loss by
his own act in taking security from the maker, such conduct
must be considered as a waiver of the legal right to require
proof of demand and notice."Now with all deference for this very respectable au
thority, I must say that, the true ground upon which the
case of Bond vs. Farnham was decided, was entirely misap-
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prehended or overlooked-Ch. J. Mellen says the case of
Bond vs. Farnham was not so strong a case as the one before
the Court, because the security in that case was insufficient to
meet the Defts liability, When Ch. J. Parsons expressly says
the nature & terms of the engagement cannot be varied by a
deficiency in the property.-The true ground in 5 Mass. was
that the indorser had got all the makers property, and like
a drawer of a bill who had no funds in the hands of the
drawee, and had no reasonable expectations that the bill
would be excepted-was himself the proper party to provide
for payt.�
So that so far from the case in 2 Greenleaf being a
stronger case for the Pl:ff than the 5 Mass. R., they have
nothing in common and cannot be compared together.
The amt of the security was considered the strong ground
in favor of the Plff, in the one case-but in the other the
nature of the transaction between the maker and the indorser
was the ground upon which the Plff recoveredThe case of Barton vs. Baker, I Serg. & R. 334, was also
cited by the Counsel for the Pl:ff-In that case, as in the
case of Bond vs. Farnham, the maker had assigned all his
property to the indorser to indemnify him for his advances
and indorsements, it was held that the holder of the note was
excused from proving a regular demand & notice in order
to charge the indorser.
In that case, and in the case of Bond vs. Farnham, the
decisions seem to have been made upon the supposition that
the indorser of a promissory note, and the drawer of a bill
of exchange, are placed in the same situation as to their lia
bilities, and their right to insist upon notice-So far as this
right may be affected by the want of funds in the hands of
the drawee of the bill, and a want of reasonable expectation
of acceptance by the drawee, and a reasonable expectation
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by the indorser that the note would be or has been paid by
the maker.
And this supposed analogy has occasioned some incon
venience in several of the English cases, respecting the rights
of indorsers of promissory notes-A distinction seems first to have been taken in the
argument of Counsel in the case of Nicholson vs. Gouthit,
2 H. Bl. 609, where it was contended, that altho notice of
the dishonor of a bill drawn without funds in the hands of
drawee, need not be given, yet that the rule in the case of
promissory notes is totally different, and notice must in all
cases be given to the indorserAnd in delivering the opinion of the Court Lord Ch. J.
Eyre assented to this distinction, and admitted the rule with
respect to notice to the indorser, to be as stated. He therefore
reversed his own decision at Nisi Prius, and granted a new
trial upon the strict law, contrary to his ideas of the Justice
of the case.
That was a very strong case, because the indorsement
was made in consequence of a previous engagement on the
part of the indorser to guaranty the payment of a debt due
from the maker of the note, who appears from the transac
tion to have been in bad circumstances at the time, and who
became insolvent before the note was payable.
From his connection with the maker, and from other cir
cumstances, the indorser must have known that the maker
would not pay the note, and it was the understanding of all
parties that it should be paid by the indorser.
The justice of the case was said to be clearly with the
Pl:ff . , and under the impression that the want of notice could
not injure the Deft, the Lord Ch. J. had at the trial instructed
the jury that it was unnecessary, and indeed that it might
be considered as received by anticipation-
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In the case of French vs. The Bank of Georgetown 4
Cranch R. 141-where the decisions of the subj ect were re
viewed, Marshall Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the
Court, says "However, then, the law may be with regard
to the drawer of a bill of exchange, who from other circum
stances may fairly draw, but who has no funds in the hands
of the drawer; it seems settled in England, by the case of
Nicholson vs. Gouthit, that the law with regard to a promis
sory note is different, and that if, in any case, where the note
is made for the benefit of the maker, notice to the indorser
can be dispensed with, it is only in the case of an insolvency
known at the time of indorsement." And he adds"In point of reason, justice and the nature of the under
taking, there is no case in which the indorser is better entitled
to demand strict notice than in .the case of indorsement for
accommodation, the maker having received the value."Several other cases are found where the same doctrine
has been laid down in respect to the indorser of a note, which
go further to establish the distinction between the right of
a drawer of bill to demand notice, when he had no funds
in the hands of the drawee, and no reasonable expec [ ta] tion
that the bill would be accepted, and the right of an indorser
of a note to require notice, notwith [stand] ing there was the
strongest evidence to show that the indorser must have known
that the maker would not, or had not paid the noteIn Dwight vs. Scovill, 2 Conn. R. 654 it was held that
notice to the indorser was necessary under the following
circumstancesA person was a member in each of two copartnerships
one of which made the note and the other indorsed it-Swift
Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court, says, "It is
true one of the Defts must, in legal consideration, have known
that the note was not paid ; but he equally well knew that
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the note when it became due had not been presented to the
makers, and payt demanded. He knew the fact that exon
erated the Defts from all liability on their indorsement ;
and it would be strange logic to say that this knowledge
rendered the Defts liable."
In the case of Ireland et al. vs. Kip, I I Johns 2 3 1 , the
PHI offered to prove on the trial, for the purpose [ of] hold
ing the Deft liable as indorser of a note, that the maker of
the note had failed before it became due, and that he had
conveyed his property in trust, to secure and indemnify the
Deft against his indorsement, and that the trust fund was
amply sufficient to indemnify him. This evid. was a rejected
and a non-suit entered-and on motion to set aside the non
suit, the motion was denied.
But the strongest case upon this point is that of Ma
gruder vs. The Union Bank of Georgetown, 3 Peters R.
8 7.
There the maker of the note died before it became due,
and the indorser was appointed administrator to this estate.
On the part of the Defts in Error, the Plffs below, it
was contended in argument-that the indorser having taken
adminis [ tra] tion of the estate of the maker, was to be con
sidered as the payer of the note-and as such was bound
to pay without demand-& no demand on him being required,
it was useless to give him notice that he had not done what
he well knew he had omitted. That the purpose of the rule
as to notice did not exist in that case, if notice was required
to enable the indorser to secure himself by calling on the
drawer, this could not be done ; and that as he had the estate
of the maker of the note in his hands for his indemnity, no
demand or notice was necessary. That the law never requires
that to done which is useless: and therefore the Deft in Error,
who could not by the notice or by its omission have affected
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the rights of the indorser, or his means of protecting himself
from loss, was not required to give it.
In giving the opinion of the Court Marshall Ch. J. says
"The general rule that payt must be demanded from the
maker of a note, and notice of non pai to the indorser, in
order to render him liable, is so firmly settled that no author
ity need be cited in support of it. The Deft in Error does
not controvert it, but insists that this case does not come within
it ; because demand of pay\ and notice of non payt are totally
useless, since the indorser has become the personal representa
tive of the maker. He has not, however cited any case in sup
port of this opinion, nor has he shown that the principle has
ever been laid down in any treatise on promissory notes or
bills.
The Court ought to be well satisfied of the correctness of
the principle, before it sanctions so essential a departure from
established usage." "The fact that the indorser is the repre
sentative of the maker does not oppose any obstacle to pro
ceeding in the regular course"-"If this unusual mode of
proceeding can be sustained, it must be on the principle that,
as the indorser must have known that he had not paid the
note, as the representative of the maker, notice to him was
useless. Could this be admitted, does it dispense with the
necessity of demanding payt? It is possible that assets which
might have been applied in satisfaction of this debt, had payt
been demanded, may have received a different direction. It
is possible that the note may have been paid before it fell due.
Be this as it may, no principle is better settled in com
mercial transactions, than that the undertaking of the indorser
is conditional. If due diligence be used to obtain payt from
the maker, without success, and notice of non payt be given
to him in time, his undertaking becomes absolute ; not other
Wtse.
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Due diligence to obtain payt from the maker, is a condition
precedent, on which the liability of the indorser depends. As
no attempt to obtain payt from the maker, was made in this
case, and no notice of non payt given to the indorser, we
think the Circuit Court should have given the instructions
prayed for by the Deft in that Court"This appears to me a very strong case. The indorser must
have known that the maker had not paid the note-It was
his duty to provide for and make the payt-He had the whole
of the makers estate in his hands in trust to pay all his debts
Neither of these facts, nor all combined were considered suf
ficient to warrant the Court in departing from the general
rule.
Not on the ground that the Indorser would suffer any in
jury-Ch. Jus. Marshall says it is possible that the maker had
paid the note before it fell due-or that it was possible the
assets which might have been applied in payt of the note in
question, had notice been given, may have been otherwise
appliedAfter supposing these possible, but improbable results
He goes on to say "be this as it may."-as much as if he had
said supposing even that there could be no possible loss or
inconvenience to the indorser from want of notice, yet "no
principle is better settled in commercial transactions, than
that the undertaking of the indorser is conditional-And that
due diligence to obtain payt &c is a condition precedent, on
which the liability of the indorser depends"Had such just views been taken by the Courts in some of
the earlier cases, where exceptions [could] have been easily
made to the general rule ; and the Courts had looked at the
nature of the engagement entered into by the indorser, and
had endeavored to carry his undertaking into effect, instead
of speculating upon the possible injury to the indorser in cer-
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tain cases, where a departure from the general rule has beeh
urged, much litigation would have been saved, and great in
convenience avoidedEven if it were conceded that, as between the parties, in
all those cases where notice has been dispensed with, justice
had been done, yet a wide door has been opened for litigation,
and the uncertainty of the rules by which commercial engage
ments are to be governed, has occasioned much greater mis
chief, than would have arisen from a failure of equitable
justice in a few cases, by the uniform observance of a general
rule of law, equally known to all.
That there are exceptions to the general rule is not in
tended to be questioned ; but as observed by Marshall Ch. J.,
in the case of French vs. Bank of Georgetown, "The Court
ought to be well satisfied with the correctness of the principle,
before it sanctions so essential a departure from established
usage."
In the case of Corney vs. Da Costa, the very nature of
the undertaking on the part of the indorser, was not condition
al, but absolute, and on that ground the case was decided
This was not strictly an exception to the general rule, that
an indorser is entitled to noticeIn the case of the Merchants Bank of N. Y. vs. Griswold,
7 Wend R. I 6 5. the indorser after the making of the note, .
received in trust, an assignt of property and outstanding debts
from the maker, with a power to sell the property and collect
the debts for the express purpose of meeting the note.
In other words he had consented to take funds to meet the
payment of the note, and to act as the agent of the maker in
making such payment. And it was as good ground upon which
to dispense with notice to him, as if the maker had left the
money with the Deft the day before the note became due,
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with instructions to take up his note the next dayThere is an averment in the Counts demurred to that the
Deft has not sustained any damage by reason of his not having
received notice of non pai of said noteBut this can avail nothing-no evidence could be received
in support of this averment.
In the case of Dennis vs. Morrice, 3 Esp. R. 1 5 8, where
to excuse the holder of a bill for not having given notice to
the drawer of non payt by the.acceptor, an offer was made to
prove, in fact, that the Deft had not been prejudiced by the
want of notice, Lord Kenyon said, "This would be extending
the case [rule] still further than ever has been done, and
opening new sources of litigation in investigating whether in
fact the drawer did receive a prej udice from this want of
notice or not"-and the evidence was rejectedIn the case now before the Court the property is alleged
to have been assigned by the maker to the Deft to secure and
indemnify him against his liability as indorser-There is no
allegation that there was any authority on the part of the
Deft to dispose of the property for the purpose of paying the
holder-nothing showing that the Deft had undertaken to
provide the means for the payment of the notes.
It was a transaction between the maker & the indorser,
by which the indorser provided for security in case his condi
tional engagement should become absolute, and he be obliged
to pay the money.
That the prudence of an indorser, in taking security from
the maker, as indemnity against eventual and contingent
liability on his conditional undertaking as indorser, should
be construed as changing the nature of such an undertaking
into an absolute undertaking, by which he would be liable in
the first instance and at all events, without the holder's mak-
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ing any attempt to get payt of the maker, cannot, certainly,
be sustained either upon principle or authority.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the facts alleged in
the 3 d & 4th Counts of Pl:ffs declaration, do not present such
a case as dispenses with a demand of payt upon the maker
and notice to the indorser-and that the Dem• be sustainedEDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 232, First Circuit-Law.
Volume I of the Journal, First Cin;uit, contains .the following entries:
p. 1 4 1 (Feb. 2, 1 842) argued and submitted ; p. 1 60 (March 29,
I 842) demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of declaration sustained. Also see
Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I. case 232.

WILLIAM E. DUNN versus JAMES MURRAY and
J. CLEMENS
March 29, I 8 42 .
1.

Where in an action for trespass there is any legal testi
mony, however slight, against one of the defendants, the
court may not direct a verdict for that defendant in order
that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant.
2. The fact that a witness called by the plaintiff on rebuttal
testified that one of the defendants had declared during
the trial "that he had no hand in taking the property" did
not justify a conclusion by the court that the plaintiff had
abandoned his action against that defendant.
3· Whether the declaration of a defendant sued for trespass
can be used against a codefendant sued as a joint tortfeasor,
quaere.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions reserved by
Circuit Court, Washtenaw County ; certified to Supreme
Court. Opinion by Whipple, J.; Fletcher, Ch. J. dissenting.
Certified by Supreme Court that court below erred in direct
ing a verdict for Clemens.
E. Mundy, attorney for plaintiff.
0. Hawkins, attorney for defendants.
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Chf Justice Dissenting.
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Hawkins for defts.
Mundy for plff.

(OPINION]

William E. Dunn
vs.
James H. Murray
and Clemens

�

Sup. Court : 2nd Circuit
Jany term 1 842.
Questions reserved :

This is an action of Trespass brought by the plaintiff
against the defendants for taking and carrying away a pair
of horses and a wagon : The declaration was in the common
form and the pleas were ; I81 the general issue ; 217, a special
plea of justification setting forth that the property was in
Clemens &c & that Murray acted by the request & under
term of the
his direction : The cause was tried at the
Circuit Court Court for the County of Livingston ; From the
case as reported to this Court, it would seem that evidence
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was introduced a [ t J the trial tending to prove that Clemens
was present & assisted Murray in taking the property : It
also appears that after the defendants had concluded the
testimony for their part, the plaintiff introduced rebutting
evidence, & at this stage of the proceeding a witness was
introduced, who stated, in answer to a question propounded
to him by the attorney of the plaintiff, that he had heard
Clemens declare during the trial, "that he had no hand in
taking the property &c," this answer it is further stated
occassioned no surprise on the part of the Counsel of the
plff : aft. this declaration was elicited from Clemens the
Counsel for the clefts' moved the Court to instruct the jury to
give a verdict of acquittal, forthwith, in favor of Clemens :
which motion was granted on the ground that the plaintiff's
Counsel had abandoned his action against him : the jury under
the instruction of the Court rendered a verdict of not guilty
in favor of Clemens, who was then called as a witness &
testifi.ed in behalf of his co-defendant Murray : The cause
was then submitted to the Jury, who were unable to agree
upon a verdict.
In the abstract of the cause with which I have been
furnished, it further appears that the Circuit Court decided,
during the trial that the declarations of one of the de
fendants could ,not be given in evidence against the other:
The questions which arise in this case, & which were
reserved for the consideration of this Court, by the Chief
Justice who presided at the Trial, are, 1"\ whether the in
struction asked by the Counsel of the Defts', should have been
granted; & 2 1Y, whether the declarations of one of the de
fendants should have been received as competent evidence
against the other :
Upon the argument of this cause, the Counsel for the
plaintiff insisted that the Circuit Court erred upon the first
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point, for the reasons ; That in an action of Trespass against
several, the Court cannot discharge any one of the Defend
ants, when there is the slightest evidence against him : The
proposition is undeniable that one of several persons charged
with the commission of a trespass cannot be discharged by
the Court, nor can the Court direct a nolle prosequi to be
entered, or the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, where
there is any legal testimony, however slight, against him :
The rule is of universal application, as is founded upon a
principle too firmly established by reason & authority to be
shaken at this day: that principle is, that, in civil causes, it
is the province of the Court to decide upon the questions of
law that govern the case, & of the jury to decide upon the
facts : the wisdom of the rule will not be questioned, & any
invasion of it would overthrow the constitutional & legal
rights of parties : Let us apply, then, this rule to the case
at bar, and ascertain whether under the circumstances the
instruction asked by the Counsel for the Defts should have
been given : It is admitted that there was some evidence
tending to shew that Clemens participated in the alledged
trespass : the degree of evidence introduced by the plfi to
prove his guilt does not appear, nor is necessary that it
should under the strict rule I have laid down : But it was
contended upon the argument of the cause by the Counsel for
the defendants, that, the plaintiff having elicited from a
witness the declaration of Clemens that he was in no wise
concerned in the trespass, and especially as it was well known
to the plaintiff's Counsel whe [ n] the question was put to the
witness, what the answer would be, that its effect was an
abandonment of the cause as to Clemens. It does not affirma
tively appear in the case reported, whether the plaintiff's
Counsel was apprised what the answer of the witness would
be,-but it is suggested that when the answer was elicited
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it occasioned no surprise: according to the view I take of
the question, however, it is of no consequence whether the
plfi had a full knowledge of what the answer would be, or
whether he manifested surprise when the answer was given.
What then was the condition of the cause with respect to
Clemens, after his declarations were given in evidence ; It
was as follows : the plaintiff had before the defendants en
tered upon their defence introduced evidence tending to prove
that he participated in the alledged trespass, & after the
defence had closed, he propounded a question to a witness
which elicited a declaration made by · Clemens that he had
no hand in the matter: here, then, was conflicting evidence ;
a portion of that evidence tending to the proof of guilt, a
portion tending to the proof of his innocence : which was,
then, the tribunal to weigh this conflicting evidence & decide
upon its effect: to my understanding the jury & not the Court
was the appropriate tribunal to refer the question: unless
there was an "abandonment'' of the cause against Clemens :
But in what consisted this "abandonment" of the cause ? Why
the Counsel would reply the "declaration of Clemens" vol
untarily drawn by the plaintiff's Counsel, from a witness, that
he was not guilty of the Trespass : this view qf the case would
be correct, if the declarations then elicited is to be regarded,
as CONCLUSIVE evidence of the innocence of Clemens: whether
it be conclusive, must depend upon the law of evidence, and
my apprehension of the law upon this point, is, that, such
declarations are not conclusive, however strongly they make
against the party who thus voluntarily draws from a witness
declarations, like that made by Clemens : To test the question :
suppose that three or any other no. of witnesses of undoubted
veracity had sworn that Clemens had confessed to them that
he committed the trespass alledged against him ; would it
be contended that the declarations of Clemens given in evi-
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dence as stated in the report, that he had nothing to do With
the matter, would be conclusive as to the fact of guilt or inno
cence, or that the legal effect would be an "abandonment" of
the cause by the plffs as regards him : the mere statement of
the question, exhibits the falacy of such a conclusion : The
whole testimony in the case, would necessarily be referred
to the jury, as the appropriate & constitutional body for
determining questions of fact :
Allusion was made by the Counsel for the clefts upon
the argument of the case upon the extraordinary course
adopted by the Counsel of the plaintiffs in the trial, in intro
ducing evidence of declarations, when he was well advised,
that those declarations would conduce to the proof of the
innocence of one of the clefts : Such a course . ought not, &
cannot vary or influence the legal rights of the plaintiff: he
had a right to elicit the declarations, and it was for him to
bear the consequences which might result from its exercise,
the defendants ought not to complain that the plaintiff elicited
facts which would go far towards establishing their claim to
a verdict of acquittal : If I have taken, a correct view of the
question under consideration, the Circuit Court erred in di
recting the jury to acquit Clemens:
I ought here to state, that reliance was had by the Coun
sel for the plff, in argument, upon the pleadings in the cause,
to establish error in the direction given by the Court to the
jury: Beside the plea of the general issue, it is said that there
was a joint plea of justification, & it was argued that if the
plea is not supported as to all, neither of the defendants can
be protected under it. The books recognize a distinction, in
this respect, between a case where several defendants, in
trespass, plead the gen1 issue, and where a j oint plea of justi
fication is pleaded, but as it is not clear from an inspection of
the pleadings, whether in point of law the second plea
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amounts to a j oint plea of justification, and especially as this
point was not urged upon the Circuit Court, an expression of
opinion upon the question will not be givenII : In the abstract of the case as reported it is alledged that
the Circuit Court decided that the declarations of one of
the clefts was not competent evidence against the other : This
opinion of the Circuit Court may have been right or wrong
according to circumstances: and as the facts necessary to form
an opinion have not been spread out in the case, any expres
sion of opinion by this Court would be hypothetical: the gen
eral rule upon the subject I apprehend is this : that if there
was any evidence connecting the defendants as joint trespass
ers, the declarations of one rnay be given [ in] evidence against
the others, in the same manner as the acts of one may be
given in evidence, against all concerned: the foundation laid
by connecting the defendants as being jointly concerned in a
trespass, the declarations & acts of each become that of all :
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Whipple, was found in file No. 235, First Circuit-Law. Volume I
of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry : p. 1 6 2
( March 29, 1 84 2 ) court below erred in directing jury to render a
verdict in favor of Clemens ; with respect to other questions raised in
the. case the Court declined to express an opinion. Also see Calendar,
First Circuit, Vol. I, case 235 ·
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JOHN LARGY versus PATRICK HOLLAND
March 29, I 842.

Delivery of an award of arbitrators (addressed to the
court) to the clerk of the court in vacation is a delivery to
the court within the meaning of the statute (Revised
Statutes of r'838, p. 53 2.)
2. A lthough, ordinarily, an award made without notice of
hearing is void, in this case the parties appeared before
the arbitrators and agreed that they might, after viewing
the land involved, make an award without notice and with
out hearing evidence.
3 · Where an award is silent with respect to notice of hearing,
it is fair and reasonable to intend that notice was given.
4· By making the agreement set forth in (2), supra, the
parties did not annul the original agreement for arbitra
tion. They merely agreed upon the means of giving effect
to that agreement.

Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Circuit Court,
Wayne County. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment affirmed.
D. Goodwin & Collins, attorney for plaintiff in certiorari.
J. A. Van Dyke � E. B. Harrington, attorneys for de
fendant in certiorari.
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[ OPINION]

John Largy, plff in Er- upon Certiorari to Wayne Circuit.
ror,
VS

Patrick Holland, deft in Sup Court I"t Circuit
Error. Jany term I 842.
------

From the return made to the Certi�rari in this cause, it
appears that the parties on the I 5 day of Sept I 840, "agreed
to submit, the demand, a Statement whereof was annexed
to the agreement, to the determination of David Thompson,
Edwin Jerome, & Joseph H. Steele, the award of whom, or
the greater part of whom, being made & reported within one
year from this day to the Court Court of the County of
Wayne, the judgm. thereon should be final &•" : this agree
ment was acknow!edged pursuant to the statute, before a
competent officer : the statement of the demand of Holland
against Largy, is in the following words "On or about the
I 7th day of June I 8 3 9, John Largy purchased of Patrick
Holland certain land in Livingston County described as the
S E ;4. & S W frac1 ;4. of the 2 8 town 2 N R 4 E' being
2 5 I 8 I/Ioo acres ; which l and the said Holland has conveyed
to Largy: The said Largy has paid Holland $ IOO on the
purchase: the matter now in dispute is how much, if any
thing more, the said Largy ought to pay said Holland as a
just & full consideration for said land." An award was made
by the arbitrators in favor of Holland for the sum of $604:
upon which judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court: To
reverse this judgment a certiorari was sued out of this court
by Largy.
Various grounds have been urged by the plff in Error
why the judgm. below should be reversed: I shall consider
them in the order in which they are set forth in the Plff's
brief:
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1 : The award was not returned to the Court either by
the arbitrators or under seal : Endorsed upon the award is
the following memorandum made by the Clerk of the Circuit
Court : "I do hereby certify that the within award was trans
mitted to the Court & remained sealed until opened by. me
in open Court on the 1 2 November 1 840." The 7 Sec. of
chapter 7 part 3 title IV of R. S provides that "the award
shall be delivered by one of the arbitrators to the Court
designated in the agreement, or shall be enclosed and sealed
by them, & transmitted to the Court & shall remain sealed
until opened by the Clerk" It is contended by the pHI that
in as much as the award was returned to the OFFICE OF THE
CLERK & FILED UPON A DAY OUT OF TERM, and not TO THE
couRT by whom the same should be opened, that the return
was void, as being against the provisions of the 7th & roth
of the chapter refd to : It will be perceived that the 7th
Section contemplates two modes by which an award may be
returned; and if the return made by the arbitrators in this
case is to be sustained it must be under the 2d clause of the
7th Sec : was then 1 Ir the award enclosed & sealed by the
arbitrators ; 2, was it transmitted to the Court ; & 3 17 did it
remain sealed until opened by the Clerk: The certificate of
the Clerk endorsed on the award appears to me to be con
clusive with respect to the 1st & 3rd requisitions of the
statute : that the 2d requirement was complied with is equally
conclusive from a further endorsement on the award, which
is in the following words : "To the Circuit Court for the
County of Wayne" "Detroit" "award of arbitration." But it
is insisted that the statute evidently contemplates that the
return should be made to the Court in term, & by the Court
opened: it would certainly be competent under the provisions
of the roth Sec. of the same chapter for arbitrators thus to
return & for the Court thus to open the award, but it does
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not necessarily follow, that a return made in the manner
pointed out by the 7 Sec. is nugatory: The language of the
7th Sec. is imperative, that of the roth permissive, "The
award may be returned at any term or session of the Court,
that shall be held within the time limited in the submis
sion" &0•
With respect to the objection that even under the 7 Sec.
the award should be transmitted to the Court in term, I have
only to r·emark, that in my opinion the language of that Sec
does not justify such a construction: I regard a transmission
of the award, enclosed & sealed, to the Clerk of the Court,
as a transmission to the Court, and the fact that the award is
to remain sealed until that seal is broken by the CLERK, indi
cates with sufficient certainty that the return may be made as
well in vacation as during the term of the Court, for if the
return was required to be made in term, it is probable that
the language of the 7th Section would have been different,
by containing an express provision to that effect, or directing
that the CouRT should break the seal : I might have stated
that this construction was adopted by this Court at the last
term in the case of the Black River Steam Mill Co vs Chad
wick when the question was fully considered & decided.
2 1 r another objection to the award is that Largy had no
notice of the proceedings of the arbitrators; & that if notice
was given it should appear, affirmatively, on the face of the
award. The 5th Section of the Chapter already adverted to,
contemplates notice to the parties to appear before the arbi
trators : and altho' the language of the Section is does not
contain an express direction to that effect, yet, a reasonable
construction justifies the conclusion that notice in all cases
is required to be given : indeed this would be the dictate of
common justice, which will not justify a proceeding of this
character, in which important interests are at .stake, without
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notice to the parties immediately concerned : was there notice
given to Largy? to ascertaine this fact we must resort to the
affidavits which were filed in the Circuit Court, copies of
which have been returned to this Court as part of the pro
ceedings in the cause : The affidavit of Largy sets forth "that
he had no notice of the time & place appointed for the meet
ing of the arbitrators, & that he had no opportunity of being
heard by them nor of producing his witnesses on the investi
gation, &c. If this was the only testimony upon this point,
the award could not be sustained; but the affidavits of Daniel
Thompson, one of the arbitrators, & of one Thomas Galla
gher, while they do not deny the facts stated by Largy, give
such a version to this part of this . cause, as are sufficient, in
my view, to render notice unnecessary: They both state, "that
both parties appeared before the arbitrators, & agreed they
might, instead of giving notice, and hearing evidence respect
ing the matter submitted, go upon the lands & premises men
tioned in the demand annexed to the agreement of submis
sion, & from a personal view & examination make the award.,
But it is urged by the Counsel for the plff in Error, that the
award is void, upon its face, for the reason rst that it does
not there appear that notice &" was given : & 2 Jy admitting
the facts to be as is stated in the affidavits of Thompson &
Gallagher they cannot avail, inasmuch as if true, they shew
a new agreement between the parties, taking it out of the
statute, & in that case the award could only be enforced by
an action at law. It has been the policy of the law to sustain
the adjudications of tribunals erected & chosen by the parties
themselves . The award of arbitrators are always liberally &
favorably construed, & every reasonable intendment will be
made to support them : And there is reason in the rule : The
submission to arbitrators is the voluntary Act of the parties-,
the arbitrators are agreed upon by them-They are the
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j udges of their own choice, which implies great confidence
not only as respects their judgment but fairness & disinter
estedness : It is a mode of adjusting differences which has
always been encouraged, as it prevents protracted litigation,
& the great expense which necessarily follows : with these
general rules in view, I think it a fair & reasonable to intend
that notice was given to the parties : & in this opinion I am
sustained by the whole current of American Authorities: The
reasoning of the Court in the case of Lutz vs Linthicum in
the 8th Peters 16 5, and in case of Ackley vs Finch, 7 Cowen
290 is strongly in point ; in the latter case the Supreme Court
of N. Y. assert, (with respect to an obj ection to an award
that it did not appear whether all the arbitrators heard the
cause, or only two, a fact necessary to be determined) "that
no case could be adduced shewing the necessity of this fact
appearing on the face of the award itself." And in the case
first cited the Supreme Court of the United States, say:
"Without question due notice should be given to the parties
of the time & place, for hearing the cause, & if the award
was made without such notice, it ought, on the plainest prin
ciples of justice to be set aside : But it is by no means necessary
that it should appear on the face of the award that such notice
was given."
I am next to consider whether the first agreement to refer
was annulled by the subsequent assent of both parties, that
instead of receiving evidence touching the matters in con
troversy, the arbitrators should by a personal view of the
premises determine its value, and make their award without
any further hearing: without an assent, expressed, or implied
it is certain that the arbitrators were confined in the examina
tion of the case to legal evidence, but it was certainly com
petent for the parties to prescribe another rule for attaining
the same end: they did not make a new agreement, but
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· simply agreed upon the means o f giving effect to the existing
one : It was simply saying to the arbitrators, that they repose
more or at least as much confidence in their judgment touch
ing the value of the premises, after they should have viewed
it, as they would in the testimony of witnesses who could
have no better means of forming an opinion : This objection,
then, to the award cannot be sustained:
With regard to the other objections, of a more formal &
technical character, it is only necessary to say, that this Court
cannot, for the alledged irregularity in receiving the affi
davits as stated in the Exceptions, reverse the judgment be
low: whether they should have been received or not was a
matter which rested in the discretion of the Circuit Court:
The other obj ections, if of any force, can be remedied,
by the necessary amendments : they are of too technical a
nature to authorize this Court to interfere with the judg
mentJ udgm-affirmed
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Justice
Whipple, was found in file No. '2oo, First Circuit-Law. Volume I
of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 145
(Feb. 4, 1 842) motion to set aside rule for return to certiorari; p.
1 49 (Feb. 8, 1 842) rule for return ; p. 1 54 (Feb. 1 4, 1 842) argued
and submitted ; p. 1 6 1 (March 29, 1 84 2 ) judgment affirmed. Also
see Calendar, First Circuit, Vol. I, case 200.
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DUNCAN McCALL et ux. versus SIMEON M.
HOUGH and PETER McPHERSON, Executors,
etc. of ROBERT FINDLEY, Deceased.
March 2 9, 1 842.
A lthough it appeared from testimony that a paper offered
for probate as a will had been signed by a person now deceased
and by three persons who signed as witnesses at his request,
in his presence, and in the presence of each other, one of whom
thought he had seen the decedent sign, HELD the supposed
will was not executed pursuant to statute (Laws of r 82 o,
p. 20) because "All must see the act of signing, or the
testator must acknowledge that he had signed it, or declare
that it is his will."

Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth
Circuit. Appeal from Probate Court, Oakland County.
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Decree reversed.
J. Goodrich & W. Draper, attorneys for appellants.
0. D. Richardson, attorne� for respondents.
( INDORSEMENT]
Sup. Court 4th Cir. 1 842

McCall et ux.
·
Hou � et al

;

�

app. from
Judge Probate

Memo of Opinion2 9 March '42-

McCALL

v.

HouGH

I37

( OPINION]

Duncan McCall and
Janette McCall, his wife
Appellants
Simeon M. Hough & Peter
McPherson, Ex•• of the last
Will & Testament of Robt
Findley, deceased,
Respondants
This i s an appeal b y Duncan McCall & wife heirs at
law of Robt Findley, deceased, from the decree of the Judge
of Probate for the County of Oakland, allowing probate, and
establishing the last will and testament of the deceased, Robt
Findley.
The cause, by the stipulation of the parties, was heard
and argued at bar, at the last term of this Court in the 4th
CircuitSeveral reasons were assigned for the appeal, but only
one has been insisted upon before this Court, which is that
the execution of the said will was not duly proved·
The will appears to have been executed on the I 2 July
I 8 3 8-and devised Real estate. It was objected that there was no evidence that the Wit.
saw the Testator sign his name to the will - - or that he de
clared in their prescence that it was his last will and testament
-or in the last place that the Signature was hisOn the hearing before this Court, the three subscribing
witnesses were produced & sworn on the part of the Re
pondantsTheron T. A rmstrong-one of these wit.-testified that on
or about the date of the will-( I 2 Aug. '3 8 } the testator
came to the field where he, Le Roy Armstrong and Sam1
Clark, the other subscribing wit., were at work and requested
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them to go to Mr McPherson's house-said he would not
detain them long-He did not say what he wanted of them
They went with him to McPherson-After they went into
the house they were requested to witness a paper laying on
the tableMr Hough, one of the Executors, and the person who
drew the will, was there, and directed wit. and the others
where to write their names-The paper was so folded up
that wit. only saw the name of deceased to the paper - - Wit.
signed the paper & saw the other two wit.-Le Roy Arm
strong and Sam1 Clark sign it-The will produced and
shown to wit. is the same paper signed by him and the other
witnesses-The deceased was present in the same room near
by when they all signed the will as witnesses-No one spoke
of it as the will of deceased at that time-Wit. supposed he
knew what it was, as the deceased had before spoken to him
about making his will-The wit: states that he did not see
the deceased sign the paper, nor him [hear] him say that
it was signed by him-or that it was his last will & testi
mony-The paper had the signature of deceased to it, when
wit. subscribed his name as a witness·

Le Roy Armstrong-testified nearly to the same facts-and
says further, that when the three wit. went into McPhersons
house with the deceased, Hough asked the deceased if those
were his witnesses-Deceased nodded assent, and said they
were-that he signed as a wit. with T. T. Armstrong and
Sam 1 Clark-That the deceased was present, and looking on
when the witnesses subscribed the paper-That after all the
witnesses had signed Hough took up the paper and gave it to
the deceased, who delivered it back to Hough at the same
time saying something which witness did not notice or under
stand-Wit. does not recollect whether he saw deceased name
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written on the paper at the time witness signed it--did not
hear him say that he had signed itSam1 Clark-was present and subscribed his name as a wit
ness to the paper-same paper now shown him- - Before
the witnesses signed, thinks deceased went to the table and
sign something-Is not positive, but thinks such was the
fact-Thinks that after Hough had done writing, the de
ceased went to the table took up the pen and signed the
paper-After the witnesses had all signed Hough took the
paper and handed it to deceased who immediately delivered
it back to him, saying something which witness did not under
stand-

Hiram A. Hills-was called to prove that the signature to
the will to be the hand writing of the deceased--and testified
he had seen him write two or three times, and thinks the
signature to the will is the hand writing of deceasedSimeon Hough, one of the Ex•s and one of the Respondants,
was then offered as a wit. by the Respondants in support of
the will-to show the due Execution &cObjection to the competency of this wit. was made by
the appellants, on the ground of interest, being a party to
the proceeding &, and liable under our Stat. for costs in case
the decree of this Court should disaffirm the willThe testimony was heard by the Court, subj ect however,
to be rejected if on examination the Court should be of the
opinion that the Ex• was an incompetent wit.The view I have taken ?f this case, however, renders it
unnecessary to decide this point, or to consider the testimony
of the witnessThe Respondants also called Dan1 Rowe as a witness to
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prove the declarations of the- deceased made after the date
of the will, that he had made a will and left it in the hands
of- Mr Hough-Appellants objected to this evid. as inad
missable-but the Court received it subject to be rejected
and disregarded, in case they should be of opinion on ex" that
it was not admissable
-But for the reason before given it is not necessary to decide
the question, or to take the testimony into consideration
-Taking therefore only the testimony of the three subscrib
ing witness [ es] and the testimony of Mr Hills who [ testi
fied] to the signature of the Deceased to the will-Is the
Evidence sufficient to establish the due execution of the will
under the Statute?
On the part of the appellants it is contended that the
testator must sign the will in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses, or must declare in their presence and hearing that
he signed the same, or that it was his last will a�d testamentThe act of the 27 July r 8 I 8 , entitled "An Act pre
scribing the manner of devising Land, Tenements and Here
ditaments"-Which was in force at the time this will appears
to have been executed, enacts
"That all devises and bequests of any lands or tene
ments, shall be in writing and signed by the party so devising
the same, or by some person in his presence and by his
express direction, and shall be attested and subscribed in the
presence of the said De'Uisor, by three or more credible wit
nesses, or else shall be utterly void, and of no effect."This is a transcript of the 5 Sect of the Stat of 29 ch. II-,
and in relation to that Stat. the principles by which it is to
be construed, have long been settled in England, and also
in this country, where the same phraseology has been adopted
by the LegislatureIn England it was never questioned but that the attesta-
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tion of the witnesses must be in the presence of the Devisor,
or that the witnesses must either see him actually sign the
Devise or that the Devisor must declare to them that it is
his last will, or must acknowledge that he had signed the
sameIt was indeed for some time questioned
6 Cr. Dig.
p. 6o.
whether such acknowledgement by the Devisor
in the presence of wit. that he had signed the instrument,
was a sufficient compliance with the Stat., or whether the wit
nesses ought not to attest to the very: act of signing by the
DevisorStonehouse vs. Evelyn. 2 P. wm• 264-[3 P. wm• 252]
Grayson vs. Atkinson. 3 Ves. 454-[2 Yes. s· 454]
But it was finally settled r Ves. Ju• ro [ u ] Ellis vs.
Smith, when Ld Hardwicke, assisted by Sir John Strange,
Ld. Ch. ] . Willes and Ld Ch. B. Parker, in which it unani
mously resolved that the declaration of a testator before 3
wit. that a paper was his will was equivalent to signing it
before them, and constituted a good will within the 5th Sec
tion of the Stat. frauds-And there has never been any re
laxation of this rule in England-Indeed how can any meaning be given to the act requiring
that the 3 persons shall attest and subscribe as witnesses
unless this construction be adopted? what do they attest, or
witness but the execution of the will by the testator?-If
this act of the testator is not attested and witnessed by the
three witnesses, to what do they attest, or witness?In this case one of the wit. was under the impression that
he saw the testator sign a paper-but the other two think
that the name was to the paper when they first saw it, and
when they subscribed as witnesses- -All must see the act
of signing, or the testator must acknowledge that he had
signed it, or declare that it is his will &c-
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The testimony therefore of the Executor Mr Hough,
even if admissable, could not avail anything-nor does the
testimony of Mr Hills who testified to the hand writing of
the testatorThe three credible witness [ es] are placed around the
testator by the Legislature for the express purpose of prov
ing the due execution of the will, and their testimony alone
can support itThis court therefore doth order adjudge and decree that
the decree of the Judge of Probate be reversed, and that the
said will and testament-be altogether held for nought
and voidEDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 234, First Circuit-Law.
Other papers will be found in file No. I 2, Fourth Circuit. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 2 {June 25,
I 839) rule for issues to try sanity and fraud ; p. 5 (Jan. 20, I 84 I )
continued ; p. 5 (Jan. 20, I 84 I ) motion for security for costs; p.
6 (Jan. 2 I , I 84 I ) motion overruled ; p. I 4 (Jan. I 9, I 842) argued
and submitted. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the
following entry : p. I 6 I (March 29, I 84 2 ) judgment reversed. Also
see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 2 ; Calendar, First Circuit,
Vol. I, case No. 234·

I.

PEOPLE versus VIRGIL M. ROSE
March 29, I 8.42;

Repeal by the Revised Statutes of r(8.J8 (p. 690} of the
act for the punishment of crimes which was in force when
the offence charged in the indictment in this case was com
mitted did not exempt the defendant from the punishment
previously prescribed for his alleged crime, the Revised
Statutes having expressly provided against such exemption
except to the extent that any punishment was mitigated by
the Revised Statutes (p. 6 r 6) .
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Repeal of the punishment for larceny prescribed by the
Revised Statutes of I8ij8 (p. 628) and provision that lar
ceny of property worth less than $I oo may be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison (Pub. Acts, I 84o, p. 42)
"does not affect any criminal act committed under the act
in force for the punishment of crimes previous to the tak
ing effect of the Rev. Stat."
3· Repeal of the mitigating provisions of the Revised Statutes
of I 8g8 (p. 62'8) leaves the defendant under the provi
sions of the act in force when the crime was committed.
z;

Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County;
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J.
Certified by Supreme Court that demurrer to indictment
should be overruled.
. . . . . , prosecuting attorney.
M. L. Drake, attorney for defendant.
.

.

. ·

.

[INDORSEMENT]
[Sup. ] Court 4th Cir.
Jan" 1 842.
The People
vs.
Rose

�

Memo of Opinion
2.9 March '42
Dem r overruled,
order that Deft
plead over-
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The People
vs.
Virgil M. Rose

-

�

[OPINION]

On questions reserved and certified from Oakland Cir
cuit, by the Presiding Judge of that Circuit-·
The Deft was indicted in the Court below for Larceny
Indice exhibited and filed I S Oct. '3 9-Charging the offense
to have been committed on the 6 th March 1 8 3 8-and alleging
the property stolen to be of the value of $82.
-To this Indictt the Deft demurred generally.
The grounds urged in support of the Demr are
I . The the act for the punishment of crimes, which was in
force on the 6th of March 1 8 3 8, the time when this offense
was alleged to have been committed, was repealed when
the Rev. Stat. went into operation on the 1 Sept 1 8 3 82 . That if by the saving clause in the Rev. Stat. repealing
the former act for the punishment of crimes the Deft
might have been Indicted, notwithstanding such repeal,
I 840, so
yet that by the act of the
of
much of the Rev. Stat. as prescribed the punishment in
case of Larceny, was repealed, and therefore the Deft
cannot be punished for the offense! . As to the repeal of the act for the punishment of crimes
by the Rev. Stat.In the Repealing part of the Rev. Stat. there is an ex
ception in the 6 th Section respecting criminal offenses-·
It is in these words-"No offense committed, or penalty,
or forfeiture incurred, under any of the acts hereby re
pealed, and before the time when such repeal shall take
effect, shall be affected by such repeal, except that when
any punishment, penalty or forfeiture shall have been
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mitigated by the provisions of this act, such provisions
may be extended and applied to any judgment to be pro
nounced after the said repeal"Here then is an express provision that offenses committed
under the former act which was repealed by the Rev.
Stat. may be punished in the same manner, a.S if the
former act had not been repealed, with this exception only,
that in case the penalty under the formerly law were
mitigated by the Rev. Stat. that such mitigated punish
ment should be applied-The repeal of the former act, by the Rev. Stat. does
not therefore exempt the Deft from indictment, convic
tion and punishment for an offense committed before
the Rev. Stat. took effect.
2. As to the effect of the. act of the 1 4 of March 1 840. upon
this prosecutionThat part of the Rev. Stat. which prescribed the punish
ment for Larceny, was repealed by the act of March 1 4.
1 84o-And a new provision was made by that act for
the punishment of Larceny-being the same as that in
the Rev. Stat. except that it abolished the distinction made
in the Rev. Stat. between Grand and Petit Larceny, and
authorised the Court to sentence the offenderto imprison
ment in the State prison when the property stolen should
be of less value than $ 1 00 But this does not affect any
criminal act committed under the act in force for the
punishment of crimes previous to the taking effect of the
Rev, Stat.Because all that a party convicted could claim under the
Rev. Stat. was that, if by the Rev. Stat. the punishment
was mitigated, he should have the benefit of that
mitigation-And if the mitigated provisions of the Rev.
Stat. were subsequently repealed, he was left then under
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the provisions of the act, in force at the time the offense
was committedFor it will be observed, that the saving exception in the
Rev. Stat. is, that-"No offense committed before the
taking effect of the Rev. Stat. shall be affected by such re
peal, except that the accused shall have the benefit of any
mitigated punishment provided by the Rev. Stat.
The repeal of such mitigating provisions of the Rev.
Stat. left the offender under the provisions of the act in
force when the offense was committed-and wholly un
affected by the Repeal part of the Rev. Stat.The Dem• therefore is overruledEDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 239, First Circuit-Law. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries: p. 13 (Jan.
1 9, 1 842) question filed; p. 1 8 (Jan. 2 1 , 1 842) submitted without
argument. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the follow
ing entry: p. 1 63 ( March 29, 1 842) Demurrer of defendant over
ruled ; leave to plead anew. Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case
No. 200 ; Calendar, First Circuit, case No. 239·

JUSTUS SIMONS versus ENOS PECK
March 29, r 842.
r . Property was taken from B's possession on a writ of execu
tion and sold to S on said writ while being held for P un
der a writ of replevin issued in an action by P against a
receiptor who held under a prior writ of execution against
B, which action of replevin was pending when the present
action of replevin was commenced by S against P. HELD,
such property was not in the custody of the law at the time
the present action of replevin was commenced; hence it
was error to instruct the jury that the property could not
be replevied in the present action.
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2. In an action of replevin brought under the circumstances
set forth in ( r), supra, the plaintiff should be permitted to
prove that a prior sale, under which the defendant claims,
was made in fraud of the seller's creditors.
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth
Circuit. Error to Circuit Court, Oakland County. Opinion
by Fletcher, Ch. J. Judgment reversed.
M. L. Drake, attorney for plaintiff in error.
G. W . Wisner, attorney for defendant in error.

[ INDORSEMENT]

l

Sup. Court 4 Cir. Jany '42
Simons
vs.
Peck

Justus Simons
vs.
Enos Peck

l

Memo of Opinion
Judgt reversed29 March 42-d.ecided-

"[ oPINION]

This is a writ of Error directed to the Circuit Court of
the County of Oakland, brought to reverse a Judgment ren
dered in the Court against the Plff below, who is also the
Plff in errorSimons sued Peck in the Court below in an action of
Replevin for a yoke of oxenThe Deft pleaded that he did not detain the property,
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and gave notice that he would prove on the trial that the
property, in question, was the DeftsA bill of exceptions was allowed, and sets forth the mat
ters upon the errors [which] have been assignedFrom the bill of exceptions it appears, that on the trial
the PHI proved that he purchased the oxen at a public sale
the 1 Feby '39, made by a constable in virtue of an execution
in favor of Le Roy & Munson and against one wm C. Bower
ing, and that the oxen, by some means unknown to the PHI
got into the possession of the Deft.
And the Pl:fi brought this action-The Pl:fi then rested
The Deft proved that he bought the oxen of Bowering in
Dec• 1 838, or about the I Jan7 '39-That afterwards they
were levied upon by a constable on an Exn against Bowering,
and that the officer delivered them to a Receiptor-and that
the Deft. Peck replevied them from the Receiptor, and gave
bond in the usual manner-That after Peck had commenced
his replevin against the Receiptor, the cattle were again taken
by a constable on Exn vs. Bowering, that the officer sold the
cattle upon that EX" to the PHI.
It was further proved the Repl,evin suit of Peck against
the Receiptor had been tried in the same Term at which this
suit was tried, and that Peck had recovered the property
It was also in evidence that when the Ex" under which
the PHI in this suit purchased the oxen was levied, the oxen
were in the poss. of Bowering.
-And the Pl:ff introduced testimony to show that the sale
from Bowering to the Deft. was fraudulent, made with intent
to keep the property from the creditors of BoweringUpon this evidence, the Court charged the Jury, that the
oxen having been replevied by Peck in his suit against the
Receiptor, and that suit then pending when they were levied
upon and sold to the PHI in virtue of an Exn, and the Re-
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plevin suit of Peck against the Receiptor being pending when
this suit was commenced, that the property was in the custody
of the law could not be sold to the Plif on the Exn or re
covered by him in this action. The Court further instructed
the Jury that .they need not inquire whether the sale from
Bowering to Peck was fraudulent, or n�t, and that the Deft.
was intitled to a verdict.
-To this charge the PHI exceptedOn the part of the Plff in error it is insisted that the
Court erred in giving the above instructions to the Jury.
r . In charging the Jury that inasmuch as the property
in question had been replevied by Peck against the Receiptor,
and that suit pending when this was commenced, that the
property was in the custody of the law, and could not be
replevied in this action2. That the Court also erred in charging the jury to dis
regard the evid. given by the PHI tending to prove that the
original sale from Bowering to Deft. was fradulent and in
tended to defraud creditors! think both these objections are well takenIn the case of_ Clark vs. Skinner 20 John. R. 467, there is a
very full review of the cases showing under what circum
stances property taken on Exn &c is in the custody of the lawPlatt says the Deft in Ex" whose goods have been taken
on a fi. fa, cannot bring trespass or Replevin against the
officer-as to him the property is in the custody of the law
But this rule has no application to the rights of a Stranger
whose property has been wrongfully taken on Ex" against
another personNor can a Deft in Replevin, replevy the property from the
PlffBut a third person mayThe first point being sustained, the 2d is of course, because
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if the Plff could maintain the action, he had a right to show
that Deft claimed the property under a fraudulent saleJudgt reversed--case remand with directions that a
de novo be awarded-

vemre

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 2 3 I , First Circuit-Law.
Other papers will be found in file No. J4., Fourth Circuit, and in file
No. 20I, First Circuit-Law. The Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains
the following entry : p. I 2 (Jan. I 8, I 842) argued and submitted.
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry :
p. . I 6o (March 29, I 842) judgment reversed ; venire de novo.
Also see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case No. I 4 ; Calendar, First
Circuit, Vol. I, case 2 3 1 .

JAMES SLAUGHTER versus PEOPLE
March 29, I 842.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to Mayor's
Court, Detroit. Opinion by Whipple, J. Judgment reversed.
G. A. O'Keeffe & G. C. Bates, attorneys for plaintiff.
J. A. Van Dyke, attorney for defendants.
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in the above case is in
file No. 20I, First Circuit-Law. In printed form, it appears in a
footnote in 2 Douglass (Mich.) 334 ( I 849) ; also, in By-Ltn��s tmd
Ordintmces of the City of Detroit, 1842 (Burton Historical Collec
tion, Public Library, Detroit) . It deals with the constitutionality of
prosecutions by complaint instead of by indictment. Volume I of the
Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 7 5 (Aug. 7,
I 8 39) motion to change name of defendant from City of Detroit
to People of the State of Michigan; p. 7 6 (Aug. 8, I 839) motion
granted ; p. I 38 (Jan. I 4, I 842) motion to quash writ of certiorari ;
p. I 40 (Feb. 2, I 842) argued and submitted ; p. I 5 8 (March 29,
I 842) judgment reversed. Also, see Calendar, First Circuit-Law,
Vol. I, case No. 201 .

TAYLOR v. B EACH
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ELISHA TAYLOR versus ELISHA BEACH
and HARVEY PARKE
March 29, 1 842.

Testimony by an employee of a bank that it was his uniform
practice to demand payment of promissory notes held b'y the
bank on their due dates, and, on the same dates, to give notice
of nonpayment to each indorser either in person or by leaving
notice at his place of business or dwelling house if residing
in the village, or by mail if residing outside the village, plus
testimony that the witness knew from a memorandum at
tached to the note sued on in this case that it was protested on
the day it became due, is "no evidence at all" that notice of
nonpayment was given to the defendants who are sued as
indorsers of said note.
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County;
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J.
Certified by Supreme Court that a new trial should be
granted.
Hunt & Watson, attorneys for plaintiff.
M. L. Drake, attorney for defendants.

[ INDORSEMENT]

l

Sup. Court. 4th Cir.
Jan1 '42
Taylor
vs.
Beach et al

Mem0 of opinion
2 9 March '42
Verdict set aside &
venire de novo
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Elisha Taylor
vs.
Elisha Beach &
Harvey Parke

l

This case was reserved and certified to this Court from
the Oakland Circuit by the Presiding Judge of that Court.,
and presents a single question whether the evidence given on
the trial to prove notice to the Defts who were sued as
Indorsers of a promissory note, of the non payment of the
note by the maker.
A verdict was taken for the Plff, subj ect to the opinion of
this Court on this questionThe note was discounted at the Bank of Pontiac, and was
there at maturityThe evidence to prove the notice, was the Deposition of
Mr. Vandevanter, and is as follows.-"! cannot recollect
particularly whether I did, or did not, give notice of the
nonpayment of the note to the said Defendants-["]
[ " ] There is no memorandum on said note by which I can
tell positively whether I did, or did not give said notice to said
indorsers- [ "]
- [ " ] It was at the time the said note matured, the prac
tices in said Bank of Pontiac, for me to demand payment, and
give notice of the non payment to endorsers, on all notes
which fell due at the said Bank-Sherman Stevens was at
that time, an officer of the said Bank, and a Notary Public, and
it was the common practice for said Stevens to leave with me
certifi.cates of protest, signed by him, to be annexed to notes
which should fall due at said Bank in his absence from the
Bank-And when notes so fell due in his absence, and not
paid, it was the uniform practice for me to demand payment
of said notes, and give notice of nonpayment to the indorsers
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on the day the note or notes matured-And whenever notice
of nonpayment was served by me, it was done by delivering
the same to the indorser personally, or by leaving the same
at his place of business or dwelling house, if he resided in the
village of Pontiac-and if he did not reside in said village,
to deposite the said notice in the Post office, directed to the
Post office nearest the residence of such indorser-From a
memorandum on the back of the certificate of Protest, in my
handwriting, it appears that the said note hereto annexed,
was protested at said Bank ; and from the practice prevailing
in said Bank, at the time said note matured, my best impres
sion is that the said note was protested by me, and that I
gave notice of the non payment thereof to the Deft-E.
Beach by delivering the same in writing to him personally,
or at his dwelling house in Pontiac, on the day the said note
mature ; and to the Deft. H. Parke by leaving the said notice
at the Post office at Pontiac, directed to said H. Parke at his
place of residence"This is all the evidence of notice to the DeftsFor the Plff it is contended that this evidence was compe
tent for the jury to pass upon, and they having found that
notice was given, it is conclusiveBut whether the evidence was sufficient is not exclusively
for the jury to determine-and as the question was reserved
by the Judge on the trial, the question now is what direction
this Court would give to the Jury if the case were now here
on trialThe witness�s swearing to his belief, which belief is
founded upon the practice in the Bank or the general course of
business has never been held sufficient-Some act done is re
quired to be shown before such general practice can be per
mitted to be allowed as a ground of beliefSmedes vs. Utica Bank-20 John. 3 72.
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Halliday vs. Martinet 20 John. r 6 8Where the evid. of notice was quite similar to the evid.
in this case-In that case a memo of notice made by a person
in the office of a Notary Public of notice left at post office
But the persons who made the memo being called as a wit.
could not recollect any thing upon the subj ect-Who put
. the
letter in the post office, or how it was directed,-He further said that it was the custom of the office to leave
notice at the residence of the indorser, if they could learn
where it was, and if they could not discover it, to put a
notice for him in the post office ; and that he had no doubt
that inquiry was made for the residence of the indorser, and
that it could not be ascertained ; but he could not say that such
inquiry was made by him, or any other person.
The Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court says
"If the Notary has stated, that the indorser could not be
found, he would have would have made out sufficient to
entitle the Plff to recover; but to charge a party on a contract
which is conditional in its nature, and creates no liability until
certain precedent acts are performed, by merely proving the
general practice of the office in other cases, accompanied by
the opinion of a witness, not resting on any recollection or
knowledge, but manifestly derived from such usual practice
only, would, in my opinion, be dangerous and unjust. There
could be no security in the administration or Justice, if such
an innovation on the rules of evidence should receive the
sanction of our Courts."
In the present case the evid. is even less than it was in the
case of Halliday vs. Martinet, last citedThe witness does not refer to a fact or circumstance with
in his knowledge or recollection respecting the notice to the
Defts-He says that from a memo which he found on the
back of the certificate of Protest, in his own handwriting, it
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appears that the · note was protested at the Bank, the day it
became due-Even this does not relate to the notice to the
indorsers-And the whole of his testimony in relation to the
notice is his belief founded, and so stated by him to be, solely
on the general practice prevailing in the Bank at the timeThere was no evidence at all upon the subj ect, and the
jury could make no inference or presumption in the case
-Verdict set aside-VENIRE DE NOVO
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher was found in file No. 229 ; First Circuit-Law. The
certificate of question reserved is in file No. 260, Fourth Circuit. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 14· (Jan.
I 9, I 842) reserved question filed; p. I 8 (Jan. 2 I , I 842) argued and
submitted. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the
following entry : p. I 59 (March 2 9, I 842) certified that the evidence
was insufficient to support proof of notice and that a new trial should
be awarded. Also, see Calendar, Fourth Circuit, case 260 ; Calendar,
First Circuit, Vol. I, case 229.

JOHN CHAMBERLIN versus CULLEN BROWN
March 3 I, I 842.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to two justices
of the peace, Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J.
Judgment affirmed.
A. & H. H. Emmons, attorneys for plaintiff.
D. Stuart, attorney for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : A copy of the opinion in this case, in Harring
ton's handwriting, will be found in file No. I 95, First Circuit-Law.
In printed form, it appears in a footnote in 2 Douglass ( Mich.) I 20
(I 849) . It deals with notices to quit, forcible entry and detainer,
function of juries in justices' courts, etc. Journal I, First Circuit,
contains the following entries: p. I 46 ( Feb. 4, I 842) rule for further
return ; p. I 5 2 (Feb. 1 1 , I 84 2 ) motion to expunge part of return ;
p. I 53 (Feb. I 2, 1842) ; part of return ordered expunged ; case
argued and submitted ; p. I67 (March 3 I , I 842) judgment affirmed,
Also, see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case 1 9 5 .
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JAMES L. LOCKWOOD and HIRAM BARRETT
versus JOHN SCUDDER and EDWIN WILCOX
March 3 1 , 1 842.

Although it appears that a writ of attachment directed to
the sheriff of another county was levied by summoning a per
son of that country who appeared and admitted that he had
money and effects belonging to the defendants, the court is
without jurisdiction to render judgment unless it appears that
a writ of attachment "!las first directed to the sheriff of the
county in which . the attachment suit was commenced and
levied on property in that county. A suii in attachment must
be "pending" before a writ may be issued to another county.
(Revised Statutes of I 838, p. sri.)
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Question reserved by Cir
cuit Court, Wayne County; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Certified by Supreme Court that
motion to quash attachment and subsequent proceedings
should be granted.
J. G. Atterbury, attorney for plaintiff.
A. D. Fraser, attorney for defendant.
[INDORSEMENT)

�

,
Sup. Court I st Cir. Jan" 42
Lockwood et al
vs.
Scudder et al

-

Mo. to quash
AttachmentMemo of opinion
29 March '42
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(OPINION]
James L. Lockwood &
Hiram Barrett
vs.
John H. Scudder &
Edwin Wilcox
Motion to quash and set aside proceedings on a writ of
Attachment. Certified from Wayne Circuit, Court, on a
statement of Facts agreed upon by the Attys of the parties.
From the facts agreed on it appears that the Plffs on the
2 Feby '41, obtained from the Clerk of the Cir. Court of
Wayne Co. on the usual affidt--of indebtness and that Defts
were non residents a writ of Attach. against the Deft, re
turnable the next May term-And afterwards on the same
day, filed an affidt that Defts had property in the County
of Hillsdale, and another affidt that Henry A. Delavan of the
Co. of Hillsdale, had monies & effects in his hands belonging
to the Defts-And upon these affidt"--obtained another writ
of Attacht directed to the Shff of Hillsdale County and re
turnable at the said May term. To the the first writ, directed
to the Shff of Wayne County, the Shff returned that he could
find no goods, &"&" in the County where onto levy the At
tachtUnder the 2 d writ of Attacht directed to the Shff of Hills
dale, H. A. Delavan was summoned as Garnishee, and on the
return of the writ appeared and admitted that he had moneys
and effects of Defts in his handsAt the May Term '41 the Defts Atty moved the Court
below to quash & set aside all the proceedings.
The grounds relied upon in support of this mo. are
I . That as the writ directed to the Shff of Wayne Co. was
not levied on any property, the second writ directed to the
Shff of Hillsdale Co. was issued without any authority of
law·
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2. That the Cir. Court for the County of Wayne could only
acquire jurisdiction of the cause by return of the writ of
Attacht upon property within that County, and as no property
was attached on that writ, or any other proceedings had upon
it, by which the Cir. Court could acquire jurisdiction, that
Court cannot take jurisdiction of the cause in virtue of the
issuing and service of the writ directed to Hillsdale Co.
3· That if the writ of Attacht issued to the County of Hills
dale was regularly issued, yet the Plffs could not on such
writ, proceed against the rights, credits &" in the hands of the
Garnishee, but could only proceed to attach the lands, tene
ments, goods or chattels of the Defts situate in that CountyIn opposition to the motion, and in support of the pro
ceedings it is contended
That the Stat. authorised the issuing of the second writ of
Attach\ on the taking of the writ of Attach t in the proper
County; and that the jurisdiction of the Court over the cause
on the service of the 2 d writ, was not dependent upon the tak
ing of property on the original writ-And that inasmuch as
the Statutes directs that the same proceeding shall be had
upon the 2 d writ as upon the original writ-The Plffs had a
right to Garnishee any one having moneys, credits or effects
in his hands belonging to the Defts-& that chases in action,
are properly included under terms "goods & chattels" men
tioned in the Stat.The determination of the questions raised in this case will
depend upon the construction of the Stat. forIt is not, and cannot be questioned, that the Legislature
may, if it deems proper, give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court
of any County in cases of Attach t by the service of a writ of
Attachment in any other County in the StateThe first seventeen Sections of Chap. r , Title 4, Part 3 d
of the Rev. Stat . provide for the issuing, and serving writs of
Attachts and the manner of proceeding to judgt-
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The r 8 th Sect., under which the 2 d writ of Attach\ was
issued in this case, provides, that "In all cases of Attach
ments in virtue of the provisions of this Chapter, if the Pl:ff,
or some other person in his behalf, shall make and file with
the Clerk an affid\ stating therein that he believes that the
Deft in Attacht , has lands, tenements, goods or chattels,
situate in any other county in this state, naming therein the
county, the clerk shall, on application in behalf of the Plff,
make out and seal another writ of attacht, directed to the
Sh:ff, or other proper officer of the County in which such prop
erty shall be, who shall serve and return . the same in the
same manner, and under the same liabilities and penalties, as
if such writ had issued, a�d been made returnable in his own
County: and on such writ being executed, the saine proceed
ings shall be had, as hereinbefore prescribed-"
The contingency, declared by the Stat., upon which a
second writ may be taken into another county, is the pendency
of an attacht in virtue of the previous provisions of that
Chapter.
The words of the Statute are " in all cases of Attacht, &c.
seem to me to require that a suit in Attach t be pending-that
property has been attached on the original writ, or a Garnishee
summoned, so as to give the Court jurisdiction, on the origi
nal writ, before another writ may be issued into another
CountyIt does not appear to have been the intention of the Legis
lature to give jurisdiction by the ·issuing of the second writ,
but when j urisdiction has been acquired by an attacht of prop
erty, or by summoning the Garnishee under the original
writ, to give additional and further process, to perfect the
remedy, and reach other property of the Defts.
Such, we should naturally suppose was the intention of
the Legislature, and there is nothing in the Stat. which re
quires a different construction-On the contrary, the very
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language of the Stat. seems to require such a construction
The very language employed seems to require, that, be
fore the second writ shall isssue, an attachment shall be pend
ing over which the Court has jurisdictionThe language is "In all cases of Attachment in virtue of
the provisions of this chapter" - This does not mean, merely the issuing of the writ-It
includes also such proceedings on the writ, as to give the
Court jurisdiction, and when that jurisdiction has attached,
then the PHis may proceed, under the I gth Section, to bring
within the jurisdiction of the Court any property which may
be found in another County-And besides, if jurisdiction may be acquired in virtue
only of the service of the collatteral writ, a suit may be com
menced in a Cir. Court in any County, when there is no prop
erty, and for the very purpose of attaching property in another
County-For in order to obtain a writ of Attacht it is not
necessary that an affidt should be made stating that the Deft
has property in the County.Statutes of this description, giving a special remedy in
derogation of Common law rights, are to be strictly con
strued
Mo. granted-&c
EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in .file No. 247, First Circuit-Law.
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry :
P· I 6 8 (March 3 I I 842) writs of attachment issued in the courts
below and all subsequent proceedings thereon, quashed. Also see
Calendar, First Circuit, I, case No. 247·

PAULDING v. wILKINS

r6r

LUTHER MOSES versus STEAM BOAT MISSOURI
March 3 1 , 1 8 42.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Questions -reserved by Cir
cuit Court, Wayne County ; certified to Supreme Court.
Opinion per curiam. Certified by Supreme Court that
demurrer to plea should be sustained.
_

. . . . . . . . . . , attorney for plaintiff.
. . . . . . . . . . , attorney for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in this case has not
been found. In printed form, it appears in I Mich. 507 {Appendix)
( I 8 5 2 ) . It deals with application of stat11:te giving liens on boats,
causes of action arising outside of state, etc. Volume I of the Journal,
First Circuit, contains the following entries : p. 147 (Feb. 5, I 842)
argued and submitted ; p. I 69 (March 3I, I 842) demurrer of
plaintiff to defendant's plea sustained. Also see Calendar, First
Circuit-Law, case No. 248.

MORRISON PAULDING versus ROSS WILKINS and
JOHN S. BAGG impleaded with ELIJAH J. ROBERTS
March 3 1, 1 842 .
I . A writ of error sued out in the names of two of three per
sons against whom a joint judgment was rendered should
be quashed unless an amendment is allowed.
2. A t common law a writ of error may not be amended by
adding a party.
3 · In Michigan the statute authorizing amendments in sub
stance (Revised Statutes of r'i838, p. 46r) does not apply
to proceedings in error. Such proceedings, in the absence
of usage or court rules changing the common law (id., p.
522), may be amended only in form (id., p. 46r:) .
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Error to Circuit Court,
Wayne County. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J. Writ of error
quashed.
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D. E. Harbaugh & Rowland, attorneys for plaintiff in
error .
D. Goodwin, attorney for defendant in error.

[INDORSEMENT]

� ,

Sup. Court 1•t Cir.
JanY 1 842
Paulding
vs.
Bagg et al

Writ of Error

Mo. to quash &
Mo. to amend.
29 March '42
Memo of Opinion.

[ OPINION]
Morrison Paulding
Ross Willi�s & John s.
Bagg, Y impleaded with
E. J. Roberts

I

Writ of Error to Wayne Circuit
Court

A motion is made by the Defts. in Error that the Writ be
set aside and quashed, on the ground that judgt in the Court
below was rendered against three Defts, to wit the present
Defts in Error-Wilkins and Bagg, and also against Elijah J.
Roberts.
From the return of the record to the writ of Error it
appears that Judgt was rendered against all the three Defts
below.
The· motion must be granted unless, the Court shall grant
leave to amend the writ of Error, on the motion made by
Plffs in Error.
The only question therefore is whether the amendment
shall be allowed.
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In support of the mo. to amend the counsel for the Pl:ff re
lies upon the Sect. 20 & 2 1 , Chap. 8, Title 2 part 3 d of the
Rev. Stat. Sect. 20 declares that "The Court in which any civil
action is pending, may at any time before judgt rendered
therein, allow amendments, either in form or substance, of any
process, pleading or proceedings in such action, on such terms
as shall be just and reasonable"The counsel for the Defts contend that this provision does
not include Writs of Error, but only original suits pending
in Court and before final judgt therein-in as much as there is
also in the Rev. Stat. express provision made for amendments
in causes pending on Writ of Error. The Sect. 2 1 of the Chap.
above cited, providing that defects or imperfections in matter
of form found in the record, or proceedings, may be amended
by the Court into which the record shall be removed by Writ
of error.
And that by Chap. 4. Title 4· pt 3 of the Rev. Stat. regu
lates the proceedings on writ of error.
Sect. 6 is in these words "The proceedings upon writs of
error as to the assignment of error, and as to the appearance
of the Deft in error, and the pleadings, judgt and all other
matters not herein provided for, shall be according to the
Course of the Common law, as modified by the practice and
usage in this State, and such general rules as shall be made by
the Supreme Court."
We think the 20 Sect. does not relate to amendments on
Writ of Error-The amendments there allowed are ex
pressly limited to amendments before final judgt and the
Judgt in the Circuit Court was a final judgt-The judgt
denominated final, does not mean a judgt on a writ of error
in the appellate Court.
-And the statute having provided expressly for amend
ments in causes pending on Writs of Error, this court must be
governed, in deciding this motion, by the course of the Com.
·
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Law, and the practice and usage in this State-Because this
court has not by any general rules provided for amend
mentsNor has any usage or practice obtained in this State except
the course of the Coin. law practice in this respect.
By the practice of the Com. law a writ of error cannot be
amended by adding another party.
Nor is [it] allowed in England since the 5 G. I Ch. 1 3
which authorizes amendment in all writs of Error wherein
there shall be any variance from the original record, or other
defect.
One case is found (2 St. 682) where an amendment was
allowed by adding other parties ; but this has been over
ruled-2 Str. I I r o-- r Lord Raym 7 1 2 Lord Ra� 1403. &
8 T. R. 302.
In the case of Andrews & another, vs. Bostwich, 3 Mass
R. where 2 only of those Defts against whom judgt was
rendered, brought error, the writ was quashd.
The case of Clapp vs. Bromagham et al, 8 Cowan & 9
Cowan, in the Court of Errors, cited in support of the mo. to
amend, does not apply to this question-That was a Writ of
Error on a Judgt of Partition of real estateThe Petition was filed against Clapp, and others un
. known, which was in conformity with the requirements of the
Stat. respecting partitionClapp, the only one of the respondents named, or known,
brought writ of error in his own name, omitting the words,
"and others unknown ["]-Deft in Error moved to quash on the ground that all the
Respondants had not j oined in bringing error-PHI in Error
moved to amend by adding, and others unknown-The
amendment was allowed, on the ground that it was a matter of
form-merely descriptive of the proceedingsAnd Spencer, Senator, in giving the opinion of the Court,
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said the proceedings below were not according to the course of
the Com. law, but peculiar, and given by the Stat, which de
clares that "any of the parties to such judgt may bring writ
of Error.-The judgt determines nothing, nor can this court
determine any thing respecting the persons "unknown." ["]
The only question which can be agitated in this court re
lates to the rights of Clapp, the PHI in Error.
The practice of summons & severance does not apply. The
reason given why all the Defts should join in a Writ of
Error, is to prevent multiplicity of suits-that is, different
suits presenting the same question, but if the judgt in partition
be final, the same question will not be presented on different
writs of error-But in this case the record is not correctly
described-and the amendment was allowed.It will be seen therefore that in the case of Clapp vs.
Bromagham, the amendment was allowed not for the purpose
of adding substantially other parties, but merely that the
writ might correspond with the description of the cause in the
record-and on the ground that the proceedings were not ac
cording to the course of the Com. law.
This same question was decided in this Court on the 5
March '41 in the case of I ves vs. Chaffee-that was originally
a Suit appealed from a justice of the peace into the Cir.
Court of Wayne Co.Judgt was rendered in the Cir. Court against Ives the
appellant, and Dubois his surety-! ves only sued out a Writ
of Error-A mo. was made to quash on the ground that
Dubois ought to have joined-and a Mo. by Plff to amend
The Mo. to amend was denied, on the authorities above cited
-and the writ was quashed-Mo. to amend denied & the
mo. to quash is grantedEDIToR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 1 68, First Circuit-Law.
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following
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entries : p. I 04 (Jan. 6 I 84 I ) defendant in error ordered to file
joinder; p. 1 08 (Jan. 9, I 84 I ) motion to set aside above order ; p.
I 09 (Jan. I I, I 84 1 ) order set aside ; p. 1 27 (Jan. 5, 1 842) motion
to quash writ of error ; p. 1 29 (Jan. 6, I 842) motion argued and
submitted ; p. 1 3 1 (Jan; 7, 1 842) motion to amend writ of error; p.
1 35 (Jan. I I, I 842) motion argued; p. I 6 7 (March 3 1, 1 842) writ
of error quashed. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol.
I, case No. I 68.

ALBERT H . PORTER and CHARLES PARSONS versus
ARTHUR G. SPARHAWK and SAMUEL
SHERWOOD
March 3 1 , 1 842 .

A person sued as principal, who has defaulted and consents
to testify, is a competent witness for the plaintiff against a
codefendant sued as secondarily liable on the same contract.
Supreme Court, First Circuit, on transfer from Fourth
Circuit. Question reserved by Circuit Court, Oakland County ;
certified to Supreme Court. Opinion by Fletcher, Ch. J.
Certified by Supreme Court that Sparhawk is a competent
witness for the plaintiffs .
. . . . . . . . . . . . , attorney for plaintiffs .
. . . . . . . . . . . . , attorney for defendants.

[INDORSEMENT]

l

Sup. Court 4 Cir. Jan7 I 842
Porter et al
VS
Sparhawk et al
Aynur
. vs.
Knowlton et al

l

Mem0 of Opinion
March 3 1-decided-

PoRTER v. SPARHAWK

Porter & Parsons
vs.
Sparhawk & Sherwood

l

[ OPINION]

This is a case certified to this court from the Oakland
Circuit by the Presiding [Judge] of that Court, and presents
only this question, Whether in assumpsit against two clefts,
and one of them, the principal in the Contract having suffered
judgment against him by default, is a competent wit. for the
Plff to support the action against the other deft, he the princi
pal, consenting to testify?
The decisions upon this question have been somewhat
con [ tra] dictory both in England, and in the United States.
In the case of Chapman vs Graves 2 Campb. R . 333 Le
Blanc J. said "The general rule is that a party to the record
is not admissible as a Witness"-and the evidence was re
j ected.
In Emmet vs. Bradley, 7 Taunton R. 599, 3 of 5 Defts
pleaded Bankruptcy, and the evidence having established
their plea, it was proposed to enter a verdict for them forth
with, and to call them as witnesses, to show that the other two
were not j oint contractors, but the evidence was rej ected.
And in Mant vs. Mainwaring, 8 Taunt. 1 39, a co de
fendant who had suffered judgt by default, was not allowed
when called as a witness for the Plff to show that the other
clefts were his partners.
Dallas and Park Justices, on the ground that he was
interested-But Burrough Justice, said "The general rule is,
that no party to an action can be examined but by consent ;
and all the parties to the record must consent ; and without
such consent none can be called. In this case, he continues,
the codefendants objected, and therefore the witness was
properly rejected"-
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In the case of Brown vs. Brown, 4
Taunt. 7 52 it was decided that a witness
who had suffered judgt by default, could
not be called for the plff to prove the partnership between
himself and the other Deft., because he had an interest
in fixing the other Deft. with a proportion of the debt ; inas
much as, having suffered j udgt by default, if the Plff failed
in the joint action, he the Witness would be liable for the
whole in a separate action.
But in several other cases it has been held that when a
party to the suit had suffered judgt by Deft. and had no inter
est in favor of the party calling him, that he was a competent
witness.
Ward vs. Haydon and another, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 553
Raven vs. Dunning 3 Esp. N. P. C. 25. Buller N. P. 98.
But the latest case I have seen, decided in the Com. Pleas
in England in I 8 3 I , appears to me to lay down the correct
rule.
This was the case of Worrall vs. Ja" Jones, wm Baker &
Ed. Jones, 7 Bingh. 395-Debt on Bond, conditioned for
the pai of rent by Edward Jones, as te�ant to the Plff,
pursuant to an agrt made in Jan7 I 8o6.
The two Jones's suffered Judgt by default, and Baker
pleaded that the tenancy under the agrt ceased on March
I 8 I 6, up to which time all rent had been paid. And the issue
to be tried was, whether the tenancy under the agrt had
ceasedAt the trial before Bosanquet, Justice, the Plff called Ed.
Jones, one of the Defts as a Witness to prove that his tenancy
under the agrt continued to I 829.
His testimony was obj ected to, on the ground, that he was
a party to the record, but the testimony was reed, subject to a
Cited 8 Taunt.
I39
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motion to the Court as to its admissibility, and the PHI re
covered a verdict.
A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the _ground
that the Witness had been improperly reed.
On the argument the cases were fully cited.
Tindal, Ch. Jus. delivered the opinion of the Court in
which he says-"No case has been cited, nor can any be
found, in which a Witness has been refused upon the obj ection
in the abstract, that he was a party to the suit ; on the contrary,
many have been brought forward, in which parties to the suit,
who have suffered judg1 by default, have been admitted as
Wit. against their own interest : and the only inquiry seems to
have been, in a majority of the cases, whether the party called .
was interested in the event of the suit or not ; and the admis
sion or rej ection of the Witness has depended on the result
of this inquiry.
,
The exclusion on the ground of interest is a known princi
ple of the law of Evidence ; and so much did Lord Chief
Baron Gilbert consider this as the only solid objection against
the evidence of a party to the suit, that after laying it down
as a general rule, that no man interested in the matter in
question can be a Witness for himself, he states, that several
corollaries may be deduced from this rule ; of which he gives,
as the first "That the Plff or Deft cannot be a Witness in his
own cause ; for these are the persons who have a most immedi
ate interest, and it is not to be presumed that a man who com
plains without cause, or defends without Justice, should have
honesty enough to confess it." "That a party to the record [ " ]
continues Ch . J . Tindall ["] should not be compelled against
his consent to become a Witness in a court of law, is [ a rule]
founded in good sense and sound policy ; it forms the point
of the decision in the case [of] the King vs. Woodburn I O
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East 3 9 5, and the decision of that case leads to the necessary
inference, that if the party consents to be examined, he is then
an adm!ssible Witness. [ " ]
H e adds "We think, therefore, when the party to the
Suit, who has suffered judgt by default, waives the objection
and consents to be examined, and is called against his own
interest, there is no ground, either on principle or authority,
for rejecting him."
The case at bar is precisely like the case in 7 Bingh. Here
the principal in the contract was called, and consented to be
examined as a Witness. I f j udgt should be rendered against
all the Defts he could not compel a contribution, as it was his
own proper debt. And the only interest he could have would
be in the failure of Plff to establish the point contract, and
against that interest he was called to testify-and waiving his
strict legal objection, and consenting to testify, I may say
with the Court in the Case of Worrall vs. Jones and others,
"there is no ground, either on principle or authority for re
jecting him"( Qn? Judm't set aside? )
James M . Aynur
The Same question
vs.
wm W. Knowlton,
wm Phelps and
Did the Wit. consent?
Olmstead Chamberlain

I

EDITOR's NoTE : The above opinion, in the handwriting of Chief
Justice Fletcher, was found in file No. 249, First Circuit-Law. The
Journal, Fourth Circuit, contains the following entry: p. 1 9 (Jan.
2 I , I 842) reserved question filed ; case submitted without argument.
Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains the following entry :
p. 1 70 (March 3 I , I 842) answer certified to Supreme Court, Fourth
Circuit that defendant Sparhawk is a competent witness on the part of
the plaintiff. Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, case No. 249·

RoYCE

v.

BRADBURN

JAMES F. ROYCE versus THOMAS BRADBURN
March 3 r, r 842.
Supreme Court, First Circuit. Certiorari to two justices of
the peace, Washtenaw County. Opinion by Whipple, J.
Judgment reversed.
E. Mundy, attorney for plaintiff.
E. Lawrence & 0. Hawkins, attorney for defendant.
EDITOR's NoTE : The original MS. opinion in the above case has
not been found. In printed form it appears in a footnote in 2 Douglass
(Mich. ) 3 7 7 ( 1 849) . It deals with forcible entry and detainer,
privity of parties, etc. Volume I of the Journal, First Circuit, contains
the following entry: p. 1 65 (March 3 1 , 1 842) judgment reversed.
Also see Calendar, First Circuit-Law, Vol. I, case No. 242. File No.
242, First Circuit-Law, contains copies of orders made in the case.

Supreme Court Rules
EDITOR's NoTE : The following rules have been copied from
journals of the Supreme Court. It is possible that other rules were
recorded in the missing journal for the Second Circuit. In 1 838 the
Legislature directed the Supreme Court to formulate rules for prac
tice in both the Supreme and Circuit Courts in all matters not ex
pressly provided by law (Rev. St. 1 838, Part III, Title I, Ch. I,
Sec. 5 , p. 358), and that within two years and at least once in every
seven years thereafter, the Court should revise the rules to simplify
and shorten proceedings, etc. (ibid.) .

January 3, 1837.
ORDERED that the rules of practice of the Supreme Court
of the late Territory of Michigan be adopted as the rules of
practice of this Court until the further order of Court.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. I ]
January 13, 1837.
ORDERED that in all cases on writ of Error now pending
in this Court for the first circuit where the pleadings are not
completed, Errors shall be assigned in twenty days from the
date of this order, and Joinder in Error shall be filed in
twenty days after the time hereby limited for filing the as
signment of Errors, where the Defendant in Error has ap
peared-and where there has been no appearance, the De
fendant in Error shall join in Error in twenty days after a
notice served on him that Errors have been assigned-and
when the plaintiff shall be in default under this rule, Judg
ment of non pros may be entered against the plaintiff, or the
Court may inspect the record and enter final Judgment at the
option of the Defendant-and when the Defendant shall. be
in default the plaintiff may proceed Ex parte.
ORDERED that in all cases on writ of Error to be brought
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into this Court sitting in the first Circuit where the writ shall
be returnable on the first Tuesday of June next the plaintiff
shall assign Errors on the day next succeeding the return day ;
and the Defendant shall j oin in Error in two days after serv
ice of a notice that Errors have been assigned, where the De
fendant shall reside within thirty miles of the place where the
Court shall be held-and where the Defendant resides more
than thirty miles from such place, j oinder in Error shall be
filed within such additional time after the service of such
notice, as a computation of the distance of Defendants resi
dence shall give, allowing one day for every twenty miles
over and above the first thirty miles, Excluding Sunday ; and
in cases of default under this rule, the same proceeding, shall
be had as provided in the rule relative to causes in Error now
pending in this Court for the first Circuit.
ORDERED that the first Tuesday of June next Ensuing be
and said day is hereby fixed by this Court as a return day, to
which all writs lawfully issuing out of this Court until that
day may be made returnable.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 2 1 ]

June 2 8, 1837
Ordered that in cases on certiorari to a justices court, it
shall not be necessary to make a formal assignment of
errors in law, but instead thereof a brief shall be made, in
which shall be specified the points of error relied on to
gether with the authorities to which reference shall be
made.in argument : and that it shall be the duty of consel
for each party making a brief to furnish one copy to the
opposite consel, and one for each member of the Court.
2 . Ordered that in cases on writ of error, assignment of
errors shall be filed on or before the first day of the term,
to which the Writ is made returnable, and j oinder in error
I.
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3·

4·

5.
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shall be filed thereto, at or before the opening of the
Court on the second day of the term : and that in cases of
Certiorari to a justices court where errors in fact are
intended to be relied on, the assignment of such facts &
the j oinder in error shall be filed severally within the
times respectively limited in this rule, for filing assignment
of errors in j oinder in cases on writ of error, unless the
court in either of the above cases for special reasons shall
allow or direct a longer or shorter time for filing such
assignment or j oinder.
Ordered that in cases of certiorari to a justices Court, the
Plaintiff in error or his consel, at any time after service of
the writ of certiorari, may serve a written notice, personally
on the defendant in error, to appear on the first, or any
other certain day of the term to which the writ shall be
made returnable, and hear & answer the errors to be as
signed in the cause which notice shall be served at least
twelve days before the first day of the next term, and on
proof of the service of such notice & no appearance being
entered for the defendant, the Court will proceed to hear
the cause ex parte.
Ordered that in cases in writ of error, the Plaintiff at his
option rriay coerce the appearance of the defendant in
error, by a writ of Sceri facias audiendum errores, or by a
personal service of a notice to appear and join in error on
the first or other specified day of the term to which the
writ shall be made returnable-notice to be served on the
defendants at least twelve days before the first day of the
term on which the defendant was notified to appear.
Ordered that in cases, where by any rule of this Court,
personal service of a notice or a copy of a rule is required
to be made, a service thereof by copy left at the place of
residence of the party, with some member of the family, in
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which the party resides, of the age of fourteen years, or
service upon the Attorney of the party shall be deemed
as personal service.
[Journal, Third Circuit, pp. 2-3 ]

January

IJ,

i838.

ORDERED 1 . On the return of a writ of Error or Certiorari,
if the defendant in Error shall fail or neglect to cause his
appearance to be entered during the term to which the writ
of Error or Certiorari shall be made returnable, the plaintiff
in Error may Enter a rule at any time thereafter in the Com
mon rule Book requiring the Defendant in Error to cause his
appearance to be Entered within sixty days after the service
of notice of said rule, or that his default be Entered.
2. The service of such notice may be on the said Defend
ant personally or by putting the same into the Post Office di
rected to his residence, or by affixing the same in some con
spicuous place in the-Clerks office, and upon filing an affidavit
of such service the plaintiff in Error may cause the Defend
ants default to be entered in the Book of Common rules.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 41-42 ]

January

I 2,

I839·

Ordered by the Court that in all cases pending in the
Chancery side of this Court, in which Subpoena has been
returned served, and in which no pleadings have been filed
by the defendant, that the defendant file his plea answer or
demurrer to the Complainanes bill of Complaint within sixty
days from this day; and that the Complainant file his replica
tion or Exceptions to such answer within thirty days there
after.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 59 ]
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February 2 7, 1839.
Ordered that the rules adopted by this Court for the
Government of the practice of the different Circuit Courts
of this State, so far as the same relate to the obtaining of com
missions to take the depositions of witnesses shall apply to,
and be the order of, this Court until further order.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 72]

January 21, 1841.
It is ordered by the Court that in actions of Right made
returnable to this Court at the present term. Declaration be
filed in Sixty days from the first day of the term and Subse
quent pleadings in twenty days thereafter Alternately.
[Journal, Fourth Circuit, p. 6 ]

January 4, 1842.
Ordered that Saturday the eight day of January instant
be a general return day for process issuing from this Court.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 126]

January 7, 1842.
Ordered that in Cases of Writs of Error issued out of
& returnable to this Court. The Defendant in Error may take
a rule upon the Plaintiff in Error to appear and bring in or
file the Record in Two days from the return day of the Writ
of Error-And after record is filed, the Defendant in Error
may take a rule upon the Plaintiff in Error to assign Errors in
two days and after Errors are assigned, the Plaintiff in Error
may take a rule upon the Defendant in Error to plead or
demur to such assignment or j oin therein in Two days. And
in case of Default in either case under this rule on proof of
a service of a copy of the rule upon the opposite party or his
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attorney-& if the default be on the part of the Plaintiff he
shall be non-prossed, and if the default be on the part of the
Defendant, the judgment shall be reversed-Provided how
ever that the Court may, in its discretion, on special cause
shewn, extend the time for either of the said rules and may
set aside any default under this rule.
[Journal, First Circuit, Vol. I, p. 1 3 2 ]

J

Circuit Court Rules
EDITOR's NoTE : The. following rules are reprinted from a pamphlet
located in the Burton Historical Collections, Public Library, Detroit.
The original record of these rules will be found in Volume I of the
Journal of the Supreme Court, First Circuit, commencing at page 68.
[*p. I]

FOR THE

CI RCUI T COURTS
IN THE

STATE OF MICHIGAN;
ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT, FEBRUARY,

DETROIT.
J. S.

&

S, A, BAGG, PRINTERS,

I 839·
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l•lCIRCUIT COURT RULES
Rule

Attorneys to
have agents.
Who may be
such.
How appointed.

Every attorney shall have an agent in each place
where there is a circuit court held in this state, except in
the city or town where such attorney keeps his office. No
·person shall be an agent unless he be an attorney of the
court, clerk of the court, or deputy clerk. The appoint
ment of agents shall be made in writing, signed by the
attorney, and filed in the clerk's office ; and the clerk
shall keep a catalogue of the appointments filed in the
office, with the attorneys' names alphabetically arranged.
Rule

Service of papers.
On whom made.

I

z.

Where the attorney for the adverse party resides
more than two miles from the place of holding court,
service of papers contemplated by these rules may be
made on an agent ; but if he has no such agent, such
service may be made by putting the notice or papers in
the post office, directed to the attorney at his place of
residence, to be ascertained according to the best infor
mation and belief of the person making such service.
Rule 3 ·

Notices to be
in writing.

All notices shall be in writing, and shall be served
on the attorney in the cause, or his agent ; and where a
party who is also an attorney of this court, shall prose
cute in person, or, if a defendant, shall give notice that
he is an attorney and will defend in person, all notices
and other papers shall be served on him in like manner ;
and where the object is to bring the party into contempt
for disobeying any rule or order of the court, the service
shall be on such party personally, unless otherwise spe
cially ordered by the court.
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Rule 4·
Notices and papers may be served on an attorney or
his agent, by leaving the same with him or his agent, or.
with his clerk in his office, or with a person having
charge thereof ; or when no person is to be found in the
office, by leaving the same, between the hours of six in
the !*1morning and nine in the evening, in some
suitable and conspicuous place in such office ; or if the
office be not open so as to admit of service therein, then
by leaving the same at the attorney's residence, with
some person of suitable age and discretion.

How to be served.

[*p. 4]

Rule 5·
Where a party, other than an attorney of this court,
prosecutes or defends in person, the service of papers
may be on such party personally, or by putting the same
into the post office, directed to him at his place of resi
dence. And no service of notice or papers in the ordinary
proceedings in a cause shall be necessary to be made
on a defendant who has not appeared therein and given
notice to the plaintiff's attorney of his intention to de
fend the suit, except where the defendant is returned
imprisoned for want of bail, in which case a copy of the
declaration shall be delivered to him, or to the sheriff or
j ailer in whose custody he shall be; and when an excep
tion is entered to bail, and no notice of retainer of an
attorney to defend is given, notice of such exception
shall be delivered to the sheriff or one of his deputies.

When an attorney
is a party.

When service not
necessary.

Rule 6.
No private-agreement or consent between the parties
or their attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in a
cause, shall be binding unless the same shall have been
reduced to the form of a rule by consent, and entered

All agreements to
be in writing.
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accordingly in the book of common rules ; or unless
evidence thereof shall be in writing, subscribed by the
party, or his attorney, against whom the same shall be
'
alleged.
Rule 7·
Original writs-
when returnable.

Original writs may be issued in vacation, or in term
time, and made returnable in any day in term.
Rule 8.

Common rule.
Special rule.

Common rule to be
entered in Common
Rule Book.
In term or
vacation.

[*p. s ]
Computation
of time.

Instanter.

Every rule to which a party would, according to
the practice of the court, be entitled of course, without
showing special cause, shall be denominated a common
rule; and every other rule shall be denominated a spe
cial rule. All common rules, and all rules by consent
of parties, shall be entered with the clerk at his office,
in a book to be provided by him for that purpose, to be
called the "Common Rule Book," and may be entered
at any time, as well in vacation as during term ; and the
day when the rule shall be entered shall be noted there
in, and the party may enter such rule as he may con
ceive himself entitled to, of course, but at his peril.
l•1Rule 9.
The day on which any rule shall be entered, or
order, notice, pleading or paper served, shall be ex
cluded in the computation of the time for complying
with the exigency of such rule, order or notice, pleading
or paper, and the day on which a compliance therewith is
required, shall be included, except where it shall fall on
a Sunday, in which case the party shall have the next
day to comply therewith. When by the terms of any
order an act is directed to be performed instanter, it
shall be done in twenty-four hours.
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Rule

IO.

In all suits originally commenced in the circuit court,
declarations shall be filed with the clerk of the court
within sixty days from the first day of the term to which
the writ is made returnable, and the defendant shall
plead thereto within thirty days from the expiration of
the 'time to declare; and all subsequent pleadings shall
respectively be filed within ten days each after the other,
until issue of fact or law be j oined.
Rule

Declaration in
sixty days.
Pleas in thirty.
Subsequent
pleadings in
ten days each.

I I.

In suits commenced by the service of declaration,
the defendant shall be entitled to the same time to plead
subsequent to the next succeeding term after the service
of declaration, as is provided by the preceding rule in
cases commenced by original writs, and all subsequent
pleadings shall be in accordance with said rule ; and in
cases against a number of defendants, where process shall
not have been served on all of them, declaration may be
filed against all the defendants, and a copy thereof
served on the defendant or defendants not served with
process, and such defendant or defendants shall plead
thereto in thirty days after notice of the filing thereof
and service of such copy, and in case such defendant or
defendants shall not plead thereto in such time, the
plaintiff, on affidavit filed of such service, may enter
the appearance and default of such defendant or de
fendants ; subsequent pleadings to be filed in ten days
each consecutively, as under the preceding rules.
Rule

Time for filing
pleadings.

Suits by
declaration.
Time to file
plea to.

When all the
defend'ts not
served with process.

How to proceed
against.

I 2.

When an attorney is retained to defend a cause,
notice of retainer shall be served on the plaintiff's at-

Notice of retainer.
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torney within fifty days from the first day of the term
to which the writ is made returnable ; and in cases com
menced by declaration, within fifty days from the first
day of the next succeeding after service thereof.
Rule 1 3 .
VVhen the defend
ant's attorney to be
served with copy of
declaration.
[*p. 6]

When the plaintiff's attorney receives notice of re
tainer, as is provided in the preceding rule, he shall, at
or before the time limited for filing £•1declaration,
serve a copy thereof on the defendant's attorney; and if
such notice of retainer be not received until after the
time above stated, then a copy of such declaration shall
be served within ten days after receiving such notice.
Rule 1 4.

VVhen copies of
pleading to be
served.

After the service of a copy of such declaration, the
party filing any pleading, whether plaintiff or defend
ant, shall, on or before the day limited for filing any
such, serve a copy of such pleading on the attorney of
the opposite party.
Rule

VVhen no special
bail filed.

Defendants cannot
plead or take
default.

Defendn't accepting
service.

r s.

When a defendant has been taken upon a capias ad
respondendum, and has given satisfactory appearance
bail, the plaintiff may proceed to final judgment, which
proceeding shall not release the appearance bail. Until
the defendant has appeared and perfected special bail,
he is not entitled to a copy of the declaration, nor can he
plead thereto, nor take any default against the plaintiff ;
and where the defendant in any original writ accepts
service, his appearance may be entered and he will be
considered in court.
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Rule r 6.
If the plaintiff shall make default in declaring, then
the defendant, or if either party shall make default in
answering, then the opposite party, may have the de
fault entered in the common rule book ; but it shall not
be competent to enter such . default unless on receiving
notice of retainer as aforesaid, copies of the pleadings in
the cause have been served, as provided by these rules.

Default in pleading.

To he entered in
common rule book.

Rule r 7.
The defendant's default being duly entered, the
plaintiff shall not be bound afterwards to accept a plea,
unless the defendant, as soon as he shall know that the
default has been entered, shall serve an affidavit of
merits,-plead issuably and pay or tender the costs of the
default.
Rule r 8 .

No plea to be after
wards accepted,
except on service of
affidavit of merits
and pleading
issuably.

The party in whose favor default shall have been
entered, may at any time after four days in term shall
have intervened, have a rule e!ltered in the common rule
book to make such default absolute, and for such judg
ment as the party is entitled to by reason of the default.
If such default be taken by plaintiff for want of plea,
he shall, by said rule, in cases where it is competent,
make reference to the clerk to assess the damages ; and
in cases where they must be assessed by a jury, said
rule shall direct that such jury be called to make the
assessment.
f*1Rule I 9.

When default to be
made absolute,

The assessment being made as provided by the
preceding rule, the court shall enter final judgment
thereon.

Judgment to be
entered on
assessment.

Plaintiff to obtain
assessment of dam
ages by clerk or
jury.
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Rule 20.
Pleas in abatement
-when to be filed.

Pleas in abatement, or to the j urisdiction, and all
other dilatory pleas, may be filed without any rule for
a special, or a general special, imparlance within the
time limited by the tenth rule.
Rule 2 1 .

· Motion to set aside
proceedings · for
misnomer.

The court will not entertain a motion to set aside
the proceedings in a cause, on the ground of misnomer
of the party arrested, but will leave him to his remedy
by a plea in• abatement.
Rule 22.

When plaintiff may
discontinue his suit.

Attorney to endorse
on pleadings his
taxed costs, and
number of folios.

Motion to set aside
default-when to
be made.
In cases of special
motion, affidavits
and papers to be
fil�d when made,
and to be served
on opposite
attorney.

The plaintiff may at any time, upon notice to the
defendant or his attorney, and on the payment of all the
costs taxed in the cause, discontinue his suit in the com
mon rule book.
Rule 23 .
Every attorney filing any pleading in a cause, shall
endorse thereon the costs allowed him by law therefor,
and the number of folios in the draft and copies thereof.
Rule 2 4.
All motions to set aside a default shall be made and
filed within the four first days of the term next after the
default shall have been entered; and in all cases of spe
cial motions (except a motion for a continuance) the
affidavits and other papers on which the same may be
founded, shall be filed at the time of making the mo
tion, and copies thereof shall be served on the attorney
of the opposite party on or before the day of making
such motion.
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Rule 25.
All motions shall be in writing, shall have endorsed
thereon the names of the parties and their respective
attorneys ; and no motion which is resisted shall be
argued on the day it is made, without the consent of
parties, unless the court, on good cause being shown,
otherwise direct.

Motions to be in
writing--to be
endorsed.
When resisted to
lay over one day.
Unless for cause.

Rule 26.
When either party shall demur to any pleading, he
shall briefly but plainly specify the objections, in matters
of substance, as well as those of form, upon which he
intends to rely on the argument ; and if the l*1pleading
shall be adjudged bad for any cause not so specified,
the party pleading, when allowed to amend on terms,
will be permitted to do so without costs.

Demurrers to be
special.

[*p. 8 ]
If not, party may
amend without
costs.

Rule 27.
The plaintiff may at any time before the default for
not replying shall be entered, if the plea shall be a spe
cial plea, or a plea in abatement, or within ten days after
service of a copy of the plea, if it shall be the general
issue, amend his declaration. After plea, either party
may, before default for not" answering shall be entered,
amend the pleading to be answered ; and where there
shall be a demurrer to a declaration or other pleading,
such pleading may be amended at any time before the
default for not j oining in demurrer shall be entered.
The respective parties may amend under this rule, of
course, and without costs, but �hall not be entitled so
to amend more than once. Under this rule new counts
or pleas may be added.

When plaintiff may
amend.

When either party
may.

May amend, of
course, without
costs.
But once.
May add counts
or pleas.
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Rule 2 8 .
Copy of amended
pleading to be
served.

Time to plead in
such cases.

N o rule t o amend shall be required, but a copy of
the amended pleading, endorsed "amended narr.,"
"plea," &c., (as the case may be) shall be filed and
served, with a notice that the same is a copy of the
pleading as amended. And the time to plead, or answer,
if notice thereof has been given, shall be from the day
of service of such copy of the amended pleading.
Rule 29.

Bill of particulars
to be furnished by
plaintiff.

In cases in which the defendant is entitled to demand
a bill of particulars, the plaintiff shall furnish such on
being served with a notice requiring the same by the
defendant or his attorney, and if such bill be demanded
before the expiration of the time for filing plea, the
defendant shall have like time to plead after receiving
the bill of particulars to which he was entitled at the
time of serving such notice.
Rule 30.

When not furnished
in time, or when
insufficient.

If the plaintiff shall unreasonably neglect to furnish
a bill of particulars, or if the bill of particulars delivered
be insufficient, the court may in its discretion nonsuit
the plaintiff, allow further time to furnish it, or require
a more particular bill to be delivered.
Rule 3 1 .

Bill of particulars
to be delivered by
defendant if set off.

In cases where it is competent for the plaintiff to
call upon the defendant for a bill of the particulars of
his setoff, the defendant shall furnish such on the
written request of the plaintiff or his attorney ; and in
case it be not furnished within thirty days after such
request, the £•1plaintiff may, by rule entered in the
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common rule book, order the plea under which a setoff
is claimed, if it requires a replication, to be struck
out ; and if it be the general issue, with a notice of setoff,
the court may exclude all testimony touching it from
going to the jury. Where the bill of particulars is de
manded and furnished in cases where a replication is
necessary, the plaintiff shall have the same time to reply
that was unexpired of the rule at the time of demanding .
such bill.

When neglected to
be furnished.

Time for pleading
in such cases.

Rule 32.
Application may be made by petition to any circuit
court, in term time, or to the presiding judge thereof, in
vacation, to compel the production and discovery of
books, papers, and documents relating to the merits of
any suit pending in such court, or of any defence to such
suit, in the following cases :
First. By the plaintiff, to compel the discovery of
papers or documents in the possession or under the con
trol of the defendant, which may be necessary to enable
the plaintiff to declare or to answer any pleading of
the defendant.
Second. The plaintiff may be compelled to make the
discovery of papers or documents, where the same shall
be necessary to enable the defendant to answer any
pleading of the petitioner.
Third. The plaintiff may be compelled, after de
claring, and the defendant after pleading, to produce and
discover all papers or documents on which the action, or
defence, is founded.
Fourth. After issue joined in any action, either party
may be compelled to produce and discover all such books,
papers, and documents as may be necessary to enable

Mode of coercing
the production and
discovery of books,
documents, &c,
relating to a suit.

To enable plaintiff
to declare.

Or defendant to
plead.

The plaintiff after
declaring, and de
fendant after
pleading.

After issue j oined.
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the party applying for such discovery to prepare for the
trial of the cause.
Rule 33·
What the petition
must state.

The petition for such discovery shall state the facts
and circumstances on which the same is claimed, and
shall be verifi.ed by affidavit, stating that the books, pa
pers, and documents whereof discovery is sought, are
not in the possession nor under the control of the party
applying therefor, and that the party making such
affidavit is advised by his counsel, and verily believes,
that the discovery of the books, papers, or documents
mentioned in such petition is necessary to enable him to
declare, or answer, or to prepare for trial, as the case
may be.
Rule 34.

Rule granting the
discovery to specify
the mode in which
to be made.

The rule granting the discovery shall specify the
mode in which the same is to be made, which may be
either by requiring the party to [*ldeliver sworn copies
of matters to be discovered, or by requiring him to
produce and deposite the same with the clerk of the
court in which the trial is to be had. The order shall
also specify the time within which the discovery is to
be made ; and when the papers are required to be de
posited, the order shall specify the time for which the
deposite shall continue.

[ *p. 1 0]

Within what time.

Rule 35·
Court to be
governed by the
principles and
practice of court of
chancery in such
cases.

The court, or presiding judge thereof, in granting
such order, shall be governed by the principles and
practice of the court of chancery in compelling discov
eries, except that the costs of such proceedings shall al
ways be awarded in the discretion of the court.

CIRCUIT CouRT

RuLES

Rule 3 6.
Every such order may be vacated by the court, or
the judge granting the same,
First. Upon satisfactory evidence that it ought not
to have been granted.
Second. Upon the discovery sought being obtained.
Third. Upon the party required to make the dis
covery denying, on oath, the possession or control of the
books, papers, or documents ordered so to be produced.

When order may be
vacated.

Rule 3 7·
The order directing the discovery of books, papers,
or documents shall operate as a stay of all other pro
ceedings in the cause, until such order shall have been
complied with, or vacated ; and the party obtaining such
order, after the same shall have been complied with, or
vacated, shall have the like time to declare, plead, or
answer, to which he was entitled at the time of the
making the order.

Order to operate as
a stay of proceed
ings until complied
with.

Rule 3 8.
In case of the party refusing or neglecting to obey
such order for a discovery within such time as the court
shall deem reasonable, the court may nonsuit him, or
may strike out any plea or notice he may have given, or
may debar him from any particular defence in relation
to which such discovery was sought ; and the power of
the court to compel such discovery shall be confined to
the remedies herein provided, and shall not extend to
authorize any other proceedings against the person or
property of the party so refusing or· neglecting.

In case order
is disobeyed.
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Rule 39·
When complied
with.

[*p. I I ]
Its effect.

The books, papers, and documents, or sworn copies
thereof, produced under any order made in pursuance of
the preceding rules, shall £*1have the same effect,
when used by the party requiring them, as if produced
upon notice, according to the practice of the court.
Rule 40.

In action of
covenant motion of
special matter may
be given.

In actions of debt, or covenant, on any sealed instru
ment, a plea of non est factum shall be so far deemed a
general issue as to entitle the defendant to accompany
the same with a notice of special matter intended be
given in evidence, as a defence to the action, provided
if specially pleaded it would be a bar to such action.
Rule 4 1 .

On argument
demurrers court to
be furnished with
a copy of special
causes of demurrer,
and pleading
demurred to.

The party filing a demurrer to a part o f any plead
ing, shall, before proceeding to the argument, furnish
the court with a copy of the part demurred to, and also
of the special causes of demurrer, if any, filed ; and if it
be a general demurrer, a copy of the whole pleading
demurred to shall be furnished, in default of which the
demurrer shall be overruled.
Rule 42.

Application for
commission, to
whom to be made.

Application for a commission to take the deposition
of any witness without this state, may be made to any
circuit court, or to a judge thereof in vacation, in all
cases provided for in the revised statutes.
Rule 43·

What to state.

Such application must be founded on an affidavit,
stating that the cause is at issue, the names of the wit-
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nesses and their residence, and that they are without this
state ; and also that their testimony is material, without
which the party cannot safely proceed to the trial of
the cause, as he is advised by counsel and verily believes.
Rule 44.
Notice of such application shall be served on the
adverse party, at least eight days before the time of
making such application, if made to a judge in vacation.

Notice of.

Rule 45·
When an order for granting a commission shall be
made by a judge in vacation, such order shall be filed in
the office of the clerk of the court in which the cause is
pending before issuing such commission, and shall be
granted only in the like cases and upon the same terms
that the court would award such commission, and shall
he subj ect to the control of the court in all respects.

Order to be filed.

Rule 46.
The commissioners named by the party applying
for a commission will, of course, be appointed, unless the
opposite party object to any [*1commissioner, and show
sufficient cause, by affidavit, when a substitution will be
made.

When any of the
commissioners
obj ected to.
[*p.

u]

Rule 47·
The interrogatories shall be settled by a judge of the
circuit court, in vacation, and a copy thereof, and a notice
of the time and place of settling the same, shall be served
on the adverse party at least four days before the time
designated in the notice.

Interrogations to be
settled by a judge.
On notice t.o
opposite party.
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Rule 48.
Deposition, &c.,
how to be returned.

The j udge may in his discretion direct the commis
sion, interrogatories, and depositions to be returned by
an agent, or private person, or by mail, directed to the
clerk of the court out of which the commission issued.
Rule 49·

Manner of execut
ing commission.

The persons to whom such commission shall be di
rected, or any one of them, unless otherwise expressly
directed therein, shall execute the same as follows :

To swear witnesses.

First.

They, or any of them, shall publicly adminis

ter an oath to the witnesses named in the commission,
that the answers given by such witnesses to the inter
rogatories proposed to them shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth .
Examination to be
in writing and
signed and certified.

Second.

They shall cause the examination of each

witness to be reduced to writing, and to be subscribed
by him and certified by such of the commissioners as are
present at the taking of the same.

If exhibits
produced.

Third.

I f any exhibits are produced and proved be

fore them, they shall be annexed to the depositions to
which they relate, and shall, in like manner, be sub
scribed by the witness proving the same. (This section
must be understood to refer to such papers as can be

If papers cannot
be produced.

produced upon the examination. I f the paper referred to
be a record, not subj ect to the control of the party or
the commissioners, it will be sufficient to annex a copy,
and the original may be produced on the trial, separate
from the commission.)

Duty of commis
sioners.

Fourth.

The commissioners, or commissioner, shall

subscribe each sheet of the depositions, shall annex all
the depositions and exhibits to the commission upon
which the return shall be endorsed, and shall close them
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up under their, or his, seals, and shall address the same,
when so closed, to the clerk of the court from which the
commission issued, at his place of residence.

Fifth.

If there is a direction on the commission to

return the same by mail, they, or he, shall immediately

195
T o whom deposi
tion, &c., to be
directed.
If required to be
returned by mail.

deposite the packet, so directed, in the nearest post office.

[*lSixth.

If there be a direction on the commission

to return the same by an agent of the party who sued

[*p. 1 3 ]

When b y an agent.

out the same, the packet, so directed, shall be delivered
to such agent.

Seventh.

A copy of this rule must b� annexed to

every commission issued under these rules.

A copy of this rule
to be annexed to
all commissions.

Rule 50.
The clerk, upon receiving such commission and re
turn, shall open the same, and immediately endorse
thereon the time and manner of receiving them, and

The clerk to open,
endorse and file the
same.

file such commission and return.
Rule s r .
Depositions o f any witness taken within this state,
in all cases provided for in the revised statutes, shall be

Depositions taken
within the state.

received, opened, endorsed, and filed by the clerk, in the
same manner as is provided for in the preceding rules
for taking depositions of witnesses without this state
under a commission.
Rule 52:
All obj ections of form as to the taking of depositions
to be read in evidence, shall be filed in writing at least
one day before the cause is called for trial.

Exceptions to
depositions to be
filed before trial.
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Rule 53·
Either party may
use the deposition.

When a deposition has been filed, i f not read on the
trial by the party taking it, it may be used by the other
party if he sees fit.
Rule 54.

Essentials of
affidavit stating
advice of counsel.

Whenever it shall be necessary in any affidavit to
swear to the advice of counsel, the party shall, in addi
tion to what has usually been inserted, swear that he has
fully and fairly stated his case) to his counsel, and shall
give the name of such counsel.
Rule 55·

Second application
for continuance,
what affidavit must
state.

When a party applies for the continuance of a cause
a second time, the affidavit must state, in addition to the
usual requirements, the facts which the party expects to
prove by the absent witness, and the diligence he has
used to procure his attendance ; but it shall be optional
with the opposite party to proceed to trial if he admit
the facts expected to be proved.
Rule 56.
Where a rule is granted upon payment of costs, a

Where a rule is
granted on payment
of costs, how
coerced.

served upon the opposite party, at the same time ex

[*p. 1 4]

hibiting to him a certified copy of the original rule ;
! *1 and if the costs be not paid on demand, and proof,

copy of the rule and of the taxed bill of costs must be

by affidavit, shall be made of the personal demand
of such sum of money, and of a refusal to pay it, the
court may issue a precept to commit the person so dis
obeying to prison, un�il such sum, and the costs and
expenses of the proceeding, be paid.
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Rule 57·
It shall be the duty of the clerk of each of the circuit
courts, previous to each term, to make out a docket of the
causes at issue, arranging them according to the date of
their issues, which docket shall be denominated "Issues

Clerks to make out
dockets.

1 , "Issues of fact.''

of Fact ; " also, a separate docket of causes which may
not be at issue, or which may be for assessment of dam
ages, either by the clerk, court, or jury, arranging them
according to the time of commencing the suits, which
docket shall be denominated "Imparlances ; " also, an

z,

"lmparlances.''

other docket of all cases in which an issue at law is j oined,
arranging them according to the date of such issues,
which shall be denominated "The Law Docket ; " and
also, a docket of all original appearances to the term.

3, "Law docket.''

4, "Appearance
docket.''

Rule 5 8 .
Th e clerk o f each circuit court shall make two copies
of each of said dockets, one for the court and the other

Clerks to make two
copies of the
dockets.

for the bar.
Rule 59.
All appeals shall be placed on the docket of issues
of fact.

Appeals.

Rule 6o.
Causes shall be heard according to their standing on
the dockets, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

Order of trying
causes.

Rule 6 r .
On the trial o f causes, one counsel on each side only
shall examine or cross-examine a witness, and two coun
sel only on each side shall sum up the cause to the
jury, unless the court shall otherwise order.

One counsel only
to examine
witnesses and only
two on each side
to address j ury.
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Rule 62.
Who to commence
the evidence.

Order of opening
case to the jury by
the plaintiff or
defendant.

The party having the affirmative shall commence the
evidence, and counsel may in all cases, previously to the
opening of the evidence, make a statement of their case ;
the defendant making his statement immediately after
the statement of the plaintiff, and before the evidence
of the plaintiff be given, or after the evidence of the
plaintiff shall have been given and before his own evi
dence is given, at his election.

[*p.

I S]

In arguments two
counsel only to be
heard on each side.
Order of argument.

r*1 Rule 63.
Not more than two counsel on each side shall be
heard on the argument of any motion, the mover being
entitled to open the argument and to reply to the argu
ment of the opposite attorney. Only one counsel can be
heard on any reply.
Rule 64.

Clerks to provide
"Special Motion
Book," in which all
special motions to
be entered.

The clerk of every circuit court shall provide a book,
to be denominated "The Special Motion Book," in which
the attorneys shall, in term time, enter all special mo
tions to be made to the court.
Rule 65.

Order in which to
be heard.

The motions so made shall be heard by the court

according to the order in which they stand in the special

motion book, unless otherwise ordered on good cause
shown.
Rule 66.
Motions for new
trial, with the
reasons, to be filed
in two days.

Motions for new trials shall be made and filed, with
the reasons and grounds on which such motions are
made, within two days after the rendition of the verdict.
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Rule 67.
Motions in arrest of judgment, with the reasons and
grounds on which they are founded, shall be made and
filed within two days after the rendition of the verdict ;

Motions in arrest of
judgment, with the
reasons, when to be
filed.

or if a motion for a new trial has been interposed and
overruled, then within two days after the overruling of
such motion.
Rule 68.
The time limited for moving to set aside defaults,
or for making defaults absolute, or for filing motions
and reasons for new trial, or in arrest of j udgment, may

Rules in certain
cases may be short
ened or enlarged by
the court.

be shortened or extended by the circuit courts respec
tively in their discretion.
Rule 69.
On the argument of motions for new trial, or in
arrest of j udgment, the party making such motion will
furnish the court with a copy of the reasons on which
such motion is founded, and also a brief.

On argument of
motion for new
trial, counsel to
furnish the reasons
and a brief.

Rule 70.
Whenever

a

stay of proceedings may be necessary

in order to make a special motion, the presiding judge
may grant an order for that purpose ; and service o f

Presiding judge
may grant a stay of
proceedings.

such order, with copies o f the affidavits o n which it i s
grounded, and the notice o f the motion, shall operate

as a stay of [ *1proceedings until the order of the
court is had in the premises, unless the j udge should in
the mean time supersede or set aside such order. But
the proceedings shall not be stayed for a longer time
than to enable the party to make his motion, according

[*p. 1 6]
How long to
operate as a stay.
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to the practice of the court, and if made, until the deci
sion of the court thereon.
Rule 7 1 .
Clerk to endorse
papers filed.
Parties to take
notice of filing at
their peril.
Clerk not to suffer
papers out of his
office, but parties
may inspect and
copy them.

The clerk shall endorse on every paper the day on
which the same is filed. Parties must take notice of the
filing of papers at their peril ; and the clerk shall not
suffer or permit any writ, pleading, affidavit, deposition,
or other paper whatever, on file in his office, to be taken
therefrom without the order of the court ; but parties
interested in any such, may inspect the same in his office,
and take copies thereof.
Rule 7Z .

Cases undisposed of
to stand continued.

All cases not disposed of at any term shall stand
continued to the next term, and shall be considered

as

continued from term to term until finally disposed of,
without any special entry of a continuance.
Rule 73·
Rules, when to take
effect.

These rules shall take effect in the county of Wayne
on the sixteenth day of February instant, and in each
of the other counties in this state, excepting in the coun
ties of Michilimackinac and Chippewa, on the fifteenth
day of March next ; and in the counties of Chippewa and
Michilimackinac on the first day of May next ; and shall
govern the practice in the several circuit courts in this

Proviso authorizing
the circuit courts
to make additional
rules, or to enlarge
a rule in any case
on cause shown.

state until altered by the supreme court, or any two of
the j ustices thereof; provided, however, that any of said
circuit courts may make such further and additional rules
as

may be deemed necessary, but which shall not be

inconsistent, or conflict, with these rules or any of them ;
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and provided also, that either of said courts, or any

j udge thereof, may, upon good cause shown by affidavit
or otherwise, in any case grant an extension of the time

limited by any of these rules for filing pleadings, or for
complying with the exigency of any rule, order, or
notice.
Rule 74.
All rules and parts of rules made anterior to this
day by said circuit courts, or any or either of them, or

All former rules
repealed.

by any one or more of the judges of any or either of said
courts, and all rules of practice which now obtain in any
of said courts, are hereby rescinded, abolished, and re
pealed. This rule to take effect in the several counties in
this state at the times respectively provided in the last
rule above for the taking effect of the preceding rules in
the counties respectively.
£•1R.ule 75.
It shall be the duty of the clerk of the supreme
court for the first circuit, forthwith to cause these rules
to be printed, and to transmit a copy thereof to the clerk
of each of the circuit courts in this state ; and it shall also
be the duty of every such clerk to copy the said rules
in their respective common rule books.

Adopted I 6th February, I 839·

Clerk of supreme
court of first circuit
to send copies of
these rules to the
clerks of the circuit
courts who are to
copy them in rule
books.
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I n dex Digest of Opinions
(References are to pages)
ABATEMENT
Where the only basis for issuing a warrant of arrest against a nonresident
was the fact that he was about to leave the county, the action should be
abated, I .
Writs, actions, etc., are abated by the creation of new courts unless ex
pressly preserved by statute, 4·
Statutes passed in I 8 3 6 authorizing transfer of cases from territorial courts
did not include cases in which the chancellor served as counsel, hence
these cases abated, 4·
Once an action has abated the legislature has no power to revive it, 4 ·
ACTIONS See Abatement ; Forcible entry and detainer; Summary proceedings.
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Where a case is submitted to a trial court on an agreed statement of facts
which does not "contain all the facts necessary to turn the case into a
question of law," the trial court's determination of the facts is con
clusive if the statement contains evidence tending to prove the facts
found, 30.
In the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on a writ
of error, 30.
AIDER BY VERDICT
The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of form which is aided by
verdict, 9·
AMENDMENT
At common law a writ of error may not be amended by adding a party, I 6 I .
Statute authorizing amendments in substance does not apply to proceedings
in error, I 6 I .
In the absence o f ,statute, usage, o r court rule changing the common law,
proceedings in error may be amended only in form, I 6 I .
APPEAL
Prior to I 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an
officer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed by certiorari,
even though the statute authorizing the summary judgment expressly pro
hibited an appeal, 85.
Under the statutes of I 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on
appeal in the nature of certiorari, even though the statute authorizing the
summary judgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 85.
APPELLATE RECORD
Iri the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on writ of
error, 30.
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ARBITRATION
Delivery of an award of arbitrators (addressed to the court) to the clerk
of the court in vacation is a delivery to the court, 1 2 9·
The rule that an award made without notice is void does not apply where
the parties appeared before the arbitrators and agreed that they might,
after viewing the land involved, make an award without notice and
without hearing evidence, 1 2 9.
Where an award is silent with respect to notice of hearing, it is fair and
reasonable to intend that notice was given, 1 29.
An agreement that arbitrators may, after viewing the land involved, make
an award without notice and without hearing evidence, does not annul
the original agreement for arbitration, 1 2 9.
ARREST
The fact that a nonresident is about to leave the county is not a sufficient
basis for issuing a warrant for his arrest, I .
ASSIGNMENT See

I S S·

ASSIGNMENT O F ERROR See Error.
ATTACHMENT See also I 6 I .
Although it appears that a writ o f attachment directed to the sheriff of
another county was levied by summoning a person of that county who
appeared and admitted that he had money and effects belonging to the de
fendants, the court is without jurisdiction to render judgment unless it
appears that a writ of attachment was nrst directed to the sheriff of the
county in which the attachment suit was commenced and levied on
property in that county. A suit in attachment must be "pending" before
a writ may be issued to another county, I S 6.
ATTORNEY
It is not error to permit an attorney to appear without express authority after
he has appeared several times without objection, 9·
If, after dissolution of a law partnership, a client knows that his claim is
being collected by the surviving partner, he cannot recover from the
retiring partner money misappropriated by the surviving partner, 30.
AWARD See Arbitration.
BILLS AND NOTES See Negotiable instruments.
BOATS AND VESSELS See

t6I.

CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM
A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the command of a writ of
capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to the county in which the prisoner
shall be confined, 9S·
A writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issued from the circuit court of G. County
directing the sheriff of 0. County to imprison a j udgment debtor in G.
County is void insofar as it fixes the place of imprisonment, 9 s:
CERTIORARI
An erroneous instruction to jurors that they were bound to allow a certain
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credit to the defendant is not harmless error on certiorari brought by the
defendant, 1 7.
Where there is "some evidence" to support the j udgment of a j ustice of the
peace, the Supreme Court on certiorari "will not stop to enquire whether
it was so full or ample as to render the case entirely free from doubt, 2. 3 .
· On certiorari to a justice of the peace the appellate court need not consider a
point not raised below, 2. 3 .
Prior to 1 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace against an
officer for failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari
even though the statute authorizing the summary j udgment expressly
prohibited an appeal, 85.
Under the statutes of 1 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on
appeal in the nature of certiorari, even though the statute authorizing
the summary j udgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 8 5 .
CHANCELLOR
Statutes passed in 1 8 3 6 authorizing the transfer of cases from territorial
courts to state courts did not include cases in which the chancellor served
as counsel, 4·
CHANCERY See Equity.
CITIES See Municipal ordinances.
COMMON COUNTS See Pleading.
COMPLAINT See r o7, r s o.
CONFLICT OF LAWS See r 6 r .
CONSTITUTION See also 1 5 0.
The schedule of the Constitution of 1 8 3 5 , declaring that all writs, actions,
etc., pending in the territorial courts shall continue, preserves these mat
ters only until the legislature acts, 4·
CONTINUANCE See 1 07.
CORPORATIONS See 68.
COURTS See also r s o.
Statutes passed in 1 8 3 6 authorizing transfer of cases from territorial courts to
state courts did not include cases in which the chancellor served as
counsel, 4·
CRIMES See Larceny ; Malicious killing o f livestock ; Perjury.
DAMAGES
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a ballot
bOJc by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for Wells,
leaving only 1 5 7 ballots for Crary) , evidence that zoo persons had voted
for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation o f damages in the absence of evi
dence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery", 65.
DEPUTY SHERIFF See Officers.
DIRECTED VERDICTS See Instructions to j uries.
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DOWER
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow in
·
wild land, 69.
ELECTIONS
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a ballot
box by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for Wells,
leaving only 1 5 7 ballots for Crary) , evidence that zoo persons had
voted for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation of damages in the absence
of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery," 65.
Proof that a person was clerk at the polls and had lawful custody of the
ballots does not connect him with an alleged "robbery» of the ballot box,
6s .
EQUITY See also 94·
A bill in equity which alleges that the plaintiff assigned a land contract
to one of the defendants to secure him ana another defendant against lia
bility as indorsers on certain notes is not demurrable on the ground that
it appears the assignment was made in fraud of creditors, although the
bill also speaks of securing a retreat for the plaintiff and his family, refers
to a nominal consideration, and alleges that the assignee was to hold the
contract subject to the plaintiff's directions, 70.
A bill in equity which directly charges that a person to whom a land con
tract was assigned for a particular purpose violated his trust by disposing
of the contract in a manner not warranted by the terms of the assign
ment alleges enough to show an equity between the plaintiff and the
assignee, 70.
A bill in equity which alleges that the maker of a land contract procured
from a trustee, to whom the contract had been assigned for a particular
purpose, a wrongful assignment so as to destroy the plaintiff's interest in
the land, and then conveyed the land to a third person, alleges enough to
show an equity between the plaintiff an!f the maker of the contract, 70.
A bill in equity which alleges that the purchaser of certain land knew
that it had been sold to the plaintiff under a land contract states an
equitable claim against said purchaser, 70.
A bill in equity which claims a general right in which all the defendants
are interested is not multifarious although each defendant has a separate
and distinct interest, 7 o.
ERROR See also 1 5 5 .
Where a case i s submitted to a trial court o n a n agreed statement o f facts
which does not "contain all the facts necessary to turn the case into a
question of law", the trial court's determination of the facts is conclusive
if the statement contains evidence tending to prove the facts found, 30.
In the absence of statutory authority an agreed statement of facts is not a
part of the court's record and, therefore, cannot be considered on writ
of error, 30.
A writ of error sued out in the names of two of three persons against whom
a joint j udgment was rendered should be quashed unless an amendment
is allowed, I 6 I .
A t common law a writ o f error may not be amended by adding a party, I 6 I .
Statute authorizing amendments i n substance does not apply to proceedings
in error, 1 6 1 .
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In the absence of statute, usage, or court rule changing the common law,
proceedings in error may be amended only in form, I 6 I .
ESCAPE
In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution, it is not necessary
that the jury find specially that the officer consented or was negligent. A
general verdict is sufficient, 9·
In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's deputy who released
the prisoner on an insufficient bond was interested in the event of the action,
and, therefore, was properly rejected as a witness, 9·
In an action for an escape, it is error to reject as a witness the escaped
prisoner when called by the defendant. If interested, his interest is against
the party calling him, 9·
EVIDENCE Also see Witnesses.
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was
refused, and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove
these facts, z 7.
Whether the declaration of a defendant sued for trespass can be used against
,a codefendant sued as a joint tort feasor, quaere, u z .
Testimony by a witness that it was his uniform practice to give indorsers o f
promissory notes notice of nonpayment, i s "no evidence" that notice was
given in the particular case, I s I .
EXECUTION

In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return a
writ of execution, a justice of the peace does not exceed his j urisdiction by
rendering a j udgment for more than $ 1 0o, 1 3 .
A renewal o f an execution at the instance o f the officer without the re
quest or consent of the plaintiff will not defeat a claim against the officer
for failing to levy or return the writ in time, I 3·
Prior to I 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a justice o f the peace against an
officer for failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari,
8s.
Under the statutes of I 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 8 s.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER See s.o, I o7, I S S, I 7 I .
FRAUD Also see Statute o f frauds.
In an action of replevin the plaintiff may prove that a sale by the original
owner to the defendant was in fraud of creditors, I46.
GENERAL APPEARANCE See Process.
GENERAL ISSUE See Pleading.
GENERAL VERDICT See Verdict.
GRAND JURY See Indictments.
HARMLESS ERROR
An erroneous instruction to j urors that they were bound to allow a certain
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credit to defendant is not harmless error on certiorari brought by the
defendant, 1 7.

INDICTMENTS See also 1 5 o.
Although, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary to allege that
issue was joined in the action in which the perjury is alleged to have
been committed, such an allegation is descriptive and must be proved strictly,

9 7·

An indictment which charges that defendants killed certain hogs of one D.
and did "thereby" destroy the personal property of said D., does not em
brace two distinct offenses, viz., { 1 ) the killing of another's livestock,
and (z) the destruction of another's personal property, 1 04.
INDORSERS

See

Negotiable instruments.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
In an action for work and labor in a j ustice's court, it is error for the justice
to instruct the j ury that inasmuch as the defendant has proved that the
plaintiff received one-half of certain crops, the j urors are bound by their
oaths to allow the defendant credit for the same, 1 7.
Where in an action for trespass there is any legal testimony, however slight,
against one of the defendants, the court may not direct a verdict for that
defendant in order that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant, 1 2 2 .
.
ISSUE

See

Pleading.

JOINDER OF ISSUE

See

JOINT PARTIES

Parties.

See

Pleading.

JOINT TENANCY
Payment of rent to one of three joint owners is a discharge of the j oint
claim, 2 1 .
JUDGMENTS Also see Summary proceedings.
Where rent is sued for in a j ustice's court in the names of three joint owners
and one of them informs the j ustice that the rent has been paid, it is error
for the justice to render j udgment against the defendant in his absence at
the instance of the other joint owners, 2 I .
JURISDICTION
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return
a writ of execution, a j ustice of the peace does not exceed his j urisdiction
by rendering a j udgment for more than $ t oo, I J ·
'
JURY See also

I S S·

In j ustices' courts j urors are judges of the law as well as of the facts,

I 7.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE See also 1 07.
A person sued in a j ustice's court must be sued in the county of his residence,
except, etc., 1 .
I n a summary proceeding against a n officer for failure t o levy or return a
writ of execution, a justice of the peace does not exceed his j urisdiction
by rendering a j udgment for more than $ 1 oo, 1 3 .
In j ustices' courts j urors are j udges o f the law a s well a s of the facts, 1 7.
Prior to 1 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace against an offi-
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cer for failure to return an execution could be reviewed by certiorari,
85.
Under the statutes of 1 8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 8 5·
LARCENY
Repeal of a statute under which a larceny was committed does not exempt
the defendant from the punishment prescribed by the statute, the repeal
ing statute having expressly provided against such exemption except to the
extent that any punishment was mitigated by the repealing statute, 1 42.
Where a statute reducing the punishment for a larceny previously committed
is repealed, the defendant may be punished under the statute in force when
the larceny was committed, 1 42.
LEGISLATIVE POWER
Once an action has abated the legislature has no power to revive it, 4·
LEVY

See

Attachment ; Execution.

LIBEL
In an action for libel (that plaintiff and three others had "robbed" a
ballot box by taking out ballots for Crary and putting in ballots for
Wells, leaving only 1 5 7 ballots for Crary) , evidence that 200 persons
had voted for Crary is inadmissible in mitigation of damages in the ab
sence of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the "robbery", 6 5 .
LIENS

See

1 61 .

MALICIOUS KILLING OF LIVESTOCK
An indictment which charges that defendants killed certain hogs of one
D. and did "thereby" destroy the personal property of said D., does not
embrace two distinct offenses, viz. ( 1 ) the killing of another's livestock,
and ( 2 ) the destruction of another's personal property, 1 04.
MAYOR'S COURT

See

Courts.

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
MULTIFARIOUSNESS

See

See

Damages.

Pleading.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES See also 1 5 0.
A city ordinance providing that "no person shall sell meat except in stalls
rented from the corporation" is invalid, being unreasonable and in restraint
o f trade (opinion of one j udge ) , 3 6.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was
refused, and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove
these facts, 2 7 .
In the absence o f evidence a court cannot presume that a memorandum at
the foot of a promissory note ("At 1 2 per cent int. D.P.") was made
when the note was made or that "D.P." means David Paddock,
one of
the makers o f the note, 6 2 .
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The fact that an indorser of a promissory note received security from the
maker to indemnify him against liability as an indorser does not make
him absolutely liable without demand on the maker and notice to the
indorser of nonpayment, t o8.
In an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against the indorser, a
declaration which alleges that the defendant received from the maker
certain property to indemnify him as indorser and that the defendant
has not "sustained any damages by reason of his not having received
notice of the nonpayment of the note" is demurrable, t o 8 .
Testimony b y a witness that i t was his uniform practice to give indorsers
of proll!issory notes notice of nonpayment, is "no evidence" that notice was
given in the particular case, 1 5 1 .
NONSUIT
The fact that a witness called by the plaintiff on rebuttal testified that one
of the defendants had declared during the trial "that he had no hand in
taking the property" did not j ustify a conclusion by the court that the
plaintiff had abandoned his action against that defendant, u z .
NOTARIES PUBLIC
In an action against an indorser of a promissory note, the certificate of a
notary public that he presented the note for payment, that payment was
refused , and that he mailed notice of protest, is not admissible to prove
this fact, 2. 7.
NOTICE TO QUIT

See t 55·

NUNCUPATIVE WILLS

See

Wills.

OFFICERS
In an action against a sheriff for an escape, the sheriff's deputy, who rel�ased
the prisoner on an insufficient bond, was interested in the event of the
action, and, therefore, properly rejected as a witness, 9•
I n a summary proceeding against a n officer for failing to levy or return
a writ of execution, a j ustice of the peace does not exceed his j urisdiction
by rendering a j udgment for more than $ I oo, 1 3.
A renewal of an execution at the instance of the officer without the re
quest or consent of the plaintiff will not defeat a claim against the officer
for failing to levy or return the writ in time, 1 3 .
Prior to t 8j8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace against an officer
for failure to return an execution could be reviewed on certiorari, 85.
Under the statutes of I8 3 8 a summary j udgment by a j ustice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution can be reviewed on
appeal in the nature of certiorari, 85.
A sheriff, being a ministerial officer, must obey the command of a writ of
capias ad satisfaciendum with respect to the county in which the prisoner
shall be confined, 9 5.
ORDINANCES

See

Muncipal ordinances.

PARTIES See also I5S.
Where rent is sued for in a j ustice's court in the names of three j oint owners
and one of them informs the j ustice that the rent has been paid, it is
error for the j ustice to render j udgment against the defendant in his
absence at the instance of the other joint owners, 2. I .
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A writ of error sued out in the names of two of thr�e persons against whom
a joint j udgment was rendered should be quashed, 1 6 1 .
PARTNERSHIPS
Testimony by a person claiming to be agent that he was "authorized by the
defendants to . . • employ workmen for them" is sufficient basis for in
ferring that the defendants, sued as "traders under the style of the Detroit
Iron Co." constituted such company, 2 3 .
If, after dissolution of a law partnership, a client knows that his claim is
being collected by the surviving partner, he cannot recover from the re
tiring partner money misappropriated by the surviving partner, 23.
PAYMENT
Payment of rent to one of three joint owners is a discharge of the joint
claim, 2 1 .
PERJURY
Although, in an indictment for perjury, it is not necessary to allege that
issue was j oined in the action in which the perjury is alleged to have been
committed, such an allegation is descriptive and must be proved strictly,
. 97·
PLEADING See also so, 68, 94, 1 07.
Where the defendant has pleaded the general issue and a special plea, and
the return of the j ustice states that issue was j oined, the appellate court
will presume that the plaintiff added a similiter to the general issue and
traversed the special plea, 9·
The omission of a similiter is a mere matter of form which is aided by
verdict, 9·
Where labor is performed under a subsisting special agreement, recovery
may not be had under the common counts. But if the agreement has been
fully performed by the plaintiff or rescinded by mutual consent, common
counts may be used, 1 7.
Where it does not appear that a memorandum at the foot of a promissory
note is a substantial part of the note, proof of the note and memorandum
is not a material variance from a pleading which describes the note with
out mentioning the memorandum , 62.
A bill in equity which claims a general right in which all of the de
fendants are interested is not multifarious although each defendant has
a separate and distinct interest, 70.
Proof ( 1) that a plaintiff, in an action on a jail-limits bond before a j ustice
of the peace, filed the bond as his declaration ; ( 2) that the defendants
filed no plea; ( 3 ) that, on appeal to the circuit court, the transcript of
the j ustice stated "The plaintiff declares on a limit bond on file", which
bond was attached to the transcript; (4) that defendants in the circuit
court filed a plea of nil debit; and (s) that no similiter was added, or
other pleadings filed-is not proof that issue was joined in the circuit
court, 97·
PRESENTMENT See Indictment ; Negotiable instruments.
PRIVITY See

I

7I.

PROCESS Also see Attachment ; Capias ; Execution.
All objections to process are waived by a general appearance, 2 3 .
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PROMISSORY NOTES
PROTEST

See

See

Negotiable instruments.

Negotiable instruments.

RENEWAL OF EXECUTION

See

REPEAL

See

Execution.

Statutes.

REPLEVIN
Property held on a writ of replevin may be replevied by a third person, 146.
In an action of replevin the plaintiff may prove that a sale by the original
· owner to the defendant was in fraud of creditors, 1 4 6.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
A city ordinance providing that "no person shall sell meat except in stalls
rented from the corporation" is invalid, being unreasonable and in restraint
of trade (opinion of one judge) , 36.
RETURN OF EXECUTION
REVIVAL OF ACTIONS
SHERIFF

See

SIMILITER

See

Execution.

See Abatement.

Officers.

See

Pleading.

SPECIAL VERDICT

See Verdict.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

See 94·

See 94·

STATUTES

Repeal of a statute under which a crime was committed does not exempt
the defendant from the punishment prescribed by the statute, the repealing
statute having provided expressly against such exemption except to the ex
tent that any punishment was mitigated by the repealing statute, 142..
Where a statute reducing punishment for a crime previously committed is
repealed, the defendant may be punished under the statute in force when
the crime was committed, 1 42..

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS See also 1 50.
In a summary proceeding against an officer for failing to levy or return
a writ of execution, a j ustice of the peace does not exceed his jurisdic
tion by rendering a j udgment for more than $ I oo, 1 3·
Prior to 1 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a justice of the peace against an
officer f(}r failure to return an execution, could be reviewed by certiorari
even though the statute authorizing the summary judgment expressly
prohibited an appeal, 8 5 .
Under the statutes o f 1 8 3 8 a summary judgment by a j ustice of the peace
against an officer for failure to return an execution, can be reviewed on

appeal in the nature of the certiorari even though the statute authorizing
the summary judgment expressly prohibits an appeal, 85.
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
TRUSTS

See

Equity.

See

Abatement.
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VARIANCE See Indictments ; Pleading.

VENUE
A person sued in a j ustice's court must be sued in the county of his resi
dence, except, etc., I.
VERDICT Also see Instructions to j uries.
In an action for the escape of a person taken in execution it is not necessary
that the j ury :find especially that the officer consented or was negligent. A
general verdict is sufficient, 9·
WARRANT OF ATTORNEY See Attorney.
WASTE
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow in
wild land, 69.
WILD LANDS
The clearing of wild land not being waste, it is proper to endow a widow
in wild land, 69.
WILLS
A declaration by a person in his last sickness, which was read over to him,
approved by him, and declared by him to be his will in the presence of
:five persons who signed as witnesses at his request, is a nuncupative will,
and not a written will which is defective because not signed by the testator,
s o.
A valid nuncupative will which purports to dispose of both real and per
sonal property may be allowed to stand as to the personalty, s o.
For the proper execution of a will it is necessary that all the witnesses see
the act of signing, or the testator m ust acknowledge that he signed it, or
declare that it is his will, I 3 6.
WITNESSES
In an action against a sheriff for an escape the sheriff's deputy who re
leased the prisOner on an insufficient bond waS interested in the event of
the action, and, therefore, properly rejected as a witness, 9·
In an action for an escape it is error to reject as a witness the escaped
prisoner when called by the defendant. If interested, his interest is against
the party calling him, 9·
Where in an action for trespass there is any testimony, however slight, against
one of the defendants, the court may not direct a verdict for that de
fendant in order that he may testify in behalf of a codefendant 1 1 2 2. .
A person sued as principal, who has defaulted and consents to testify, is a
competent witness for the plaintiff against a codefendant sued as secondar
ily liable on the same contract, I 66.
WRITS See Attachment ; Capias ad satisfaciendum ; Certiorari ; Execution ;
Error; Replevin.

